Political violence, or terrorism, by State as well as non-State actors has a long history in India. The allegation that Indian Muslims indulged in "terrorism" gained currency with the ascent of the Hinduvta forces in the mid-1990s and because state ideology with the BJP's ascent at the Centre. With even the "secular" media taking on the role of stenographers to security agencies, the idea of Muslim terrorists because an accepted fact, so much so that even many Muslims started believing this false propaganda.

S.M.Mushrif, a distinguished former senior police officer who unearthed the Telgi scam, looks behind the propaganda screen, using mostly material from the public domain as well as his long police experience. He reveals some startling facts and his analysis, the first of its kind, exposes the real actors behind so-called "Islamic terrosim." These are the same forces that murdered Maharashtra ATS chief Hemant Karkare who dared to expose them and paid with his life for his courage and commitment to truth.

This book takes a hard look at some of the major incidents attributed to "Islamic terrorism" in India and finds them baseless.

ISBN-10: 81-7221-036-1
ISBN-13: 978-81-7221-036-6

Terrorism
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MUSHRIF

WHO KILLED KARKARE?

PHAROS

S.M. MUSHRIF
Former I.G.Police, Maharashtra



Who Killed Karkare?

The real face of terrorism in India

S.M. Mushrif

Who Killed Karkare?

The Real Face of Terrorism in India

In a time of universal deceit,
telling the truth is a revolutionary act
GEORGE ORWELL

§

DEDICATED
to the
FATHER OF THE NATION
who, when asked,
"What is God?,"
replied, "Truth is God"

S.M. Mushrif

WHO KILLED KARKARE?

The Real Face of Terrorism in India

PHAROS

First edition 2009
Revised edition 2009

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PUBLISHERS
Pharos Media & Publishing Pvt Ltd
D-84 Abul Fazl Enclave - I
Jamia Nagar, New Delhi-110025, India
Tel. 011-26947483
Email: books@pharosmedia.com
Website: www.pharosmedia.com

ISBN-10: 81-7221-036-1
ISBN-13: 978-81-7221-036-6

This book is also available in Urdu and Hindi from the same publisher

PRINTED IN INDIA
at Nice Printing Press, Khureji, Delhi.

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Preface

This book is a research work based on my long experience in the police service and in the social field, and on the reports published in newspapers and periodicals in respect of communalism and terrorism during the last few years. The main objective of this book is twofold: one, to seek answers to many questions in regard to communalism in India that had been nagging me throughout my life, especially after I joined the police service; and two, to put on record the yeoman service rendered by late Hemant Karkare to the nation by exposing an anti-national terror plot.

One of the factors that inspired me to pen this book was the background provided by the serene and secular ambience of the place where I grew up against the communally-turbulent atmosphere at most of other places in the country. I belong to a place called Kagal in Kolhapur district of Maharashtra, a town having a rural ambience with a slight touch of urbanity, with its vicinity to the district headquarters and also because of its abutting on the National Highway.

In the 1960s and 1970s, when I was a student, there had been frequent reports of serious Hindu-Muslim riots throughout the country, especially in the central and northern states, including Maharashtra. But Kolhapur district was an exception. When most of the places had been seething with communal riots, Kolhapur remained an oasis of peace and communal harmony, thanks to the vision and progressive social, economic and educational policies of Chhatrapati Shahu, the Maharaja of erstwhile Kolhapur State. It was he, who for the first time in the history of India, in 1902 reserved 50 percent of government jobs for socially and economically backward sections of the society, irrespective of caste, creed and religion. As such, the atmosphere in the district had been so secular and peaceful that my generation of people did not feel the heat of communal riots and their catastrophic consequences.

I joined the police service in 1976 as a directly recruited

Dy. Superintendent of Police and in a short span of time was inducted into the IPS with 1981 seniority. I took voluntary retirement in 2005 when I was the IGP of a range and devoted myself thereafter to social work. I was fortunate enough to have got mostly executive assignments. As most of the districts and cities I worked in were communally sensitive or hyper-sensitive, I had a lot of exposure to communal problems.

Coming as I did from a socially progressive district like Kolhapur, the communally surcharged atmosphere at the places of my postings and the deliberate attempts on the part of a section of the society to instigate the people and foment communal riots, initially startled and traumatised me. But, in course of time, I got accustomed to the changed atmosphere and as a professional devised ways and means to deal with the situation. Though it was very difficult for a Muslim officer to work in communally sensitive districts, I could tackle the situations tactfully and professionally and was exceedingly successful in all my assignments. And, it was this experience which egged me on to do research in the subject.

During my tenure as a police officer, apart from investigating the cases arising out of communal disturbances as per the provisions of law, I studied them in the light of the Medieval history, and in the context of sociology and mob psychology. I noticed that the frequent Hindu-Muslim riots were not the outcome of any genuine misunderstanding between the two communities, nor were they the result of some sudden or incidental causes, but the consequence of deliberate and incessant attempts on the part of some Brahminist organisations masquerading as "Hindu organisations" to spread communal virus in the society. I tried to connect the incidents to Medieval history, but I could not find any logical connection. However, when I tried to go back to the history of communal riots, especially of the riots which had taken place in the 20th century, I could fix 1893 as the year from which started the series of riots that continued throughout the 20th century with increasing frequency and intensity, and which eventually resulted in the demolition of Babri Masjid and Gujarat pogrom of 2002. This we may call the first phase of communalism.

The beginning of the 21st century witnessed a series of bomb blasts across the country; their blatantly wrong and exaggerated reporting in the media, apparently at the instance of the premier intelligence agency of the country (the IB), the uncalled for interference of the IB in the investigation of bomb-blast cases with ulterior motives; the self-detected Nanded blast case of 2006; the absolutely honest and transparent investigation of the Malegaon blast case of 2008 by the then Chief of the ATS Maharashtra, late Hemant Karkare, exposing a nationwide terror network; the interruption of the Malegaon blast investigation by the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11 which was a result of the deliberate blocking of an extremely specific piece of intelligence by the IB, the dastardly and brutal killing of the ATS Chief Hemant Karkare; the post-haste appointment of the highly controversial officer KP Raghuvanshi as Hemant Karkare's successor; the doubtful investigation of CST-CAMA-Rangbhavan Lane part of the Mumbai terror attack by the IB and the FBI, with the Crime Branch Mumbai merely acting as a puppet, and so on.

In this book, I have sought to answer the questions which arose out of the above-mentioned developments from the first pre-planned major Hindu-Muslim riot of 1893 to the Mumbai terror attack of 26 November 2008, *viz.*,

1) Why did the Brahminists (who espouse the cause of Brahmins) suddenly start instigating Hindu-Muslim riots from 1893, by deliberately creating an anti-Muslim atmosphere when the relations between Brahmins and Muslims had been cordial throughout the Medieval period and even thereafter?
2) Why did the IB, the premier intelligence agency, keep the government in the dark about the nefarious communal activities of the Brahminist organisations, like the RSS, which had been openly spewing anti-Muslim poison throughout the country through their thousands of branches?
3) When the communal riots had been raging in the country for over 60 years, why didn't the IB control them by feeding the government with correct and timely intelligence and by giving it honest advice?
4) Why, in the beginning of the 21st century, did the IB suddenly start

spreading rumours, in the garb of "intelligence" of potential danger to VVIPs, to vital installations and to religious places from so-called "Muslim" terrorist outfits?

5) Why didn't the IB apprise the government of the preparations being made by some Brahminist terrorist outfits, such as imparting terror training to their cadres, collecting arms, ammunitions and explosives, preparing bombs and even carrying out explosions?
6) Why did the IB keep the government in the dark about the activities of Abhinav Bharat and its plan to establish "Hindu Rashtra"?
7) Why did the IB unnecessarily and arbitrarily interfere in almost every bomb blast case and terror attack case, when its core duty was collection of intelligence?
8) Why did the IB block the extremely specific information about the Mumbai terror attack and did not share the same with the Mumbai Police and the Western Naval Command whom it concerned most?
9) Why didn't the IB keep under observation 35 mobile phones, suspected to have been used by the 26/11 terrorists even though their numbers had been furnished to it five days in advance?
10) Why did the IB get a highly controversial and communal officer like KP Raghuvanshi installed as the ATS Chief within hours of the death of Hemant Karkare?
11) Why did the IB virtually take over the investigation of the Mumbai attack case from the very beginning and why did it allow FBI, a foreign agency, to interfere so much in our internal affairs?

My research tells me that all the above-mentioned issues are correlated and interconnected. The main players in this game have been the Brahminists - a very small section among Brahmins and also some highly indoctrinated non-Brahmins, the Brahminist dominated IB, and a section of the media controlled by the Brahminists. Their main agenda has been to establish total control of the Brahminists over the Indian society. Initially their goal was limited to gaining social and religious control by engaging common Hindus in communal riots. But the response they received to their anti-Muslim campaign was so overwhelming that they

were tempted to acquire political power as well and to that end continued whipping up communal passions more vigorously by raking up emotive issues like the Ram Janmabhoomi. Ultimately they were successful in gaining political power after the demolition of the Babri Masjid which can be called the culmination of their post-Independence communal politics.

Having thus tasted power, the ambition of the Brahminists soared still higher. But the hardcore amongst the Brahminists were not satisfied with sharing power with other non-Brahminist parties as they felt that they could not carry out their main Brahminist agenda with their help. They wanted absolute power. Hence they started conspiring to establish the Brahminist Rashtra in the name of "Hindu Rashtra," by overthrowing the constitutionally-established Union government. Their plan was to cause a series of bomb blasts in the country and blame them on Muslims with the help of their sympathisers in the IB. Thereafter, a section of the media would create a chaotic situation, which would facilitate their takeover of the country. But, fortunately for India and unfortunately for them, their dream remained unfulfilled as their conspiracy was exposed by the Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) Maharashtra, headed by Hemant Karkare during the investigation of Malegaon blast case of 2008. While Karkare was half way through the investigation came the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11 and the investigation was abruptly interrupted. In the attack, Hemant Karkare was killed under suspicious circumstances. The terror attack could have been easily avoided, but for the wilful omission on the part of IB to disseminate to right quarters the absolutely specific intelligence it had received. This mala fide intention of the IB was further confirmed by the appointment of KP Raghuvanshi, the highly controversial and communally-biased officer, as the ATS Chief, in place of Karkare, within hours of the latter's death and by the over-enthusiasm of the IB, the main suspects in the CST-CAMA Rangbhavan Lane part of the Mumbai attack case. This enabled Raghuvanshi to immediately take over the investigation of the Malegaon blast case 2008 and hurriedly complete it.

In this book, I have narrated the above-mentioned incidents in their

chronological order. After analysing them on the basis of newspaper reports and other inputs, I have drawn my own logical conclusions putting forth a hypothesis which was further vindicated by the fact that *whereas hundreds of Muslim boys were being arrested after every bomb blast in the country, the blasts had not stopped but after the arrest of the real terrorists in Malegaon blast case of 2008, they have almost completely stopped.*

I do not know how people would receive this book, especially the chapter dealing with the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, as during the last over nine months since the incident, people have been bombarded with a lot of false and fabricated information, especially as regards the CST-CAMA-Ranghhavan Lane part of the Mumbai terror attack, by the IB and the Crime Branch Mumbai, through the media. I am sure, if you read the whole book carefully, you will find my reading and interpretation much more plausible than the police version. I do not insist that it should be accepted and acted upon without scuritiny. My only wish is that in the light of the new revelations, the whole matter be thoroughly inquired into by an independent agency or a high level commission. This demand has been made, among others, by no less a person than the leader of opposition LK Advani, as mentioned in chapter VII of this book.

So far as the Brahminist elements are concerned, they would react in one of three ways, which has been their set *modus operandi* – either they will totally ignore it (but that is not possible in this case, as the matter is highly sensitive) or they will pick up some emotive issue from the book out of context and try to whip up public frenzy, or they will instigate common Hindus to agitate, hiding themselves as usual behind the curtains, as they did in case of Dr Babasaheb Ambedkar's book *The Riddles of Hinduism*. I request the readers not to react without reading the whole book and not to be taken in by Brahminist propaganda as that would defeat the very purpose for which this book has been written.

I

Hindu-Muslim riots

A new-age strategy of Brahminists to subjugate common Hindus *(Bahujans)*

One may not admit it, but the general public perception, so far as the communal scenario in the country is concerned, is that Muslims in India, by and large, are unpatriotic, are favourably inclined towards Pakistan and are sympathetic to so-called "Muslim terrorists," and that it is for this reason that the Brahminists in the country, supposedly a highly patriotic and nationalist lot, are strongly opposed to Muslims and have been awakening common Hindus and cautioning them against the "danger" of Islam. One more reason that is being overtly touted by the Brahminists for their strong opposition to Muslims in India is the alleged persecution perpetrated by Muslim rulers for over 700 years during the Medieval period.

Before discussing how much truth there is in the above contention, we must know as to who are the Brahminists who have arrogated to themselves the role of saviours of this country and Hindu religion. The Brahminists are a very small section among the Brahmins and a microscopic percentage of highly indoctrinated non-Brahmins, who believe that the castes are by birth and that the Brahmin is the most superior caste, almost divine, and hence is destined to rule Indian society in perpetuity. Now, the million dollar question is whether the Brahmins have been really against Muslims and if so, since when? History tells us that Brahmins had never been against Muslims; but they suddenly turned against them since 1893, which is a landmark year in the communal history of India. Let us analyse this point on the touch-stone of the Medieval history.

It is a historical fact that Muslims ruled India for over 700 years. It is also a fact that the Brahmin dominance over the Indian society

during that period was definitely more unchallenged than it is today. Gullible common Hindus had been totally subjugated by them and would do whatever the Brahmins wanted them to do. Had the Brahmins been really against the Muslim rulers, they would not have allowed them to rule India even for a year. But there is not a single example in the history of Medieval India that Brahmins tried to "awaken" common Hindus against the Muslim rulers or carried out open or underground movement for overthrowing the Muslim rulers. On the other hand, Medieval history is replete with examples of Brahmins having assisted Muslim rulers in managing their affairs and ensuring that their administration ran smoothly. Among the Mughal Emperor Akbar's "Navratna," there were many Brahmins; Tipu Sultan's main advisors and administrators were Brahmins; and even in the "durbar" of Aurangzeb (whose name is very liberally used by the present-day Brahminists to whip up communal frenzy), there were more than 50 percent Brahmins. It fact, it was because of Brahmins' support that Muslims could rule India comfortably for over 700 years, with the tenures of Mughal kings like Akbar and Aurangzeb extending up to 50 years each. The long and short of it is that the relation of the Brahmins with the Muslims had been cordial during the Medieval period. Against this background, the claim of MS Golwalkar, a former chief of RSS, in his book, *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, that "Ever since that evil day, when Moslems first landed in Hindustan right up to the present moment, the Hindu Nation has been gallantly fighting on to take on these despoilers," appears a blatant lie, unless he meant to exclude Brahmins from the term "Hindu Nation."

Even during the period of Brahmin Peshwa rulers in Pune, though the Muslim population was more than 30 percent, there was not a single recorded incident of Hindu-Muslim conflict till the end of the Peshwa regime, *i.e.*, till 1818. In the time of the Peshwas, while Hindu Dalits were required to hang earthen wares in their necks to spit in and to attach brooms to trail behind them so that their "unholy" footprints were wiped out, Muslims were treated with dignity. Moreover, the first War of Independence of 1857 was fought by common Hindus,

Brahmins and Muslims together and it were common Hindus and Brahmins who declared the titular Mughal Emperor Bahadur Shah Zafar as their king. In short, relations between Muslims and Brahmins had been very cordial till the first half of the 19th century, and even after that, and the Brahmins were not against Muslims or Muslim rulers till then. Then comes the obvious question: why did Brahminists take an anti-Muslim stance at the end of the 19th century, since 1893 to be precise, when the first of a series of communal riots which eventually resulted in the partition of the country and which continue till today, was engineered?

To understand the history of communal riots in India from 1893 till today and of terrorism, both mythical and real, during the last few years, we must know the history of the reformist movement aimed at changing the Brahminist social order, which swept the country, especially Maharashtra and some southern states, in the later half of the 19th century.

Brahmins using Muslims as decoys to divert the attention of common Hindus from the reformist movement

From time immemorial, Brahmins have been dominating the social life of India, almost completely. Whenever their position was threatened in the past, they used different strategies and tactics like killing and driving away Budhhist monks (*Bhikkus*) from India, creating caste system, glorifying Brahmins and raising them up to the status of God in the scriptures written by themselves, authoring *Manusmriti* and by projecting it as a divine book consolidating the caste system, promoting and propogating blind faith and superstition in the society, inviting aliens to check native Kshtriya kings, writing wrong and perverted history with selfish motive and so on, depending on the prevailing situation in order to get over the opposition and thus continued their supremacy in the society.

They maintained their hegemony even during the Mughal and British periods by using the same subterfuge. But, in the second half of the 19th century, Jyotirao Phule of Pune (Maharashtra), who was later conferred the title of "Mahatma" for the first time in recent times,

exposed the Brahminists' age-long treachery inside out. He opened schools for common Hindus, the down-trodden and women who had been hitherto deprived of education. He wrote books, songs and plays and through them awakened common Hindus and explained to them how the Brahminists had, through ages, enslaved the general public and how they had been responsible for the suffering and woes of the peasants, artisans, women and the down-trodden; how the Brahminists had subjected the common populace to suffer educationally, economically and intellectually and how the handful of Brahminists had prospered in all the fields at the cost of the rest of the community. His awakening had a tremendous impact on the society.

Motiyated by his movement and the response he had been getting, Shahuji, the Maharaja of Kolhapur (Maharashtra) and Sayajirao Gaikwad, the Maharaja of Baroda (now in Gujarat) not only awakened the people, but based on the teachings of Mahatma Jyotirao Phule, carried out many social experiments in their states at the exclusion of the Brahminists. At about the same time, social reformists like Ramswami Periyar and Narayan Guru started similar movements in the south. By the end of the 19th century, the movement had gained sufficient momentum in Maharashtra and some southern states and was sweeping through the rest of the country.

This development was a cause of serious concern for the Brahminists who feared that if the movement spread throughout the country, and if common Hindus were made to believe that the Brahminists had been responsible for their suffering and woes, they would not spare them and would definitely have their revenge, especially after the British left the country sooner or later. Therefore, Brahminist leaders and intellectuals sat down to think over and devise a strategy whereby they could tide over the crisis, make the common populace forget the atrocities committed by them and would continue their domination over the society. Some Brahminist leaders from Pune stumbled upon a brilliant idea according to which the only way to save Brahminists from the onslaught of the reformist movement and the consequent wrath of common Hindus was to divert the attention of

common Hindus from the movement by creating a Hindu-Muslim divide and making them fight amongst themselves. The Brahminists unanimously endorsed the idea, unitedly embarked upon the project and tried out its first experiment by successfully engineering a communal riot in Pune in 1893 by exploiting a stray communal riot which had taken place in Mumbai the same year over an incidental issue, by provoking Hindus against Muslims. Thereafter, Brahminists did not look back. The open incitement to genocide given by MS Golwalkar in his book *We or Our Nationhood Defined*, by invoking the example of Nazi Germany was a part of this strategy: "To keep up the purity of its race and culture, Germany shocked the world by her purging the country of the Semitic races, the Jews. Race pride at its highest has been manifested here...a good lesson for us in Hindustan to learn and profit by." Thus, the series of communal riots, that started in 1893 and which have continued unabated till today, is nothing but the result of the Brahminist strategy in the current age devised for diverting the attention of common Hindus from the reformist movement aimed at changing the discriminating and atrocious Brahminical social order. In this strategy, the main targets were common Hindus, with Muslims used as mere baits.

Though the Brahminists had started implementing their strategy since 1893 by fomenting communal problems at regular intervals, their activities were not well-planned and well-organised. With a view to implementing the strategy systematically and bringing about discipline and coordination among the Brahminist cadres, the RSS was formally established in 1925. For achieving its objective, the RSS decided to take over two important institutions, *viz*., media and intelligence, which were capable of moulding and influencing public opinion. By the time India attained independence in 1947, the RSS had gained substantial control over these two vital organs. After independence, it almost controlled them fully and utilised them for vitiating the communal atmosphere in the country and, thus, by diverting the attention of the general public from the vital issues facing the country, gained control over all important social and cultural institutions.

Let us discuss here only the role of the media and intelligence agencies, how powerful they have become over the years and how they were used by the Brahminists in the RSS for attaining their social and political objectives.

Brahminist-controlled media

Media is a very powerful weapon in the hands of the Brahminists, and they use it very effectively. They have gained near total control over the media from the beginning and have very jealously held on to it. They are almost omnipresent in the media. One doesn't know at what level and in which capacity they are ensconced in the print and electronic media and who is actually calling the shots. They are like electrons, which are not seen but their presence is certainly felt. Barring a few exceptions, if we read any mainstream newspaper, we get a feeling that some invisible Brahminist force is controlling it. The same is now true of the electronic media. With this powerful weapon in hand, they very effectively control government, politicians, bureaucrats, police, businessmen, etc., irrespective of which party is in power.

The reason for the Brahminical domination of the media is very logical. From time immemorial, education has been monopolised by the Brahmins and hence journalism was naturally dominated by them in the early period. But in the good old days the Brahmins in the media would play a positive role by highlighting social, economic and political issues concerning the common people. Through the media, they would give vent to the grievances of the people and try to get them redressed. They would also play watchdog and exercise checks on the arbitrary rulers and tyrannical authorities.

But from the last decade of the 19th century, the Brahminists among Brahmins took over journalism and used it for carrying out the Brahminist agenda of diverting the attention of common Hindus from the reformist movement aimed at changing the Brahminist tyrannical social order by making common Hindus and Muslims fight among themselves and of continuing to subjugate the society, as in the past. To that end they spoilt the communal atmosphere in the country and misguided

the general public by feeding them misinformation.

After independence, the Brahminists almost wholly monopolised the local vernacular print media. Though by then some journalists belonging to other castes, communities and ideologies had joined the press, they were in a thin minority and hence could not assert themselves. They knew that the whole system was controlled by Brahminists and in order to survive in the system, they had to willy nilly toe the Brahminist line. If someone tried to follow a different line or raised a voice of dessent, he would very systematically be sidelined from the mainstream media.

However, there was some consolation for the reformists, secularists, minorities and the common people. Though the vernacular media was monopolised by the Brahminists, the English newspapers had been, to a great extent, out of their control and hence independent and unbiased. This was the situation so long as they had the main editions published only from the metropolitan cities. But after they started their regional editions, the Brahminists infiltrated into them as well on a large scale. Today, the English press and electronic media are also controlled by them. As a result, the Brahminists, who are well-entrenched in all media, pressurise, almost blackmail, everybody right from the highest functionary to the lowest worker in the government, to the businessmen and even to the common people and have their way.

The Nexus between the Brahminists and the IB

Smooth take-over of IB by RSS

The IB has been the premier intelligence agency of the Government of India. Nay, it has been the eyes and ears of the government. Hence, from the very beginning, Brahminists started infiltrating into the organisation, and within ten years of Independence acquired near full control over the IB. This is a classic example of how a communal organisation can systematically take over a government organisation if it has grit and wit. How they did it makes an interesting reading. There are two types of officers and employees in the IB; some are permanent and some, especially those at the middle and higher levels, are on deputation from the states. Initially, the Brahminists got entry into the IB and occupied

most of the important posts in the permanent staff. At the same time Brahminist organisations, like RSS, started directing the young, smart and dynamic Brahminist IPS officers from various states to go on deputation to IB. Marathi fortnightly *Bahujan Sangharsh* (30 April 2007) reported that,

> After the RSS loyalists having, thus, acquired higher positions in the IB, they also started a system of marking "suitable" officers and picking them up, with the result that some pro-RSS IPS officers went to IB in the prime of their careers and remained there for 15 to 20 years; some even remained in the IB throughout their careers. Mr VG Vaidya from Maharashtra remained in IB till his retirement and reached the highest post of DIB and, interestingly, when he was the IB Chief, his real brother MG Vaidya was the RSS Chief of Maharashtra State... If the list of IPS officers on deputation to IB from various states is scanned carefully, it will be seen that most of them were either RSS loyalists or had close connections with the RSS and were either directed by RSS to join IB or RAW or were picked up by their brethren in these organisations to carry out the agenda of RSS. For the sake of record, some non-RSS officers were also taken on deputation in the IB, but they were invariably given unimportant jobs.

IB carrying out the RSS agenda

As the IB had, thus, been virtually taken over by the RSS, it set out to implement the RSS agenda very meticulously, as if it was an organ of RSS and, over the years, has been extremely successful in its objective of glorifying the RSS as a nationalist organisation and condemning the leftists as insurgents and Muslims as a fundamentalist, terrorist and anti-national community, by following the policy of *suppresio veri, suggestio falsi*, as given below:

1. The IB all along kept the government in the dark about the communal activities of the RSS and of its front organisations; the huge foreign funds they received; their infiltration in social, educational and cultural organisations and also into print and electronic media and, more importantly, the communal poison they had been spreading, day in and day out, through thousands of their branches called "shakhas" spread all over India. Instead, they projected the RSS as a nationalist, social and cultural organisation. This will be borne out by the careful scrutiny of the reports submitted by the IB to the government during the last several years.
2. The IB adopted an entirely different policy in respect of left and secular parties, as well as secular and Muslim organisations. It gave highly exaggerated and at times totally false information to the government about the activities of such parties and organisations, which had been much less harmful to the nation than the RSS and its front organisations. The successive governments, which were solely dependent on the IB for information, relied on its reports and curbed even the lawful activities of leftist and secular organisations and parties by branding them as "extremists" or "terrorists" and eventually marginalised them.

The IB is more Brahminist than the RSS

Over the years, owing to the political ambition of the young generation and partly because of its anxiety to put up a Hindu face to its Brahminist soul, the RSS and its political wing BJP had to do some compromises and consequently, their commitment and dedication to the Brahminist cause was considerably diluted. But that is not the case with the Brahminists in the IB. They constantly remind themselves of the real agenda of the Sangh Parivar. They have been as committed and dedicated as before; rather, day by day, they are getting encouraged to take up more and more adventurous tasks thanks to their ever-growing clout in the government and awe among the bureaucracy. The IB has, thus, gradually assumed the role of the real crusader of Brahminism and the conscience-keeper of the RSS. But for the commitment and tenacity of the Brahminist officers in the IB, the real spirit of the RSS would have vanished long ago and it would not have been possible for the RSS, notwithstanding all its resources and highly efficient networking, to gain control over the society, as it has done.

How much the RSS and IB are indistinguishable is well-illustrated by the following example:

Prof. SAR Geelani of Delhi University, who was acquitted by both the High Court and the Supreme Court in the Parliament attack case, wrote in *Tehelka* (22 November 2008) that "I have seen the intelligence agency very closely. Sitting with them, I never felt I was in a government office of a democratic country. Instead, it felt like the RSS headquarters."

No comparison between the IB and the RAW

I do not tend to put the RAW in the same category as that of the IB, as there is a qualitative difference between the two, the reasons for which are as follows:

1) The RAW was set up about 20 years after Independence by the then PM Mrs Indira Gandhi, and hence it could not be Brahminised as much as the IB, though serious attempts had been made to that end. There have been many officers in the RAW, professing Brahminist ideology, but they can only be called one-off cases. The system as such has not been ideologically infiltrated like the IB.
2) Moreover, as the role of the RAW is mainly confined to Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Sri Lanka and some other foreign countries, it cannot influence the internal developments in the country and hence cannot make its presence felt as much as the IB.
3) Over the years, the professional rivalry between the two organisations has reached such a height, that either does not miss a single chance to discredit the other.

For these reasons, in spite of having a sizable number of Brahminist officers in the RAW, the RSS and the other Brahminist organisations did not consider it as *their* own and hence did not repose full faith in it, though they used it selectively and occasionally. As a result, the IB gradually emerged as the single most powerful organisation.

The Brahminist-controlled IB – a power unto itself

The successive governments at the Centre were so busy politicking and in their routine business of governance that by the time they realised that the IB had been virtually taken over by the Brahminists, it was too late. By then the IB had evolved such a straitjacket system that it was not possible for any government to break it, but had to accept it as *fait accompli*. Though theoretically, the government had the prerogative of appointing the IB chief in practice, the government had hardly any choice in his selection. It has become a convention that the outgoing Director IB nominates his successor and government accepts it without questioning. Barring a couple of exceptions in the past, this practice has been continuing till date. Even if a non-Brahminist chief is appointed by a government, it hardly makes a difference. The Brahminist elements are so well-entrenched in the organisation that they do not allow such *outsiders* to make any major changes in the system and if he is found to be adamant or recalcitrant, they create such a situation that it would embarrass both him and the government, thus forcing him to fall in line.

How the IB controlled the central and state governments and other authorities

The daily routine of the Prime Minister of India normally starts with a 15-20 minute briefing by the Director, IB during which the PM is apprised of the important developments which took place in the country during the last 24 hours, and is also given a forecast of the future developments based on the social, political, communal, and international intelligence obtained by the IB through its sources. The DIB also briefs the Home Minister on a daily basis. The Defence and the Foreign Affairs Ministers are briefed occasionally whenever there are important inputs pertaining to their ministries.

The daily briefing of the PM and the Home Minister by the DIB has been exploited over the years by the Brahminist elements in the IB to the maximum and they very intelligently insulated the IB from the rest of the government and administration as described below:

1) They ensured that under the pretext of "top secret

information," "secret operation," etc., there is no communication among important government departments like PMO, MHA, MFA and MoD regarding matters concerning the IB's activities.

2) They created the impression among state and UT governments, senior bureaucrats, the higher echelon of the police, and even the judiciary, that whatever the IB does is in the interest of the security and the prestige of the country and that their actions have the PMO's nod.
3) By repeatedly using the terms like "covert operation," "secret operation," "counter-insurgency operation," "anti-terrorist operation," "internal security," "international relations" and so on, they rendered almost all their activities non-transparent.

As a result of the above situation, various departments of the central government, the state governments, bureaucrats and Police started obeying the IB's instructions very meticulously as if it were the PMO's instructions. They did not question the IB's *bona fides*, nor did they cross-check with the PMO or HM or any other authority, lest the "top secret information" would leak. They also had the apprehension that the IB might use its potent weapon of the Official Secrets Act 1923 against them if they dared suspect its *bona fides*, or did not obey its dictat. Thus, the cover operations of the IB continued unabated and unobstructed. In the absence of free communication about "top secret" matters, one wouldn't know whether all such operations had the PMO's or MHA's sanction. It could be that the PMO or HMA were not aware of some of them. *Thus, over the years, the cover of the IB's cover operations has become so thick that it is doubtful whether even the PM and the HM can see through it.*

Audacity of the IB

Nothing can illustrate the communal ideology of the IB than the fact that till 1993 there was not a single Muslim officer in the organisation (*Communalism Combat*, September 1993; *The Telegraph*, Calcutta,

18 March, 1994 and *The Sunday*, 27 March-2 April, 1994). Though, after 1993, for the sake of record, some Muslim officers were recruited and taken on deputation in the IB, it can only be imagined, how they must have been treated or how much confidence must have been reposed in them, especially in view of the fact that the officers in the IB had the audacity not to report to a Muslim Home Secretary who happened to be their immediate boss. In an article in the November 2008 issue of *Muslim India*, a retired DGP, KS Subramanian says, "A former Secretary of the Union Home Ministry, the first ever Muslim to hold the post, once complained to me that the IB did not show its reports to him. He was the formal boss of the organisation..."

How the Brahminists in the IB treated Mufti Mohammad Sayeed when he was the Union Home Minister is not known. But they could not have ignored him as his Prime Minister VP Singh was not a person to be taken in easily as he knew the horoscope of the Brahminists like the palm of his hand. During his tenure, the IB would have lied low only to bounce back like a spring-doll after the change of guard.

Government in IB's trap

Marathi fortnightly *Bahujan Sangharsh* (30 May 2008), had reported that,

> The reason why things have come to such a pass, and why the IB, like the ISI in Pakistan has, of late, become so powerful as to dictate terms to the government and at times to blackmail it and its leaders is that in the early 1990s the then PM and the Home Ministry allowed the IB to make off-the-record discreet inquiries in certain sensitive matters and to unofficially keep the telephones of some persons under observation. The IB officials convinced the then government that there was every likelihood of the information of the official interception of telephones or of the formal inquiries in sensitive matters being leaked out and thus they arrogated to themselves the extraordinary power of unofficially intercepting telephones and making inquiries. The IB regularised this practice by manipulating posting of like-minded officials in the key positions of telephone department and

continued it by convention. It is not known whether express permission from successive governments was taken by the IB in this regard or whether the successive governments were aware of it. But this practice is said to be continuing even today. The government, which permitted this practice, did not realise that it was giving the IB a double-edged weapon which could also be used against it. This practice has very dangerous implications as by simply manipulating the posting of an RSS loyalist in a key position in telephones department, the IB can have access to the telephone conversation of any person, however big or mighty he or she may be, and can blackmail him or her no end. Thus, the government has been caught in a trap of its own making.

Moreover, as the government doesn't have any other *alternative* source of information, it accepts the IB's version as Gospel Truth without subjecting it to any scrutiny. In a way the government considers the IB as omnipresent and omniscient not realising that in course of time it has also become omnipotent and has been controlling all the critical faculties of the government and using them for consolidating the Brahminical system in the country. In short, over the years, the IB has grown into a hydra-headed monster capable of eating its own master, *a la* ISI in Pakistan.

RSS and other Brahminist organisations gained strength

With these two extremely powerful weapons – a major section of the media and the IB – at hand, the RSS in a short span of time managed to spread its tentacles through the length and breadth of the country. Today, it has about 44,000 branches (*shakhas*), operating across 30,000 cities and towns. The exact number of its volunteers is not known. It could be in the range of seven to eight million. The renowned writer Arundhati Roy in her article "9 is not 11 and November isn't September" in *Outlook* magazine (22 December 2008) says, "The RSS has 45,000 branches, its own range of charities and seven million volunteers preaching its doctrine of hate across India."

The RSS has the following known front organisations, the objectives of some of which sound absolutely innocuous:

Names of the front organisations and their purported objective/subjects assigned

1) Hindu Jagran Manch – agitational wing
2) Bajrang Dal – agitational wing
3) Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) – political wing
4) ABVP – students' wing
5) Vidya Bharati – educational organisation having 13,000 educational institutes, 70,000 teachers and over 17 million students
6) Akhil Bhartiya Grahak Panchayat – consumer movement
7) Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram – tribal welfare
8) Akhil Bhartiya Sahitya Parishad – literature
9) Pragya Bharati – thinktank
10) Dindayal Research Institute
11) Bhartiya Itihas Sankalan Yojanalaya – historical research
12) Sanskrit Bharati – Language
13) Seva Bharati – welfare of slum-dwellers
14) Hindu Seva Pratishthan
15) Swami Vivekanand Medical Mission – health-care
16) National Medicos organisation
17) Bhartiya Kushtata Nivaran Sangh – service to leprosy patients
18) Sahakar Bharati – cooperative movement
19) Bharat Prakashan – printing and publication of newspapers and other propaganda material
20) Suruchi Prakashan – printing and publication
21) Kokhut Prakashan – printing and publication
22) Gyanganga Prakashan – printing and publication
23) Archana Prakashan – printing and publication
24) Bhartiya Vichar Sadhana – printing and publication
25) Sadhana Pustak – printing and publication
26) Akashwani Sadhana – printing and publication
27) Samajik Samrasata Manch – social amalgamation
28) Vishwa Hindu Parishad – religious wing

29) Vivekanand Kendra – philosophy wing

The list goes on and on...

The RSS and its communal, violent subsidiaries like VHP, Bajrang Dal and Hindu Jagran Manch overtly pledge to transform the country into a "Hindu Rashtra" but their real intention is to establish "Brahminist Rashtra" and to establish the supremacy of Brahminism over the Indian society, not only in the realm of religion but also in the affairs of the State. With this end in view and also, as discussed earlier, to divert the attention of the Hindu community from the reformist movement and from the historical facts of the atrocities and persecution perpetrated by the Brahminical classs on common Hindus and Dalits for centuries, they have been creating communal divide between Hindus and minorities and also driving a wedge, albeit discreetly, between other Hindus and Dalits. Brahminist "volunteers," well-trained and brainwashed in RSS "shakhas" since childhood, catch hold of gullible common Hindu boys and girls and continuously poison their minds against the minorities, especially Muslims and Christians, by giving a perverted and concocted version of Indian history and by spreading misinformation about Islam and Muslims and, in some parts of India, against Christians. They do not miss a single opportunity to create communal tension, with the crowded religious festivals and processions offering them the best opportunities.

Apart from young "volunteers," other professionals and intellectuals such as historians, writers, playwrights, journalists and even public servants who pledge allegiance to the RSS, play their role of vitiating the communal atmosphere and indirectly glorifying the Brahminical traditions very honestly in their respective fields and places. The hardcore Sanghis do not leave a single opportunity to try to bring home their controversial points of view at parties, functions and even during journeys with a view to creating an anti-Muslim atmosphere.

By such continuous pumping of the communal virus by the RSS and other Brahminist organisations into the society, the atmosphere remains surcharged and even a small spark is enough to set off a communal catastrophe. In the riots that follow, Muslims and common

Hindus including Dalits burn their fingers, their families suffer untold miseries, their young boys get entangled in police and court cases and ruin their careers. On the other hand, hardcore Brahminists, who are mainly instrumental in engineering such riots are not affected at all, as the moment riots start they subtly vanish from the scene leaving the Muslim and common Hindu boys to their fate who eventually face police action and court cases for many years. Thus, the RSS and other Brahminist organisations have been fairly successful in keeping common Hindus and Muslims fighting amongst themselves.

The history of the communal riots in India since 1893 has been so vast and complicated that it is beyond the scope of this book to discuss the same in detail. But, putting it in a nutshell, we are constrained to admit that by this devilish game plan, the Brahminists have been able to establish not only social and religious control over the society as envisaged, but have also achieved much more.

Communal riots – a magic wand for winning elections

Even the propounders of this game plan might not have imagined in the dream of their dreams that in future it would also pay handsome political dividends to the Brahminist forces and would work as a magic wand for winning elections. In fomenting communal riots, the Sangh Parivar has not only discovered a potent remedy against reformist anti-Brahminist movements, but has also found a magic wand for winning elections. Even if a reformist movement has progressed up to 80 percent in a particular area, the Sangh Parivar can bring it back to square one merely by engineering a communal riot, as once a communal riot starts common Hindu youths forget everything else and rally round Brahminist forces which masquerade as "Hindu" organisations. This fact was very intelligently exploited by the RSS for political gains. As there was no secular organisation as committed, as devoted and as motivated as RSS to counter its moves ideologically and politically, by using this magic wand, its political wing BJP gained power in many states, and after the high drama of Babri Masjid demolition, even grabbed the Centre. But this situation was not to last long. People gradually started suspecting Brahminists' role in fomenting communal riots and also their

ill-motive in doing so. Especially after the Gujarat riots, Sanghis were badly exposed and they felt an urgent need to look for alternative methods to demonise Muslims for achieving their political objectives.

II

Switching gears

From Communalism to the bogey of "Muslim terrorism"

The 2002 Gujarat carnage was condemned all over the world and the RSS and BJP were universally discredited. The Brahminist forces realised that henceforth engineering communal riots – their magic wand for over five decades – would not yield desired results and would not pay handsome political dividends but, on the other hand, would boomerang on them and would nullify their political gains accrued so far through their communal politics, the demolition of Babri Masjid being the high point of their pernicious policy. Therefore, they decided to switch gears from the policy of engineering communal riots to raising the bogey of Muslim terrorism, and with the help of the IB, and supported by the media, started preparing grounds for the same.

The IB played a very vital role in raising the bogey of Muslim terrorism in India. After the Brahminists in India decided to use terrorism as a new weapon for Muslim-bashing, the IB started spreading rumours under the garb of "general intelligence" about impending terror attacks by some known or unknown Muslim terror groups on VVIPs, vital installations or religious places and thus indicating an increase in Muslim terrorist activities in the country. In fact, there is nothing called "general intelligence" in the intelligence parlance. The very term intelligence means definite and specific information obtained discreetly, which is not to be divulged or leaked out but to be kept secret and confidential and to be worked out and acted upon effectively. But the IB, at the behest of Sangh Parivar and other police organisations at the instance of the IB, aided and abetted by the media, started spreading such intelligence-cum-rumours almost on weekly basis with a view to demonising and demoralising Muslims. This is apparent from following

samples of news items published during the last three years, very consistently:

1. "Madarasas being misused by the terrorists: IB" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 13 June 2006).
2. "Major temples are the terrorists' target" (Marathi daily *Mahasatta*, Kolhapur, 21 June 2006).
3. "Plans of bomb explosion in Ganesh festival at Pune" (Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune, 26 July 2006).
4. "Qaida may hit Mumbai and Delhi, U.S. warning on independence day terror" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 August 2006). (The IB had disclosed it to the media but the very next day U.S. denied this information.)
5. "Car bombers on prowl in Delhi, UK plot leader linked to Jaish" (*Sunday Times of India*, 13 August 2006). (*The New York Times* investigated into the UK plot and declared that it was a damp squib: daily *Sakal*, 31 August 2006.)
6. "Seven human bombs active": ATS Chief (Marathi daily *Pudhari* 4 September 2006).
7. "Terrorists in police uniform may sabotage the immersion procession of Ganapati in Mumbai" (daily *Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 5 September 2006 quoting "intelligence sources").
8. "Possibility of major terrorists attack on atomic energy centres: PM" quoting the intelligence agencies (in all newspapers on 6 September 2006).
9. "All not over yet," warns the ATS chief; says LeT planning more terror attacks on vital installations (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 October 2006).
10. "(Nuclear) installation under threat" – says Shivraj Patil quoting intelligence agencies (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 November 2006).
11. IB chief ESL Narsinham demands immunity from legal action to those fighting terrorism [read killing innocent Muslims] in the presence of the PM, in the annual conference of DGPs and IGPs of the states (daily *Sakal*, Pune and all leading newspapers on 24 Nov 2006).
12. Shri Arvind Inamdar, Ex-DGP Maharashtra who is a well-known RSS sympathiser, immediately supported the above demand of IB Chief and emphasised the need to have a strict law like POTA to fight terrorism (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 2 December 2006).
13. "Goa tourists target of Al-Qaida" (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 15 December 2006, quoting "intelligence agency").
14. "Alert as Qaida targets Sonia, terror outfit is backed by Pak's ISI" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 22 December 2006 quoting Home Ministry source based on inputs from intelligence agencies).
15. "High alert for Dec. 25 and 26" as there was a threat of terrorist attack in Mumbai during the Christmas and the PM's visit. The CP Mumbai alerted all the police stations in Mumbai City. He said that the threat is based on a call from a waiter of a five-star hotel in Dubai that he overheard chat between suspected terrorists (*Mid-Day*, Mumbai, 20 December 2006).
16. Apprehension of attack on prominent leaders by using toy planes operated with remote control device; attack likely during electioneering in UP, Punjab and Uttrakhand; Smt. Sonia Gandhi and Mr. Rahul Gandhi among likely targets; intelligence agencies got this information in the course of interception of terrorists' conversation (Marathi daily *Pudhari*, 22 Jan 2007).
17. "Danger of terrorist attack on team India. Sachin Tendulkar, Saurav Ganguli, and Dravid main targets." The intelligence agencies got this information during the interception of terrorists' conversation. Union Home Secretary Shri Duggal has written to Chief Secretary, Orissa and cautioned him (daily *Pudhari*, 23 January 2007). While reporting the same news items, the daily *Sakal*, Pune, has stated in its issue of 23 January 2007 that the Times Now TV Channel has given

this information quoting "intelligence sources."

18. "Timers of Samjhauta same as Malegaon ones" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 24 February 2007, quoting a Gujarat Police team camping at Patiala, who *were not investigating the case* but blamed Lashkar-e-Toiba and SIMI for the terror attacks).
19. "Terrorists have chemical bombs, possibility of attack in October" (daily *Pudhari*, Kolhapur, quoting "police sources").
20. "Terror outfits playing in Stock Markets: National Security Advisor" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 15 February 2007).
21. "Liquid bomb is the new terror device" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 27 May 2007 quoting "security agencies").
22. "Now Harkat's attention on Gujarat?" (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 28 May 2007 quoting "intelligence agency").
23. "Al Qaida outfit wages war against India" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 9 June 2007, and daily *Sakal* Pune, 9 June 2007). (This information appears to be spread by the IB merely on the basis of a letter and a CD received by a local news agency, CNS, in Srinagar by an unknown outfit which called itself "Al Qaida-i-Hind".)
24. "Centre puts states on alert" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 September 2007, and daily *Sakal*, Pune, 4 September 2007). (The officials later clarified that the alert was "non-specific," and not based on any hard information. It was just a warning in view of ensuring Janmashtami and Ganesh Festival.)
25. "Shirdi-Trimbakeshwar on hit list" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 17 September 2007, quoting Spl. IGP Nasik Range whose information was based on IB's report).
26. "Red-alert in Mumbai, Hyderabad, following an information of "human bomb" (*Sakal*, Pune, 6 October 2007, quoting "intelligence agencies").
27. "Jaish planned grenade-garland for Rahul Gandhi, say police" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 November 2007 and *Sakal*, Pune, 23 November 2007, on the basis of information

given by the IB and the U.P. Police).

28. "Al Qaida's threat to Mahant Nrityagopaldas" (*Nav Bharat*, Mumbai, 23 November 2007 based on the information given by the police that the *mahant* had received a letter from Al Qaida saying that "embrace Islam along with your disciples or face death." But, the very next day it was found that the letter was written by the mahant's disciple, Santosh Jaiswal, in order to get the *mahant*'s security stepped up (*Aaj ka Anand*, Pune, 24 November 2007).
29. "Lashkar recruiting in Bangladesh under guise of relief work" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 27 November 2007, quoting "intelligence officials").
30. "U.P. hotbed of ISI-backed terror module: government" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 26 November 2007, on the basis of a reply given in Rajya Sabha and also quoting security and intelligence agencies.)
31. "Delhi put on alert after terror threat" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 December 2007 and *Sakal*, Pune, 4 December 2007 quoting a senior police officer that the inputs had been received from the IB).
32. "Why is Mayawati on militants' hit list?" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 December 2007).

    It is apparent from a careful reading of the news item that IB has spread this rumour. By subtly trying to suggest that Mayawati had incurred the wrath of Muslims by once calling them "fundamentalists" and hence she was being targeted by militants, the IB tried to prejudice her against Muslims.
33. "Arrested terrorists had a plan to blow off Gateway of India" (Marathi daily *Lokmat* , Pune, 1 January 2008, quoting police officers interrogating five terrorists arrested in connection with the blasts in U.P. in the previous month)
34. "Dawood accepted contract to kill Advani and Modi" (daily *Sakal*, Pune, and daily *Samana*, Pune, both of 30 January 2008 on the basis of information telecast by Star News

quoting RAW).

35. "Suspect wanted to hit U.S." - Terrorist leaders felt: "There is much to do in India" (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 3 February 2008, on the basis of information given by police officers of Devangere, Karnataka state, interrogating terrorists arrested in some cases).
36. "Karnataka terrorists planned to bomb Goa tourist hot spots" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 8 February 2008, on the basis of information furnished by the Karnataka Police, interrogating some terrorists).
37. i) "6 Lashkar terrorists in STF net" - BSE [Bombay Stock Exchange] in militants' crosshairs (*The Times of India*, Pune, 11 February 2008).
    ii) "Mumbai saved" (daily *Pudhari*, Pune, 11 February 2008). Both these newspapers published this information on the basis of the press briefing of the Karnataka DGP Vikram Singh, who "disclosed" that the terrorists were planning to attack the Bombay Stock Exchange, the Churchgate Station and a famous temple in Mumbai.
38. "Fahim Ansari had an important role in the conspiracy, Mumbai target" (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 13 February 2008 quoting U.P. Police).
39. "Conspiracy to stage bomb blasts at 13 places in Mumbai" (daily *Pudhari*, Pune, quoting Mumbai Police sources on the basis of interrogation of some arrested suspects)
40. "Sonia cancels J&K meet after RDX haul" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 February 2008 and daily *Pudhari* Pune, 23 February 2008). The next day it was found that the information was wrong. *The Times of India*, on 25 February 2008 reported this news item captioned: "CRPF's wrong claim of RDX haul scuttled Sonia's J&K meeting." But the damage had already been done. Who was responsible for cancelling Sonia Gandhi's important public meeting? – the CRPF which made a wrong claim or the IB which refused to give clearance for the meeting without verifying the facts?
41. "D [Dawood] Company, now a part of Lashkar" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 28 March, 2008 and daily *Pudhari* 29 March 2008, quoting "intelligence sources").
42. "32 women SIMI terrorists active in Mumbai" (daily *Pudhari*, Pune, 21 May 2008 quoting Mumbai Police sources).
43. "Jagannath temple on hit list" (daily *Sakal*, Pune (18 May 2008) quoting "intelligence report").
44. "ISI threat may be on till 2025" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 9 June 2008, on the basis of a "confidential report" meant for internal circulation. The report was prepared by a committee comprising five officials from "security agencies").
45. "Police fear more terror attacks – leading IM members arrested, but Sleeper Cell Active" (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 28 September 2008, on the basis of "security agencies" apprehension).
46. "Al Qaida, SIMI set sights on Goa Global Terror Network Wanted to Hit Baga Beach" (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 12 October 2008, quoting "intelligence and police sources").
47. i) "Plan to Kidnap Sachin Tendulkar" (daily *Sakal*, Kolhapur, 3 November 2008 quoting Nagpur Police sources).
    ii) "Jaish's plan to kidnap Sachin Tendulkar; but intelligence agency denied the report" (daily *Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 4 November 2008, quoting Police Commissioner Nagpur).
    iii) "Danger to Sachin from Jaish" (daily *Tarun Bharat*, Kolhapur, 4 November 2008 quoting police commissioner Nagpur, who, when the IB denied the report, clarified that he had received a phone call from Union Home Ministry in this regard).
48. "India forced to reassess threat: Jihadi terrorism in Pakistan about to spill over into India" (*The Times of India*, Delhi, 31 March 2009).
49. "Alert in Kerala after terror-from-sea tip-off" (*The Times of*

India, Delhi, 31 March 2009).

50. "Chhota Shakeel planned to kill Varun" (*The Times of India*, Delhi, 1 April 2009 quoting an unknown IB source in Lucknow).
51. "Target Sene Chief, not Varun" (*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 1 April 2009).
52. "Trained Pilots sneak in on terror mission" - a senior intelligence office said "we cannot take chances." (*The Times of India*, Pune, 2 April 2009).
53. "Strengthen security for 11 CMs: Centre." The Union Home Ministry's missive comes in the wake of reports suggesting terrorist threats to key leaders in the run-up to the polls, sources said (*The Times of India*, Pune, 8 April 2009).

The above sample news items have been taken from newspapers to which I had access. The same may have been published in many other newspapers across the country on the relevant dates. My intention in giving a long list of news items is to show how consistent the Brahminists in the IB have been in publishing rumours and how they have ensnared in their web politicians of all hues like Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, Varun Gandhi, Mayawati, LK Advani, Narendra Modi, Chief Ministers of eleven important states, and also popular personalities from other fields like Sachin Tendulkar, Saurav Ganguli, Rahul Dravid, apart from usual targets like "vital installations" and "religious places," the only intention being to prejudice all types of politicians and all sections of the society against Muslims.

It is, thus, abundantly clear that the IB and other intelligence agencies have been at the beck and call of the RSS and, in keeping with the latter's game plan of creating an anti-Muslim atmosphere, have been spreading unfounded and baseless rumours of so-called Muslim terrorism. Had there been real terrorism, at least some of the above-mentioned information would have come true, which did not happen.

The only welcome development after the publishing of the news report at serial No. 52 above, about the alleged sneaking of pilots, is that

the Union Home Minister, P Chidambaram, for the first time since such baseless reports had been published quoting IB or government sources, took cognisance of the report, made some enquiry and declared at a press conference on 2 April 2009 that "there is no credible threat, but we must remain watchful...there is no truth about immediate plane hijacking and that the airport alert has been cancelled." The Union Home Minister further cautioned the media not to publish news which has no basis. The minister's timely action was definitely very welcome, but he should know that the source of such reports in most of the cases is his own intelligence agency, IB. He will do well to warn the IB sternly against spreading such baseless rumours and take deterrent action against those who do it intentionally with ulterior motives.

Security-checks -- further spreading the Muslim-terror theory

The impact of such news items is not limited to the readers of newspapers alone. It has far reaching consequences. As a result of such constant rumour-mongering, security at vulnerable places like airports, railway stations, religious places, other public places and of the VVIPs is generally tightened and whoever undergoes the ordeal of standing in long queues and getting frisked and checked, invariably curses the existent or non-existent "Muslim terrorists" and unwillingly forms adverse opinion about Muslims in general. That is the worst part of it, but that is exactly what is intended by the planners of the scheme.

Fake attacks and encounters

The IB does not stop at spreading baseless rumours about the activities of so-called terrorists. In order to give credence to its rumour-mongering, it occasionally engineers "terror attacks" and manipulates "encounters" in which, more often than not, all the "terrorists" are killed, who are later declared "Muslims" belonging to some known or unknown terrorist outfits. In real attacks or encounters it should always be possible to capture at least one or two of the terrorists alive, rather it is desirable to capture a couple of them alive so that detailed information about their organisation and their future plans can be obtained. But most of

the times all of them are killed, thus pre-empting further enquiry into the matter. In such attacks and/or encounters automatic weapons and explosives are shown on the persons of the slain "terrorists" in order to give the incident a real-life touch. But this fact, by itself, is not a proof that the persons killed were real terrorists, as the IB and RAW have easy access to such weapons and explosives. The intention of the IB and RAW in engineering such "attacks" or "encounters" is only to create ill-feeling among common Hindus against the Muslim community and to indirectly help the Brahminist forces working under the garb of Hindu organisations to consolidate their hold over the society. They do not allow the government to make a thorough enquiry into such incidents apprehending that their game plan would be exposed.

Mythical terrorism

The reports of impending terror attacks, which are being published in rapid succession by the media, mostly at the instance of the IB and presumably without any verification, caricatures a devil-size picture of "Muslim terrorism" in India. Is the so-called "Muslim terrorism" in India so monstrous? Or does it even exist in the first place? Given the psychology, methodology and the history of terrorism all over the world, the answer is "no".

A glance at the terror history of the last couple of centuries tells us that terrorists across the world have not spared those who opposed them or their ideology or tried to suppress them or refused to accede to their demands as seen from the following important cases:

1) U.S. President, Abraham Lincoln, was assassinated on 15 April 1865, by a member of the Confederacy which wanted the southern states to become a separate entity from the rest of America, which Lincoln opposed.
2) Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an heir to the Austro-Hungarian empire, was killed at Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, by a Serbian terrorist group "Black Hand" as they wanted Bosnia to be part of a greater Serbia and not part of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Incidentally, this killing sparked off the World War I.
3) The assassination of President of America, John F. Kennedy, on 22 November 1963 is still a mystery. It is now suspected that he was killed by the American Mafia, with the connivance of America's own intelligence agencies for his anti-Mafia stance.
4) The death of Martin Luther King Jr., who fought to end segregation and racial discrimination against Blacks, is also shrouded in mystery. James Earl Ray, who was charged and sentenced for his murder, claimed that he was only a small fry in the big conspiracy, apparently of a white racist group.
5) The former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto, was assassinated on 27 December 2007. She is suspected to have been killed by the anti-Shia fundamentalist terrorist group Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) for her alleged anti-Islamic behaviour.

We don't have to look far for the cases of the terrorists having eliminated their adversaries. In India alone, three of our beloved leaders have been killed by terrorists during the last 60 years. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, was mercilessly shot down by Brahminist terrorists purportedly for his favourable disposition towards Pakistan, but in reality for refusing to accept Brahminist social order in independent India; Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was brutally killed by Khalistani terrorists for launching the Blue Star Operation; and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was blown off by LTTE, one of the most dreaded terrorist groups, for sending armed forces to Sri Lanka to assist the Sri Lankan government in fighting the menace of LTTE.

The logical conclusion we can draw from the above examples is that real terrorists do not spare leaders who oppose them. But that does not seem to be the case with the much talked about "Muslim terrorists" in India. The picture of "Muslim terrorism" that has been delineated by the Brahminists with the help of the IB and the media, over the last few years, appears much more ferocious than any of the past and present

terrorist groups in India. At the same time, the opposition to this terrorism is much more vehement than other terrorist groups. Logically, the terrorists should not have spared those who oppose and criticise them. Many political and religious Brahminist leaders, and at their instigation other leaders, have been spewing poison against Muslims and "Muslim terrorism" in India, day in and day out. But leave alone attacks, there is not even a single attempt on any of them.

It may be argued that terrorists could not attack the Brahminist leaders so far because of tight security or that terrorists do not dare attack them fearing Hindu backlash resulting in large-scale anti-Muslim bloodbath. Both these arguments are fallacious, as the assassination of many heads of State in the past has proved that terrorists can penetrate through any number of security rings and that nothing stops them from getting to their targets. Secondly, the kind of Jehadi terrorism that the IB and the Brahminists have been projecting has no place for emotion or compassion. The "Jehadi terrorists" would not bother about a few thousand Muslim lives in India for the sake of their perverted ideology. The fact is that the monster does not exist. The Brahminist leaders know it too well and that is probably why they have been moving freely through the length and breadth of the country delivering hate speeches.

Are Indian Muslims terrorists?

There is absolutely no historical record of "Muslim terrorism" in India. It was only during the British period that like Hindus, some Muslim revolutionaries and patriots who participated in the First War of Independence of 1857 and later in the freedom struggle under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi had been stamped as "terrorists" by the British Government.

In the recent past, however, there have been three major incidents in which Muslims were found to be involved – Mumbai blasts of 1993, Coimbatore blasts of 1998 and the highjacking of the Indian Airlines plane to Kandahar in 2001. Out of them only Kandahar incident can be called a "terror act." The Mumbai blasts of 1993 were the handiwork of a gang of Muslim criminals to avenge the persecution of Muslims in the

communal riots which took place following the Babri Masjid demolition and the Coimbatore blasts of 1998 were also caused by a Muslim gangster who had been riled by the anti-Muslim activities of the Sangh Parivar. But both the incidents were definitely not acts of "terrorism."

The spectre of mythical "Muslim terrorism" was deliberately devised by the Brahminists and the IB for camouflaging the real Brahminist terrorism which was in the making and preparations for which had been underway in various forms, at various levels and at many places in the country, as evident from the following reports.

Terrorist Activities of RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal

1) March 2000: Bajrang Dal organised a training camp at Pune to train its activists, among other things, in the use of gelatin sticks. About 40 to 50 state-level activists attended the camp. Himanshu Panse of Nanded (who later died while preparing a bomb in April 2006) was the group leader. The camp was organised by Milind Parande, the head of the Bajrang Dal's All India Physical Education wing (as disclosed in the investigation of Nanded blast case of 2006).
2) 2001: 40-days training camp of RSS-Bajrang Dal activists was organised on the premises of the Bhonsala Military School, Nagpur. A total of 115 activists from all over the country, including 54 from Maharashtra, attended the camp. The trainees were imparted training in handling of weapons, making of bombs and exploding the same. Retired and serving army officers and retired senior IB officers were among the trainers (as disclosed in the investigation of Nanded blast case of 2006 and Malegaon blast case of 2008).
3) 2003: At a training camp organised at Akanksha Resort on Sinhgad Road near Pune, activists were given training in preparing and detonating bombs. About 50 youths attended the training. A man identified as "Mithun Chakravorthy" was the main person who not only imparted training in the use of explosives but also handed over large quantities of explosives to the trainees

on the concluding day. Among others who imparted training were serving and retired army officers, an arms expert from Pune, Rakesh Dhawade, and two professors of chemistry identified as Prof. Sharad Kunte and Dr. Deo (as disclosed in the investigation of Nanded and Malegaon blast cases).

4) 15 May 2002: "153 members of Sangh Parivar between the age of 15 and 45 years attended a 21-day orientation camp in Pune city. In khaki shorts, they learnt all about "Hindu Rashtra" neatly mixed with Lezim, Lathi, Yoga, Kho-Kho, Kabbadi and a smattering of spoken Sanskrit....This summer camp was behind padlocked gates. No stepping beyond the gates and no surprise visitors." Similar camps were being organised at 71 locations across the country, at the same time. At Latur (Maharashtra) 45 to 60 years-old persons were taking lessons meant for senior citizens (Pune Newsline [*The Indian Express*] 15 May 2002).
5) 31 May 2002: A week-long training camp of Bajrang Dal activists was held at Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, in which nearly 150 activists were imparted training in the use of firearms. The camp was organised to train youths to fight in case a war with Pakistan breaks out (*The Times of India*, Pune, 31 May 2002).
6) 18 May 2003: A camp for female activists of Vishwa Hindu Parishad was organised in Mumbai from 17 May 2003, to train girls in Karate, Judo and combat with knives and swords (*Sunday Times of India*, 18 May 2003).
7) 31 May 2003: As a part of the RSS' nation-wide training programme for women, started in Kanpur on May 25, retired army personnel gave special training to nearly 70 girls on how to load a gun, aim and shoot, while Judo trainers educated them in the martial art. Six more training camps were held in different districts of the state (U.P.) while all over the country, this programme was organised in 73 cities (*Sunday Express*, Pune, 1 June 2003).
8) 18 May 2001: Explosion of pipe bomb occurred near Nageshwarwadi Ganesh temple of Aurangabad (*Lokmat*, Aurangabad, 24 May 2006).

9) 17 November 2002: Explosion of pipe bombs occurred near Khadkeshwar Mahadeo temple and near VHP office in Niral Bag of Aurangabad (website of *Loksatta* on 24 May 2006 and *Lokmat*, Aurangabad, 17 November 2002). (After the bomb explosion in Nanded on 6 April 2006, in which two RSS and Bajrang Dal workers were killed while making bombs, police found that there were also pipe bombs and there was a striking similarity between their bomb and the Aurangabad bombs – *Lokmat*, Aurangabad, 24 May 2006.)
10) 1 June 2006: There was an attempted attack on the RSS headquarters at Nagpur, in which three terrorists of Pak-based terrorist group were killed in the encounter. (The fact-finding team headed by Mr BG Kolse Patil, retired High Court judge, came to the conclusion after enquiry that the encounter appeared to be fake and demanded judicial enquiry. This operation was apparently carried out by the IB at the instance of the RSS.)
11) November 2003: Bombs were thrown on Mohammadia Masjid, Parbhani.
12) August 2004: Bombs were thrown on Merajul Ulum Masjid, Purna (Distt. Parbhani).
13) August 2004: A bomb was thrown on Kadria Masjid, Jalna.
14) 6 April 2006: Explosion occurred in Nanded in which two activists of RSS-VHP-Bajrang Dal were killed and three injured while making bombs.
15) 10 February 2007: In a mysterious blast in Nanded, one Pandurang Bhagwan Amilkanthwan (age 28) was killed and another person, Dnyaneshwar Manikrao Gonewar (age 40), was seriously injured. Both are suspected to belong to Bajrang Dal (*The Times of India*, Pune, 11 February 2007).
16) September 2007: Three boys, claiming to belong to an organisation called "Jehad-i-Islami" and extorting money from people by sending threatening letters had been arrested by Rampur (U.P.) Police. But all three were non-Muslims. They were identified as Rajpal Sharma, Dori Lal and Dharam Pal (*The Milli Gazette*,

1-15 October 2007).

17) 26 September 2007: Six bombs were found in Mumbai ahead of cricketers' arrival. The Mumbai Police arrested two persons, *viz.*, Rajeev Govind Singh and Sumitra Badal Roy who were carrying six low-intensity bombs, enough to kill at least half a dozen people, ahead of the Indian team's victory procession through the city (*The Times of India*, Pune, 27 September 2007).
(One shudders to think what would have happened if they had succeeded in throwing the bomb at the procession and were not caught. Moreover, what could have been the reaction of the police, the public and the media, if these two persons happened to be Muslims?)

18) 12 December 2006: Nasik Police seized 50 detonators, 11 boxes containing gelatin sticks, and five tins of ammonium nitrate from an unidentified vehicle near Nasik. They are suspected to have links with Bajrang Dal (Weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

19) 2006: 15 kg. RDX was found in the house of one Shankar Shelke, a resident of a village in Ahmednagar district. The person later died under mysterious circumstances (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

20) 2006: From a sugar factory at Pathari (Distt. Ahmednagar) a large quantity of explosives was seized by police (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

21) 14 October 2006: From the house of the "Sarpanch" of Adgaon village in the jurisdiction of Chikalthana P.S. of Aurangabad, 4.5 kg ammonium nitrate, 186 sticks of gelatin and 566 detonators were seized by the police (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

22) 2006: From a club on Aurangabad-Mumbai Highway, police seized 20 kg. Ammonium nitrate and 18 sticks of gelatin from one Laxman Jayavant (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

23) 11 October 2007: In a powerful blast in a village in Yevatmal district of Maharashtra, one Dr. Bafna was killed. The deceased was suspected to belong to RSS (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

24) 2007: Ammonium nitrate and gelatin sticks worth Rs. 14 lakh 72 thousand were seized by the Latur district police from seven youths. Their names were Vikas Mawad, Kailas, Vinod, Dhananjay, Nitish, Mahesh and Ganesh (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, Mumbai, 4-10 July 2008).

25) 15 October 2007: On the eve of Diwali, bombs were sent as gifts to some persons in Wardha. Police arrested four persons in this connection, *viz.*, 1) Chintu *alias* Mahesh Thadwani, 2) Jitesh Pradhan, 3) Prakash Balve and 4) Ajay Jivtode. However, the "mastermind" of this plan, one Bandu Telgote alias "Laden" was still absconding (*Dainik Bhaskar*, 3 November 2007).

26) 20 February 2008: A bomb was planted at Cineraj Cinema in Panvel town, about 50 km. from Mumbai during the screening of the film "Jodha-Akbar" (*Communalism Combat*, Mumbai, July-August 2008).

27) 31 October 2008: The Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad (BDDS) of the police, defused a bomb found in a plastic carrier bag at an auditorium in Vashi, Navi Mumbai. Later it was found to be planted by a Brahminist organisation (*Communalism Combat*, July-August 2008).

28) 4 June 2008: A bomb exploded in the Gadkari Rangayatan theatre in Thane, where a Marathi play "Amhi-Pachpute" was due to be staged. Seven persons were injured. Police found that Brahminist organisations such as Guru Kripa Pratishthan, Sanatan Sanstha and Hindu Janajagruti Samiti were behind the blast at Gadkari Rangayatan and for planting bombs in Vashi and Panvel. (*The Indian Express* investigation shows that the linkages to these groups of Maharashtra and Goa go all the way to Australia and U.S., as reported in *Communalism Combat*, July-August 2008.) During their investigation, police recovered massive stocks of explosive items at Penn and Satara at the instance of the arrested accused.

29) 24 January 2008: A bomb blast took place at the RSS office at Tenkasi in the Tirunelveli District of Tamil Nadu. After a thorough investigation, the Tamil Nadu Police arrested eight persons belonging to Sangh Parivar outfits. The police said 14 pipe

bombs were assembled and the operation had begun from July 2007. The arrested persons confessed that their objective was to create communal divide (*The Milli Gazette*, 16-29 February 2008).

30) April 2008: In the investigation of a minor riot involving two different communities, police found that in village Amerti of Chopda Taluka of Jalgaon district, deadly weapons like pistols, swords, choppers, etc., were manufactured on a large scale. The investigation also revealed that one person by name Shetty Phitewala, who was a resident of Samatanagar and an active member of a communal party, gave training to the youth in the use of weapons and showed communally provocative films and CDs to them (*The Milli Gazette*, 16-31 May 2008).

31) 17 April 2008: The Malegaon Police raided a pathological laboratory situated in the basement of a private hospital and recovered five live RDX explosives, three used RDX explosives, one pistol, a laptop, a scanner, two mobile phones, four fake currency notes of Rs. one thousand each and Rs. 5,000 in cash and arrested three persons, *viz*., Nitish Ashire, Sahebrao Dhurve and Jitendra Khema belonging to some unknown organisation (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 May 2008).

32) June-July 2008: RSS activist, Suraj Narain Tondon, was arrested by Bara Banki Police for conspiring to demolish the Thakur Dwara Temple of the city (*The Milli Gazette*, 16-31 July 2008).

33) Oct.-November 2007: In the investigation of the bomb blast at Thane and planting of bombs in Vashi and Panvel, it was revealed that the same gang had planted a bomb in the Muslim graveyard of Ratnagiri on Ratnagiri-Panvel road, at the time of Diwali last year, but fortunately it did not explode (*The Milli Gazette*, 16-31 July 2008).

34) 4 April 2008: Near Ajara in Kolhapur district on 10 April 2008, police arrested two youths, Oliver Bardeskar and Datta Shankar Pachawadekar, while carrying on a motorcycle 35 crude bombs, ammunition and a gun (daily *Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 11 April 2008).

35) July-August 2008: One Pramod Mutalik of Rashtriya Hindu Sena (RHS), an outfit of RSS, has formed an Anti-Terrorist Squad at Bangalore, with 700 people from all over the state and 150 from Bangalore. Mutalik claimed that he has set up the team to weed out terrorism from the state (*Pune Mirror*, 23 August 2008).

Pramod Mutalik also heads Sri Ram Sene. He claimed that a total of 1,132 Hindu suicide bombers have become members of his suicide squad. Sri Ram Sene has also set up secret training camps in Mangalore, Belgaum and Shimoga in order to provide training to these suicide bombers (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

36) 2 August 2008: Faizabad (U.P.) Police arrested a terrorist in the guise of a Sadhu, carrying live bombs in his *jhola* (bag) while entering a court premises. His name was found to be Nankaoo Das (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 September 2008).

37) 24 August 2008: Two Bajrang Dal activists, *viz*., Rajeev Mishra and Bhupinder Singh, died while making explosive devices in Kanpur (U.P.). The IGP Kanpur zone told reporters that investigations had revealed that there were plans for a massive explosion. Apart from the huge stock of explosive material, the police found a diary and a hand-drawn map of minority-dominated Ferozabad (*Outlook*, 15 September 2008; *Communalism Combat*, September 2008). In the investigation of this case, the STF (U.P.) found that the deceased Bajrang Dal members had frequently called up on two mobile phones in Mumbai two months before the blast. But on enquiry, the SIM cards were found to have been obtained in fake names. The police were trying to get details of the calls from the service provider. The police said that large quantities of chemicals recovered from the house of Mishra could have caused destruction like the ones in Gujarat and Bangalore (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 29 October 2008).

38) 21 September 2008: Dakshin Kannada Crime Branch of Mangalore (Karnataka) arrested one Duresh Kamath for illegally storing huge quantity of gelatin sticks, detonators and other explosives in a private commercial complex in Puttur (*The Milli*

Gazette, 1-15 October 2008).

39) 3 October 2008: In Talegaon Dhabhade (Distt. Pune) "Durga Mata Daud" (rally) was organised by VHP and Bajrang Dal on 2 October 2008 on the occasion of Dussehra. In the rally, youngsters carrying swords, lathis and flags participated (daily *Lokmat* [Hello Pune], Pune, 4 October 2008).

Several such rallies were organised elsewhere in Maharashtra, in which swords, torches, trishuls and lathis were carried openly and provocative slogans against Muslims were raised. The largest rally was in Sangli where about 5,000 people participated.

40) 29 September 2008: Hindu Jagran Manch, an Indore-based extremist group having links with BJP's student wing ABVP, carried out bomb blasts in Malegaon (Maharashtra) and Modasa (Gujarat) in which, respectively, six and one persons (all Muslims) died (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 23 October 2008).

Later in the investigation, the involvement of a Hindutva (Brahminist) terror group called Abhinav Bharat and some army officers and religious leaders was revealed. It has been suspected that the same group is responsible for bomb blasts on Samjhauta Express, Ajmer Dargah and some other places.

In this connection, some highly explosive facts came to light. Members of the Abhinav Bharat terror group were preparing for a nationwide bombing campaign as early as 2002. In December 2002, the M.P. Police had discovered an improvised explosive device at Bhopal's railway station. A second IED was found exactly a year later in Bhopal's Lamba Khera neighbourhood. Both bombs were intended to attack delegates arriving in the city for the annual convention of the Tablighi Jamaat, an event that attracts 5 lakh Muslims. Madhya Pradesh Police, the sources said, soon developed information linking the attempted bombing to local Hindutva activists, Ramnarayan Kalsangram and Sunil Joshi. Both men, now alleged by the Maharashtra ATS to have occupied commanding positions in Abhinav Bharat, were questioned along with several other suspects linked to the Bajrang Dal activities

(*Hindu*, Delhi, 20 November 2008).

But what transpired in the enquiry and what action was taken against these terrorists is not known. Apparently, they were allowed to walk free; otherwise they would not have been able to cause blasts in Malegaon, Modasa, Ajmer, Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid and many other places.

41) 10 November 2008: Two RSS activists were killed in a bomb blast in Kannur district of Kerala while assembling a bomb. The next day while searching the area the police recovered 18 crude bombs from the house of BJP leader Prakashan, about 200 meters away from the spot where the two persons were killed (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 11 November 2008 and *The Times of India*, Pune, 13 November 2008).

42) 9 November 2008: Acting on a tip-off, police recovered seven live crude bombs from village Manjargaon of Badnapur tehsil in Jalna district of Maharashtra. One person was arrested and further investigations were going on, said police officials (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 11 November 2008).

43) 11 November 2008: ULFA chairman Arbinda Rajkhowa alleged on 11 November 2008 that RSS was behind the deadly October 30 blasts in Assam and ethnic violence in Bodo Territorial Administered Districts (BTAD) which claimed 140 lives (85 in blasts and 55 in ethnic violence). He also claimed that ULFA had enough evidence to prove RSS involvement in the blasts. A few months ago in its mouthpiece, *Freedom*, ULFA had mentioned the secret directives sent by RSS to carry out blasts in different parts of the country, but the government took no steps in this direction (*DNA* online news, 11 November 2008).

44) 10 December 2008: Two Maharashtrian youths, identified as Mahesh Parab and Anil Jagtap, were arrested by the Gujarat Police at Khambalia near Jamnagar on suspicion. The police recovered from them two laptops, four mobile phones, a motorcycle and maps of Jamnagar airport, Saurashtra region, Attari border, areas of Gujarat and Rajasthan and the maps of Reliance and Essar

companies. They were handed over to the ATS for further enquiry (Marathi daily *Pudhari*, 10 December 2008).

45) 27 December 2008: Bajrang Dal organised a three-day camp for training youths "to fight against terror." The camp was organised during 27-29 December without prior permission of police officials. Youngsters were taught the art of wielding lathis, swords and air-rifles and they also participated in discussions on how Islamic Jihad was responsible for the recent terror attacks. The camp was attended by youths between the age group of 18-35 years, from across Mumbai (*Asian Age*, 29 December 2008 and *The Milli Gazette*, 16-31 January 2009).

46) 12 January 2009: A Karnataka dacoit, Nagaraj Jambagi, with links to a radical Hindu right wing group confessed to having carried out the Hubli district court bombing of 10 May 2008. Sources in the state intelligence said that Jambagi and two others in his gang, Ramesh Pawar and Lingaraj Lalgar, were members of a radical right wing Hindu group.

The blast had taken place, as the first phase of the polling for the Karnataka Assembly elections was on, in a magistrate's court room where cases against SIMI leaders including Safdar Nagori were scheduled to be heard two days later. The investigation was not concluded, but SIMI was widely believed to have been responsible (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 13 January 2009).

47) 4 April 2009: A bomb explosion took place in a non-descript village called Ghatsavali in Beed district of Maharashtra. The village has a population of about 1,000, with only 70 to 80 Muslims. The blast case was detected and three persons, Ashok Lande, Mayoor Lande and Tulshiram Lande were arrested. During the interrogation, they told the police that they caused the blasts as they did not want a mosque in the village (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, 29 May-4 June 2009). In this case the explosion may have caused little physical damage, but its implications are very dangerous.

Instead of raising the bogey of mythical "Muslim terrorism," had the IB taken note of the real Brahminist terrorism, which is a precursor to

the establishment of the "Brahminist Rashtra" in the name of "Hindu Rashtra," many subsequent bomb blasts could have been avoided and thousands of lives saved. But the IB apparently ignored these incidents at the instance of its masters. On the other hand, it connived at the Brahminist terrorist activities and helped them wherever possible.

How the IB arbitrarily intervened with the investigations of the bomb-blast cases and how it took them on wrong tracks with a view to saving the Brahminist terrorists by implicating innocent Muslim boys is seen from the analytical notes in respect of the investigation of some of the bomb-blast cases, as given in the next chapter.

III

Bomb blast investigations

IB's uncalled for and deliberate interference to save Brahminists and implicate Muslims

During the last few years, especially since the frequent bomb blasts have been taking place in the country, the IB has hardly been doing its core job of intelligence-collection. It has been mostly doing the investigation of bomb-blast cases. There is not a single incident in the recent past wherein bomb blasts or terror attacks have been averted by correct intelligence and timely intervention of the IB. On the other hand, almost after every blast, the Brahminist officers in the IB are found to have intervened and forced the local police or the investigation agencies to accept their theory and the readymade evidence furnished by them.

In most of the bomb-explosion cases which are claimed to have been detected, the IB is suspected to have played a very dubious role. If the reporting in the media of all such cases is carefully studied and analysed, the pattern of investigation followed by the IB in almost every bomb blast investigation is seen to be as follows.

1) Indictment of Muslim-outfits and/or persons from day one

It has been the experience in almost every bomb blast case in the country during the last few years, that even *before* the reverberations of the blast die down or even *before* the blood of the victims dries up, there starts a scramble among the intelligence and investigation agencies to blame it on some Muslim outfits like the LeT, HuJI, SIMI, or the recently devised "IM" or even some unknown outfit, merely based on their wild guess and to give it as wide a publicity as possible through the ever-cooperative media, which, to a great extent, is controlled by Brahminist elements. This is in keeping with the main objective of the IB and the Brahminists to create an anti-Muslim atmosphere and to prejudice

common Hindus against Muslims.

Though the local police, its Crime Branch, the Anti-Terrorist squad and other such special squads or teams join the race, they do it with their eyes revetted on their ring-master, *i.e.*, the IB and gauging its mood, as everybody right from the local police to senior bureaucrats and even the government has been given to understand by the IB, directly or indirectly, that any bomb blast case, being connected to terrorism is the IB's baby and everybody has to toe the line taken by them. As nobody, including the government, has the guts to question the IB, everybody blindly toes its line. Therefore, the views concerning the probable terrorists involved in the blasts, expressed *immediately* after the blasts by either the local police or the ATS, other investigation agencies, or even by the senior bureaucrats and the government in 90 percent of the cases must be taken to mean that they are the views of the IB. If anybody dares to differ, he or she is forced to fall in line in no time, given the clout of the IB.

2) The IB virtually taking over the investigation

More often than not, the IB doesn't allow any bomb blast investigation to run its logical course. It ensures that it has a finger in every pie of blast-investigation. Even if the local police have been doing the investigation on correct lines, it abruptly steps in, presents its own theory, along with a readymade package of evidence and executes the same through a "soft" investigation squad chosen carefully from amongst the local police. This is more so if the Brahminist elements are suspected to be involved or if the blast is the handiwork of the IB itself.

If the local police or investigation agency are seen groping in the dark, the IB would immediately get itself busy writing the script and in manipulating the evidence to fit in the story. With the amount of power and resources at its command, IB is capable of creating or extracting or manipulating any evidence such as mobile phone print-outs, confessional statements, even taped conversation, seizures of explosives, weapons or incriminating literature or mobile phones, or for that matter, just *anything* which could convince the gullible public, the media and even the

trial courts granting police custody remands. After such a spade-work, the IB abruptly steps in under the pretext of assisting the local police or the investigation agency and virtually takes over the investigation. Thus, they smoothly get their plan of arresting hundreds of Muslim youths, with a view to demonising and demoralising the whole Muslim community and creating an anti-Muslim atmosphere among the gullible common Hindus, executed through the local police or investigation agencies like the ATS or SIT or even the CBI; with the result that while Muslims and secularists blame the government or the police for their communally biased actions and high-handedness, the main producers and protagonists, *viz.*, the Brahminists in the IB, remain behind the curtain and enjoy the situation on their TV screens. The IB is certain to intervene in cases where the Brahminist elements are suspected to be involved or where the blasts are the result of the IB's so-called cover operations.

3) "Encounter" - the patent weapon of the IB to fill in the gaps

For manipulating evidence or for joining the important missing links in any blast case, encounters come in very handy for the IB. Before the encounter, any "terrorist" can be asked to write in his diary whatever the investigators want him to write, such as names, addresses, phone numbers, etc., of his "associates" or "handlers," the places he visited for undergoing "terror training," the "future plans" of his group, etc., or he can be forced to talk on a mobile phone to "his associates" or "handlers," or he can be asked to do whatever is required to fill in the blanks of investigation, so that after the "encounter," apart from the usual articles like explosives, weapons, *Jehadi* literature, etc., these special articles like diary written in his own handwriting, the mobile phone on which he talked to other terrorists, could be "recovered" from his person.

The darlings of IB, such as Special Cell of Delhi Police, STF of U.P., ATS of Maharashtra (headed by KP Raghuvanshi), Crime Branch Mumbai, SIT Rajasthan, M.P. Police, a section of JK Police, a section of Karnataka Police, Hyderabad City Police, help them in this task. The safest place for an "encounter" undoubtedly is Kashmir, which nobody can question.

The IB has used this weapon in the investigations of Mumbai train bomb blast case, Ahmedabad-Surat case, Delhi blast case of 2008, Sankat Mochan blast case of 2006, serial blast case of U.P. courts, Jaipur case and so on.

4) Not following important leads to save Brahminist terrorists

Even if extremely vital clues have been found at the scene of the blasts or important leads have been disclosed by the local police during the course of early investigation, they are not allowed to be followed meticulously and taken to their logical end by the IB, if such leads are likely to implicate Brahminist terrorists or if they do not fit in the preconceived and predecided theory of the IB as happened in the case of Mumbai train blast of 2006, Malegaon blasts of 2006, Samjhauta Express blasts of 2007, Hyderabad Mecca Masjid blast of 2007, Ajmer Sharif blasts of 2007, Jaipur blast of 2008 and Ahmedabad blast of 2008.

5) The IB changing tracks frequently

Many a time it happens that the IB fixes up its theory and hands it over to the investigation agency for execution and thereafter some unforeseen developments contradicting its theory take place. In such an event, the IB changes its tracks as easily as changing a shirt. In some cases it has changed tracks, not once or twice but many a time. If the investigation agency is not amenable to the IB, two parallel theories are found to run side by side, putting the IB to a lot of embarrassment. This has happened in Mumbai train-blast case, Hyderabad Mecca Masjid blast case, Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast case, serial blast case of U.P. and Sankat Mochan blast case.

6) Gaping holes in chargesheets

Once the suspects are zeroed in on by the IB, they are bound to be framed by fabricating the evidence. As the investigation in most of the blast cases is based on the theory of untruth, the chargesheet sent in such cases suffers from many infirmities and has many loopholes notwithstanding the manipulations and encounters. But the IB is not

worried about them as its main objective of discrediting the Muslim community has been achieved and it knows that the accused will remain in jail for several years till the case comes up for hearing.

This pattern of investigation has been evident in almost all the bomb-blast cases, some of which are analysed below on the basis of published newspaper reports.

i) Mumbai Train bomb blast case of 2006 (11 July 2006)

A Tale of two parallel investigations having two different theories, with real terrorists untouched

A) Initial reports about the blasts and suspects

I) Indictment of Muslim outfits and persons from day one:

i) On the very first day, IB confirmed that cadres of SIMI were responsible for the blasts (*Afternoon*, Mumbai, 12 July 2006).

ii) Police suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba and SIMI (*Mid-Day* Mumbai, 12 July 2006).

iii) Militants identified as Rahil, Faiyas Kagzi and Zainuddin to have been involved (*Mid-Day*, 12 July 2006).

iv) Nepal Police arrested four Pakistanis in Kathmandu (*Rediff.com*, 12 July 2006).

v) Police pick up three SIMI activists from Hyderabad (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 12 July 2006).

vi) After four days of train blast at least 250 people were detained from city's Mahim area (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 15 July 2006).

II) IB virtually taking over the investigation

i) IB took over the charge of investigation. IB has maintained utmost secrecy. Except the ATS Chief, KP Raghuvanshi, nobody knows about the investigation (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 22 July 2006).

III) Other Reports

i) Sketches of the suspects have been prepared after getting details from an eye witness and injured persons (*Rediff.com*, 12 July 2006).

ii) CPI(M) politburo member and West Bengal's ruling Left Front Chairman Biman Bose suspected that train blasts were set off by Hindu fundamentalists (*Rediff.com*, 15 July 2006).

iii) Forensic experts reported presence of RDX, ammonium nitrate and fuel oil in the debris (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 17 July 2006).

B) ATS claim of solving the case

1) The ATS (read IB) had first arrested one Kamal Ahmed from Bihar on July 20, and one Ehtesham from Meera Road, Mumbai, on July 29 on suspicion. During their narco-analysis test, they revealed the names of some of their associates who were involved in the diabolical plot. On the basis of the information given by them, four more suspects were arrested by the ATS. They were Mohammad Sajid, Mohammad Shafi (both residents of Mumbra), Wajihuddin Shaikh (resident of Kashi-Mira) and Mohammad Majid Shaikh (resident of Kolkata). With the arrest of these persons, the ATS claimed to have "solved" the case. The four were said to have given logistic support to Pakistani nationals who planted bombs in the train. Out of them, Majid Shaikh, is suspected to be a member of a LeT sleeper cell (*The Times of India*, Pune, 30 September 2006).

2) Commissioner of Police Mumbai, AN Roy, said, "one of the Pakistanis involved in the plot could not get down from the jam-packed train compartments and died in the blast at the Khar station. His badly mutilated body remained unclaimed. The police had got the face reconstructed and conducted DNA tests on the body. Investigators learnt from narco-analysis tests of one of the arrested persons

that it was the body of Salim, a resident of Lahore, Pakistan" (*The Hindu*, Mumbai, 1 October 2006).

3) A senior bureaucrat posted in New Delhi said, "Ever since the detention of the first accused Kamal Ansari from Bihar, the ATS had gathered minute details of the movements of all the accused and the two Pakistani nationals, Salim (killed in one of the seven blasts) and Mohammad Ali (killed in an "encounter" with the police at Antop Hill, in August 2006)"... Roy (C.P., Mumbai) has already declared that the Mumbai Police have sufficient evidence on the involvement of ISI... The centre has backed up the Maharashtra Goverment's claims of direct ISI involvement in the blast"... "Our evidence is based on these (arrested accused) persons' movements, intercepts of their cell-phone conversations, the proof of their participation in LeT camps in Pakistan, receipt of funds via hawala transactions and detection of RDX at the residence of one of the accused."...Top police officials from Maharashtra would submit a report on the role of the ISI in the serial blasts to Union Home Secretary on Wednesday, *i.e.*, 4 October 2006" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 October 2006).

4) The evidence to the effect that a) ISI had plotted the conspiracy of blasts, b) 11 Pakistan nationals took direct part in the blasts and c) they had been imparted training at Bahawalpur camp in Pakistan, was presented to the Home Secretary by Mumbai C.P. AN Roy and the Chief of the ATS, KP Raghuvanshi (*Sakal*, Pune 5 October 2006).

5) According to sources, ATS and IB officials have been investigating the relations Kamal had with over a dozen of people in Madhubani district of Bihar (to which he belonged) (*Rediff.com*, 11 October 2006).

C) Filing of chargesheet by the ATS

Later, a chargesheet was submitted by the ATS in the court against

13 arrested persons showing another 15 (including 10 Pakistanis) absconding.

The main evidence furnished by the ATS is in the form of i) confessional statements of accused persons, ii) interception of their cell-phone conversations, iii) narco-analysis test of some of the accused, iv) DNA test of the Pakistani killed in the encounter, v) RDX seized from the house of one of the accused, and vi) seizure of a Maruti car in which the bombs had been transported from Gowandi to Bandra and which had traces of RDX.

The ATS has cited, among others, two "important" witnesses. One of them is a commuter on Western Railway. According to him, on the day of the incident he had a quarrel with one of the suspects as some heavy object being carried by the suspect hit him. After reading the description of the suspect in newspapers, he could connect him with the person with whom he had fought, he voluntarily came forward and identified the suspect. The second witness is a taxi driver. On the day of incident he was taking three passengers from Govandi to Churchgate. They had some heavy boxes with them which they put on the front seat. On way, when once he applied the urgent brake, one of the objects fell down. The passengers got annoyed and shouted at him. He was a little surprised. But after seeing the sketches of suspects in the newspapers, he came forward to identify them.

D) How far is the evidence credible?

i) How could a person who had a quarrel with a co-passenger in a crowded suburban train, and that too, during peak hours recognise the person after a lapse of several weeks on the basis of his description and volunteer to identify him?

ii) The same is the case with the taxi driver. How could he remember faces of a couple of passengers from amongst hundreds that he might have ferried since the blast?

iii) How and when the mobile phone conversations of the suspects were recorded? If their phones were under observation of the IB or the police since before the blasts, why were the persons not located and arrested earlier? If they were kept under observation after the blast, on what basis, was it done? Had the voices been scientifically identified?

iv) How credible would be the confessional statement recorded by the police under MCOCA, especially in view of the fact that the Supreme Court has stayed trial on the point of the validity of some sections of MCOCA? (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 1 March 2008).

v) Can a person be made an accused only on the basis of narco-analysis test, if there is no other corroborative evidence against him?

vi) How can a Pakistani national be identified on the basis of DNA test? Is it possible to identify his religion, nationality or the terrorist outfit he belongs to by this test?

vii) How far is the recovery of RDX from somebody's house by the Mumbai Police reliable? Given their reputation, the Mumbai Police can show the recovery of RDX from anywhere they wish.

Thus, there were so many weak links in the investigation of this case. The manipulation in the evidence was so obvious that no sane person having an average intelligence would swallow the theory put forth overtly by the ATS and actually by the IB. So much so, that even the national security advisor, MK Narayanan, was not satisfied about the quality of evidence. He said "Some pieces of puzzle are missing and I am hesitant to say that the evidence is clinching." (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 October 2006)

Thus, when many pieces of the jigsaw puzzle had been missing and when there was no conclusive evidence about the involvement of ISI, the then Police Commissioner of Mumbai, AN Roy, should not have declared cracking of the case with such fanfare as he did.

As a matter of fact, the Mumbai Police Commissioner had no *locus standi* in this case, as the explosions did not take place in his jurisdiction, nor was the case being investigated by the Mumbai Police. The blasts

happened in the jurisdiction of the Mumbai Railway Police Commissioner. Secondly, the investigation was done by the ATS, which was under the control of the DGP Maharashtra. Therefore, either the Railway Police Commissioner or the ATS chief or the DGP should have briefed the press. But it appears that for some unknown reason, Mumbai CP, AN Roy, was told to do so by the IB either directly or through the government. In fact, as a seasoned police officer, he should have politely refused, but apparently he didn't. Unfortunately, our leaders, as has been the case since independence, have failed to understand that the real motive of the IB in manipulating evidence in such cases and in giving it a wide publicity was not so much to fix ISI and Pakistan, as it was to malign the image of Indian Muslims so that the general public gets further prejudiced against Muslims and the Brahminist forces and Sangh Parivar could continue their diabolical activities unhindered and their political wing, the BJP could reap the harvest.

By disclosing a half-baked story of ISI involvement to the media, and by not being able to furnish clinching evidence in support of the same, the ATS has put the government to a lot of embarrassment internationally.

E) The new "IM" theory of IB

The credibility of the ATS hit the rock bottom after the recent claim of the Mumbai Crime Branch that they had busted a key "Indian Mujahideen" (IM) module that was responsible for the Mumbai train blasts of 2006.

Three suspected terrorists out of the five arrested by the Crime Branch have confessed that they were part of a separate module of nine men who caused the blasts. Sadiq Sahikh, alleged co-founder of the "Indian Mujahideen" who was arrested on September 24 in Mumbai; Arif Shaikh, who was held along with Sadiq and Saif, who had been held following the Batla House (Delhi) "encounter" on 19 September 2008, have given the above confession. Sadiq and Arif have reportedly confessed to the Mumbai Police, while Saif has spoken to the Delhi cops. They had named five other men who included Arif Amin and

Mohammad Sajid who were killed in the Delhi shootout; Zeeshan, who was arrested after the shootout and Saif's brother Dr. Shahnawaz Khan and Abu Rashid, both of whom are absconding.

The sources said the previous 13 could have been a "sleeper cell" or arrested by the police under pressure. But going by the confessional statements of the accused arrested and prosecuted earlier by the ATS and those of the three recently arrested by the Mumbai Crime Branch, the theory of either of the module being a sleeper cell or being a part of the same group is totally unacceptable as there is nothing common between the two versions as is evident from the following facts:

i) According to the ATS, Faisal Shaikh and Asif Khan Bashir Khan were the key conspirators, whereas according to the Crime Branch Mumbai, Sadiq Shaikh, the co- founder of "Indian Mujahideen" was the key operative.

ii) The ATS says the bombs were assembled at Mohammed Ali's residence at Cheetah Camp, Gowandi, Chembur, while the Crime Branch says they were assembled in a flat at Sewri, which was rented by Abu Rashid.

iii) As per the ATS theory, Asif Khan Bashir Khan brought ammonium nitrate and detonators while Kamal Ansari transported the RDX brought by Pakistani national, Ehsanullah, for preparation of bombs; whereas according to the Crime Branch, Riyaz Bhatkal *alias* Roshan Khan brought ammonium nitrate to the Sewri flat for preparing bombs and RDX was *not* used in the bombs.

iv) As per the ATS, Sajid Margum Ansari procured timer circuitry and other devices for the blasts whereas the Crime Branch says that Arif Shaikh, an electrician, prepared circuits at his residence at Cheetah Camp and brought them to the Sewri flat two days before the blasts.

v) In the chargesheet of the ATS, it has been stated that the bombs were prepared by Pakistani operatives in Shaikh Mohammad Ali's house at Gowandi, and Asif Khan Bashir Khan, Sajid Ansari, and Ehtesham Siddiqui helped in

assembling the bombs whereas according to the Crime Branch the bombs were assembled by Sadiq Sahikh, Mohammad Saif and his brother Shanawaz Khan who were assisted by Zeeshan Shaikh, Arif Shaikh, Mohammad Sajid, Abu Rashid and Atif Amin.

vi) Even the persons who carried the bombs and planted the same in trains are totally different.

vii) Moreover, Saif has told Delhi Police, "We don't know who these (13) people are."

(*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 3 October 2008 and *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 15 October 2008)

It has also been reported that Mumbai Crime Branch sources said that Intelligence Bureau (IB) was baffled when no links between the IM and the 13 accused on trial were established. In fact, there was no reason for the IB to get baffled as both the investigations have been done as per their script – the earlier one involving ISI and 13 accused was done through ATS Mumbai when it was headed by their confidant KP Raghuvanshi and the latter one, involving "IM" module, through the Mumbai Crime Branch headed by even more loyal officer Rakesh Maria. What is really baffling is why did the IB change the tracks knowing fully well that the new revelations could severely damage the ongoing trial in a MCOCA court against the 13 men. The behaviour of IB is highly suspicious. Given the IB's track record, it would not have allowed the Mumbai Crime Branch to pursue the latter version even if it were true and would have stalled it on the ground that "the government would be put to embarrassment as the IB has already declared and conveyed to Pakistan that ISI is involved in the case," as it did in respect of Samjhauta Express case. In that case, the Government of India, at the instance of the IB, had informed Pakistan, U.S. and other countries that ISI was involved in the case. But later, when the case was really detected in the course of the Malegaon blasts of 2008 by the ATS headed by Hemant Karkare who was apparently not working under IB's influence, exposing the devilish role of Brahminist forces, the IB stepped in and

advised the government to stall the investigation saying that our credibility would go down internationally if we proceeded with the new findings (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 November 2008). Surprisingly, the IB did not do so in the Mumbai train blast case when the new theory was brought in by the Crime Branch Mumbai. On the other hand, the IB seemed to have favoured the new theory. It is here that the IB's role becomes suspicious, especially in view of the fact that whereas the authenticity of the detection of the Samjhauta Express case by the ATS was beyond reasonable doubt, the new revelation in the Mumbai train blast case is shrouded in thick mystery. This issue needs to be analysed logically and critically.

Of late, especially after the Ahmedabad blasts, the Crime Branch Mumbai and its chief Rakesh Maria, for some unknown reason, have been found to be under full control of the IB and have been doing the investigation as per its diktat. Therefore, it cannot be said that the IB was not aware of the developments leading to fresh revelations. On the other hand, there is a reason to suspect that the new theory was also its brain child. If that is so, the million dollar question is: what were the compulsions of the IB in doing so when it knew too well that it meant damaging the ongoing prosecution case beyond repair and, more importantly, putting the government to a lot of embarrassment internationally. Could it be that the IB wanted to prove that RDX was not used in Mumbai train blasts as it had an apprehension that the RDX theory could implicate some influential Brhamanist leaders, or the IB itself in the Mumbai blast case in view of the disclosure by the ATS in its investigation of the Malegaon blast case that the RDX stolen by Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit had been used in various blasts which have taken place since 2003? But it is very difficult for the IB and the Crime Branch Mumbai to prove the "no-RDX theory" as forensic experts have already reported the presence of RDX in Mumbai train blasts (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 17 July 2006). That could not be proved wrong only on the basis of the statement of one of the accused (Sadiq Shaikh). Under these circumstances, it is interesting to see what steps the IB and the Mumbai Crime Branch would take to prove their new theory.

F) Biased and mysterious investigations

The findings of both the investigations are highly suspicious as there is no convincing evidence against the accused in both the cases and the whole matter smacks of concoction.

a) First investigation by the ATS

1) The investigation started on a totally wrong note of predetermined anti-Muslim bias of IB, the premier intelligence agency, declaring on the very first day that cadres of SIMI were responsible for the blasts (*Afternoon*, Mumbai, 12 July 2006) and the local police suspecting LeT and SIMI (*Mid-Day*, Mumbai, 12 July 2006).
2) No investigation agency took note of the suspicion expressed by the CPI(M) Politburo member and West Bengal's ruling left front chairman, Biman Bose, that the blasts were set off by Hindu fundamentalists (*Rediff.com*, 15 July 2006).
3) Some important factors were not taken into consideration, *viz.*, i) the explosions could not be an act of revenge against Gujarat riots as a period of four years had elapsed since then; ii) even presuming that it was so, the explosion should have taken place at or near Hindu-dominated and Gujarati-dominated stations, *i.e.*, from Churchgate up to Dadar and from Bhayendar up to Virar; iii) instead, most of the explosions took place at or near Muslim-dominated stations, between Mahim and Meera Road..
4) The fact that the explosions had been timed to take place after Dadar which was the stronghold of RSS and Maharashtrian Brahminists, and that the bombs were planted only on fast trains so that two other stations dominated by Maharastrian Brahmins, *viz.*, Vile Parle and Malad could be avoided, was also not considered.
5) The RSS-VHP-Bajrang Dal workers involved in blasts which had taken place at Nanded in the recent past were not interrogated.
6) No thorough enquiry was made with the four non-Muslim boys who had thrown a suspected bag in the sea near Bhayendar, only a couple of days after the incident.
7) No thorough enquiry was made in a complaint made by a woman lecturer in Ahmednagar who had called up Union Home Ministry and informed it that she knew a 7/11 terrorist, that his name was Ganesh Khanderao who lived in Ashanagar area of Aurangabad. But as the telephone operator had wrongly taken down the name, the police could not trace him. The woman again called up Aurangabad Police and gave the correct name. She also sent a letter giving his details. Still the police did not interrogate him. They interrogated his brother and father and came to the conclusion that the lady had made the complaint to teach Khanderao a lesson for not marrying her as promised, and closed the case (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 August 2006).

In this case, even presuming that the lady had been frustrated in love, it did not necessarily mean that the information given by her was wrong. She was a lecturer and knew the implications of giving wrong information to the Home Ministry and the police and, secondly, when she came to know that the police had got a wrong name, she promptly gave the correct name and also wrote a letter. Therefore, the police ought to have made a thorough enquiry into the matter. They should have traced Ganesh Khanderao, interrogated him thoroughly on all the points given by the lady, confronted him with the lady and got verified all the facts mentioned by the lady in her letter. But the police did not seem to have done so.

On the other hand, in connection with the Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) blast, in a similar complaint given by the second wife of a Muslim person, the police promptly searched his house, and "recovered" a country-made rifle. He was

booked under the Arms Act and was made to languish in jail for several days before the police finally came to the conclusion that there was no evidence to link him to the blasts (*The Times of India*, Pune, 28 May 2007). This is a classic example of the biased attitude of the police.

8) As the needle gradually started pointing towards Maharashtrian Brahminists, the Sangh Parivar, through the IB, pressurised the Commissioner of Police Mumbai to declare cracking of the case and involvement of ISI even though there was no clinching evidence in support of the theory.
9) In the chargesheet of the ATS, the allegations against each of the accused are elaborate: travel for terror training, hatching conspiracy; raising funds; arranging explosive material; making bombs; carrying bombs to the stations and planting them in trains. The only small problem is that nearly all of them are based on the *confessions* of the accused.
10) One of the accused led the investigation to a spot near railway tracks in Dahisar, *three months* after the blast from where a bag containing some incriminating articles was recovered.
11) The identity of numerous prosecution witnesses has not been disclosed.
12) How could the face of the mutilated body of a Pakistani national be reconstructed and got identified by other accused persons as claimed by Commissioner of Police Mumbai, as it can only be said whether the skull, if found intact, belongs to the deceased, if his photograph taken from the front is available?
13) It is not known whether the accused were got identified by the eyewitnesses on the basis of whose description sketches had been prepared and published.

b) The second investigation by Mumbai Crime Branch

1) The very foundation of the second theory is illogical and incredible. It is unbelievable that the accused persons

arrested in one case would *suo moto* disclose their involvement in another case, least of all in a blast case and provide all the details to the police.

2) As there is hardly anything common between the confessional statements of the 13 accused arrested earlier by the ATS and those of the three persons arrested by the Crime Branch, the theory that either of them was a "sleeper cell" of the other or part of the same group is not acceptable.
3) The theory of use of RDX in the blasts which had been ratified by forensic experts in the earlier investigation cannot be nullified merely on the basis of the *confessional* statement of *one* of the accused arrested by the Crime Branch.
4) The matter became further complicated when the Crime Branch filed its chargesheet on 17 February 2009 against the five alleged "IM" terrorists arrested by them in October 2008 and their associates as evident from the following:
   i. The chargesheet is silent on their earlier claim that they were the backbone of the module responsible for Mumbai suburban train blasts of 7/11. While the chargesheet against the IM module is limited to the terror emails sent before the blasts, the ATS says it cannot seek the custody of these "IM" men and file a supplementary chargesheet in 7/11 case, as it has not received any "official communication" about the "IM" men being linked to the blast (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 17 February 2009).
   ii. The chargesheet claims that the "IM" was also involved in "bomb blasts in Mumbai since 2005." However, it is not clear from the rest of the chargesheet whether it had a hand in any such attack. Since 2005, Mumbai has seen only two attacks, *i.e.*, the July 2006 suburban train bombing and the recent 26/11 attack. The ATS has maintained that "IM" had no role in train bombings and that investigations in 26/11 attack are still going on (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 February 2009).

iii. The chargesheet also says that the "IM" used unsecure Wi-Fi locations in Mumbai to send threatening emails minutes before the explosions took place at Ahmedabad and Delhi in 2008 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 February 2009).

5) The attempt on the part of the Crime Branch Mumbai and the ATS to pass the buck on to one another has further eroded their credibility. It is still not clear, why the ring-master, *i.e.*, the IB, has been making these two investigation agencies somersault every now and then, making a mockery of themselves. There could be only two reasons, *viz.*,

i) as discussed above to disprove the RDX theory earlier established in the ATS investigation and thus to absolve the Brahminist leaders towards whom the needle has been pointing after the disclosure in the investigation of the ATS headed by Hemant Karkare in Malegaon blast case that the RDX stolen by Lt. Col. Purohit had been used in blasts which took place since 2003; and,

ii) to reaffirm its theory that somebody had hacked into Ken Haywoods's computer and sent threatening emails in the name of "Indian Mujahideen." But in its attempt to protect the Brahminist leaders and to absolve an American national, the IB has been putting the Indian Government to a lot of embarrassment in the international arena.

Thus, the whole issue is extremely complicated and smacks of some deep-rooted conspiracy involving the Brahminist forces and the IB. In fact, both the investigations have been done practically by the IB and both now appear to be wrong. Under these circumstances we need to find out *(i)* what compelled the IB to make the case turn by 180° and *(ii)* who are the real culprits? The answer to the second query will definitely be found if the first part is probed deep by some independent agency, minus the IB.

Some later interesting developments

While it is difficult to predict how the IB proposes to get out of this labyrinth, some of the later reports that have been appearing in newspapers make an interesting reading:

1) Following pressure from the Chief Minister and Deputy Chief Minister, the then Commissioner of Police, Mumbai, AN Roy and the then DIG ATS, Subhodh Jaiswal, directed their subordinates to arrest dummy accused in the Mumbai train blast case. Therefore, some officers got themselves transferred from the ATS while an honest officer, Vinod Bhatt, could not stand the mental pressure and committed suicide (Marathi weekly *Shodhan* Mumbai, 21-27 November 2008 quoting Shiv-Sena mouthpiece daily *Samana*).

2) The state ATS, on 18 February 2009, said it will seek the custody of alleged "Indian Mujahideen" member Mohammad Sadiq Israr Ahmed Shaikh to probe any possible role played by the outfit in the 7/11 serial blast case (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 19 February 2009).

3) "Indian Mujahideen" top operative Sadiq Shaikh's confession on his alleged role in the 11 July 2006 serial Mumbai train blasts has come as a huge embarrassment to the Maharashtra ATS. Two years ago, the ATS had chargesheeted 13 persons but Sadiq and other members of the "IM" module were not named as conspirators.
On 27 February 2009, after a news channel aired the videotapes of Sadiq's confession, in which he says that he and his associates had purchased pressure cookers, placed bombs in them and planted them in trains, the ATS was at pains to rubbish it saying Sadiq was trying to mislead investigation (*The Times of India*, Pune, 28 February 2009).

4) The Anti Terrorist Squad (ATS) is likely to discharge "Indian Mujahideen" co-founder, Sadiq Shaikh, in the 11 July 2006 train blast case, indicating that they have not found evidence to believe the "IM" was involved. The move may leave the Crime Branch red-faced (*The Times of India*, Pune, 17 March 2009).

The moral of the story: Two untruths do not a truth make.

ii) Malegaon bomb blast case (8 September 2006)

The correct investigation by the local police derailed by the ATS (read IB) to save real Brahminist terrorists

The story of the investigation of the Malegaon bomb blast case is similar to that of Mumbai train bomb-blast case insofar as the interference of IB and the suddenly changing complexion of investigation is concerned.

A) Correct investigation by local police in the initial stage

Initially the local police, *i.e.*, Nasik district police, was investigating on the correct lines:

i) They had kept their options open and were probing on the lines that either the Bajrang Dal or a Lashkar group could have been involved in the blasts. They found that Bajrang Dal had followed a similar pattern in blasts at Parbhani's Mohammadia Masjid and the mosques at Purna and Jalna. DGP Pasricha had told reporters about this angle (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 9 September 2006).

ii) Three days after the blast, the police claimed to have found a clear direction to proceed in the case as the investigating team had identified the shop from where the cycles used for carrying the explosives were bought (*Afternoon*, Mumbai, 11 September 2006).

iii) The IGP Nasik Range, PK Jain, had released the sketches of two men who had bought two of the three bicycles used in the bomb blast. He also added that there were two or three concrete clues on which the police were working (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 10 September 2006).

iv) The telephone calls received and made from the landlines as well as mobile phones, before and after the blasts, were being probed (daily *Pudhari*, Pune, 10 September 2006).

v) Hindu organisations suddenly became defensive and VHP General Secretary Pravin Togadia dismissed the involvement of Hindu organisations in the blasts. He said that it was wrong to infer that Hindu organisations were involved only because the blasts had taken place in mosques (*Pudhari*, Pune, 12 September 2006).

vi) Five days after the blasts, the police had detained 20 persons from a predominantly Hindu locality of the town (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 13 September 2006).

Thus, it is seen that the local police had been investigating the case professionally and on logical lines.

B) Interference of the IB in the garb of the ATS

Going by newspaper reports, it appears that the ATS Maharashtra, headed by KP Raghuvanshi, which had been acting as a puppet of the IB since the Mumbai train bomb blast of 2006, gradually took over the investigation and, thereafter, the complexion of the case suddenly changed:

i) An officer of the ATS Mumbai said that the suspected terrorists belonged to Jaish-e-Mohammad as, though their *modus operandi* was very different from the Mumbai blasts, the explosives used were very similar (*Afternoon*, Mumbai, 10 September 2006).

ii) Two days after the Malegaon blast, the Anti-Terrorist Squad Mumbai had stumbled upon a number of similarities between Malegaon and the Mumbai train blasts (*The Statesman*, Mumbai, 14 September 2006).

iii) On 30 October 2006, the ATS held a press conference where it declared that it has cracked the case and found that SIMI was behind the conspiracy; that it had arrested one Nooral Hooda, a SIMI activist, for his complicity in Malegaon blast conspiracy. Nooral Hooda was working in the battery shop of one Shabbir Ahmed Ansari

(Batteriwala) who was alleged to be the brain behind the conspiracy. Shabbir Ahmed had allegedly gone to Pakistan via Saudi Arabia and taken training there; he was arrested by police immediately after Mumbai blasts (*The Malegaon blasts had taken place while Shabbir was in the custody of Mumbai Police*). Nooral Hooda is said to have carried out Shabbir's orders; the bombs were made in Shabbir's factory; the blast conspiracy was hatched eight months ago; RDX was smuggled into India by another module (*Maharashtra Times*, Mumbai, 31 October 2006, and *The Times of India*, Pune, 4 November 2006).

iv) In a bid to pre-empt the transfer of the case to CBI, the DGP Dr Pasricha, declared that the investigation had been completed. He repeated the details earlier given by the ATS on 30 October 2006 and added that the ATS had arrested eight men, all SIMI activists, and was on the look-out for eight more; that two Pakistanis were involved in the blast; that one of them was one "Muzammil" who came to India in July and helped to fashion the improvised explosive device; that one of the arrested accused, Mohammad Ali, had sent Shabbir for training at a terrorist camp near Karachi after 7/11 blasts in Mumbai; that Ali supplied 15 to 20 kg of RDX to Shabbir, of which 1.5 Kg was used in Malegaon; that the plan was hatched on May 8, at the time of Nooral Hooda's wedding; that the intention was to create religious animosity between Hindus and Muslims. Pasricha, however, said, "it is not known whether Pakistan had a hand in the blast" (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 28 November 2006).

v) Hours before the case was handed over to the CBI, the chargesheet was submitted in the court by the ATS (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 21 December 2006).

C) The evidence on record

i) Traces of RDX in Shabbir Batteriwalla's godown.

ii) A statement recorded u/s 165 Cr.P.C. of an independent witness whose identity could not be disclosed.

iii) Confessional statements of the accused.

iv) Reports of brain mapping, polygraphy and chemical analysis tests.

v) Documentary evidence like tickets, details of which cannot be revealed (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai 28 November 2006).

vi) Statement of one of the accused (Abrar Ahmed) who had turned approver (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 December 2006).

D) The credibility of the theory and the evidence

i) How could the "mastermind" Shabbir Batteriwala plan such blasts when he had been in the custody of Mumbai Police since the Mumbai train blasts, *i.e.*, two months before the Malegaon blasts?

ii) Why was the identity of the independent witness not disclosed?

iii) How far the statement of an approver is reliable when he had been in the unauthorised custody of police for a month?

iv) What has been disclosed in brain mapping and polygraphy tests? Is there any corroboration? Why was the narco-analysis test report not placed on record?

v) Why were the details of the tickets not being revealed?

vi) Isn't it possible for the police to manipulate evidence like "traces of RDX" from any place they wish or to record the "confessional" statements of the accused to suit their theory? (On this very point the Supreme Court has stayed the trial of this case.)

E) The questions that have remained unanswered

i) What happened to the sketches of two men who had

bought the cycles used in the blast?

ii) What was the result of the analysis of the telephone calls which were being probed by the local police?

iii) Were the accused involved in the Nanded blast of April 2006 interrogated? If so what was the finding? (It has now been confirmed that the accused involved in Nanded blast had also caused the blast at Parbhani, Purna and Jalna which, according to the police, had similar pattern as the Malegaon blast.) Moreover, a very important news item was published in the issue of 11 September 2006 of Urdu daily *Inquilab* of Mumbai. It said: "The dead body of a man who was wearing a fake beard and had died in the bomb blast of Malegaon has mysteriously disappeared. His body was badly mutilated and the lower part was completely missing. Aqeel Ahmed, a 37-year old tailor from Islampura area of Malegaon says that he himself had moved the dead body of this man into the ambulance van when his (fake) beard came off....The Malegaon Municipal Corporation Medical officer Dr. Wagh said that post-mortem had been carried on 30 corpses in Wadia Hospital and one body was autopsied in Dholia Hospital, but none of them was without legs....This revelation links these blasts to the explosions in the house of an RSS member in Nanded, from where fake beards were discovered."

iv) What transpired in the interrogation of 20 persons who had been detained from a predominantly Hindu locality of Malegaon?

v) And most important, why should Muslims stage bomb blasts to kill Muslims and that, too, at the time of an important festival?

F) New Revelation

While the people of Malegaon had been hoping to get satisfactory

answers to these questions from the CBI, the bizarre revelations in the investigation of Malegaon blast case of 2008 pointed to the possibility that the Malegaon blasts of 2006 were also the handiwork of the same group. Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune, 10 November 2008, quoting investigating officers reported, "some of 54 youths who participated in the training camp in Nagpur in 2001, were suspected to be involved in two Malegaon blasts and the Nanded blast."

iii) Ahmedabad bomb blasts and Surat unexploded bombs (26 July 2008)

A Brahminist lesson to Narendra Modi
Vital clues found in the investigation thrown to the winds
Sudden joint cracking of the case by Ahmedabad, Mumbai and Delhi Police, well-orchestrated by the IB
Muslim techies implicated after trial and error,
in order to give Ken Haywood a clean chit

On 26 July 2008, Ahmedabad was rocked by 17 blasts, killing over 50 persons and injuring about 100.

A) Initial reports

I) Indictment of Muslim outfits and/or persons from day one

1) The police see the hand of the "sleeper cell" of the SIMI in the carnage (*The Hindu*, 27 July 2008).

2) An activist of outlawed outfit SIMI by name Abdul Halim, wanted in connection with 2002 post-Godhra riots, was picked up by the police from Dani Limda area of Ahmedabad. He had remained elusive since the riots (*The Times of India*, Pune, 28 July 2008).

II) IB's interference in the investigation

1) Intelligence officials are veering round to the view that local

SIMI activists have engineered the serial blasts and the "Indian Mujahideen" was a front for outfits like LeT, JeM or HuJI and that the operation was funded from outside India (*The Telegraph*, Mumbai, 28 July 2008).

2) The Gujarat Police are struggling with a severe lack of intelligence because of the complete breakdown of the information network since communal violence of 2002. *All anti-terror operations conducted in Gujarat in the aftermath of communal violence were wholly based on tips from the central intelligence agencies* (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 27 July 2008).

3) The Union Home Ministry asked the Intelligence Bureau (IB) to specifically look into the *modus operandi* and "pattern" of the serial blasts in Ahmedabad, Jaipur, Hyderabad, Lucknow and Varanasi (*Deccan Herald*, 27 July 2008).

III) Emails of so-called terror outfits

1) An email was received by India TV office from a group called "Indian Mujahideen" only five minutes before the blasts claiming responsibility for them and taunting security agencies to try and prevent the serial attacks, just as was the case in the May 13 Jaipur blasts and November 23 court blasts in U.P. last year (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 27 July 2008).

2) Late in the *same* night, LeT and HuJI "accepted" the responsibility for the blasts (*Pudhari*, Pune, 27 July 2008).

3) A private channel had received an email saying that shortly bomb blasts would be carried out in Delhi (*Pudhari*, Pune, 28 July 2008).

IV) Important clues: Maharashtra connection

1) The police raided a Navi Mumbai flat on Sunday (27 July 2008) and seized a computer in connection with the email sent to TV channels the previous day. The flat was traced through the I.P. address of the email allegedly sent by

"Indian Mujahideen." The email sent from the account of "alarbi Gujarat" was traced to Ken Haywood, an American national, who had hired the flat in Navi Mumbai. He was working as a manager in Bangalore-based company called Campbell White. He also imparted IT training. Ken Haywood claimed that somebody had hacked into his computer and sent the email. Forensic experts were summoned to verify the facts (*The Times of India*, Pune, and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 28 July 2008).

2) There is an information that clues to Ahmedabad blasts are found in Navi Mumbai (*Pudhari*, Pune, 28 July 2008).

3) Moreover, the Gujarat Police conveyed to their Mumbai counterparts that the two Maruti "Wagon R" cars laden with explosives and found abandoned in Surat were registered in Navi Mumbai. An ATS officer of Mumbai confirmed this (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 29 July 2008).

V) Other reports

1) Most of the bombs were planted behind bicycles in tiffins contained in blue polythene bags, while the bombs in a hospital were placed on automobiles (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 27 July 2008).

2) The bombs were packed with timer devices and microprocessors. Preliminary report suggest ammonium nitrate was used in the bombs (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 27 July 2008)

3) The technique and *modus operandi* of Jaipur, Bangalore and Ahmedabad blasts are found to be the same (Marathi daily *Pudhari*, Pune, 28 July 2008).

4) On 27 July 2008, two unexploded car-bombs found in Surat in two Wagon R cars. Both the vehicles were CNG-run cars. In Ahmedabad also the vehicle that was used for explosion at Civil Hospital was a CNG run Wagon R car, which in fact points to the connection between Ahmedabad and Surat incidents (*The Times of India*, Pune,

28 July 2008 and *The Telegraph*, Mumbai, 28 July 2008).

B) Later reports - Surat bombs and further developments

1) From 27 to 30 July 2008, 23 live bombs were recovered and defused in Surat (*The Times of India*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
2) Experts from Forensic Science Laboratory confirmed that all of Surat's bombs were potent and would have caused a lot of destruction had they gone off (*The Times of India*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
3) HuJI accepted the responsibility for Ahmedabad blasts by sending a letter to the news channel TV9 of Gujarat (*Pudhari*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
4) Jaipur and Hyderabad Police arrived in Ahmedabad as there was a lot of similarity between the blasts of these two cities and that of Ahmedabad (*Sakal*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
5) In a twist to the mysterious live bombs found in Surat, the local police revealed that the Surat bombs were actually planted hours before the Ahmedabad serial bomb blasts took place. A citizen who had spotted the bombs and informed the police, revealed that he first spotted the bomb at 11.00 am on Saturday, *i.e.*, 26 July 2008. This means the Surat bombs were planted *before* the Ahmedabad serial blasts (*Asian Age*, 31 July 2008).

C) Theories of various agencies - all veering round Muslims only

1) A senior officer of the intelligence agency said that the "masterminds" of Bangalore and Ahmedabad blasts were Rasulkhan Parti and Mohammad Suphia, presently hiding in Pakistan (*Pudhari*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
2) The officers of ATS Mumbai claimed that underworld don Dawood Ibrahim was suspected to be involved in the serial blasts of Ahmedabad and that SIMI was not directly or indirectly involved in the blasts. With the help of underworld criminals in India, Dawood was suspected to have established "Indian Mujahideen" to which funds were supplied by ISI. It is also suspected that the gang engaged for stealing cars from Navi Mumbai must also be connected to Dawood (*Pudhari*, Pune, 31 July 2008).
3) Indian intelligence agencies, including the RAW, strongly suspect the involvement of Chhota Dawood and Ahmedabad-born Rasool Khan Yakoob Khan Pathan in the serial blasts in Gujarat and Bangalore. Chhota Dawood is operating from Peshawar in Pakistan and Rasool Khan Pathan has founded the new militant outfit "Indian Mujahideen." The two men are reportedly in touch with India's most wanted fugitive, Dawood Ibrahim, in Pakistan and work under his instructions and those of Pakistan's ISI (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 31 July 2008).
4) The police were investigating whether people behind the serial explosions in Ahmedabad and the failed attempts at Surat received local support. The agencies were believed to be questioning several Muslim clerics in Gujarat. Sources said some "maulvis" might have provided logistic support and shelter to the perpetrators of the blasts. Well-placed sources said that some maulvis from Ahmedabad, Bharuch and Mangrol and those who are originally from West Bengal have been detained and are being questioned (*DNA*, Mumbai, 1 August 2008).
5) Maharashtra's ATS suspects that the conspiracy for the serial bomb blasts in Ahmedabad was hatched by the SIMI during its meeting in Gujarat in January. One Abdul, who was arrested in March from Madhya Pradesh, told the ATS that around 15 SIMI men, including its chief, Safdar Nagori, his deputy Shibli Abdul, and two high-ranking activists from Gujarat, *viz.*, Sajid Mansoori and Asif Kagzi, attended the two-day training camp in a forest area near Halol, 50 km from Baroda on January 13-14. Mansoori from Baroda and Kagzi from Ahmedabad were believed to have gone underground after the blasts (*DNA*, Mumbai, 4 August 2008).

D) Vital clues found

1) The persons detained in connection with car thefts said during

interrogation that the stolen cars used for terrorist activities had passed through the Talasari toll *naka* (in Thane district of Maharashtra) on July 9 and July 20. As this toll *naka* has an elaborate network of CCTV cameras, which not only record the registration number of the vehicles crossing the *naka* but even take pictures of the drivers, the ATS Mumbai had hoped it could finally put a face to the Ahmedabad terror engineer. But, the ATS found to its dismay that the disc it seized from Talasari *naka* is "corrupted" and does not have any footage of the suspected terrorists crossing the *naka* with the cars stolen from Navi Mumbai on those two days. The Additional Commissioner ATS, Param Bir Singh, said, "we are probing whether there is any problem with it." He further said, "The footage either got deleted or was over-written. If it was inadvertently deleted, there was a way to retrieve it. However, if it had been rewritten, it was difficult to get it back."

Another senior IPS officer involved in the investigation said that the CCTV data could have been tampered with.

However, sources in Thane district police under which the toll *naka* falls, said that a few weeks ago they had been informed by toll-naka officials that CCTV apparatus was malfunctioning (*The Times of India*, Pune, and *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 1 August 2008).

2) The detonators used in the blasts in Ahmedabad and in the unexploded bombs in Surat, according to the markings on the detonators recovered from the sites, were learnt to have been manufactured by A.P. Explosives (P) Ltd., a company based in Andhra Pradesh. This company makes detonators and detonating fuses (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 31 July 2008).
3) The investigators believe that the explosive-manufacturing company in Rajasthan, *viz.*, Rajasthan Explosives and Chemicals Ltd. (RECL), in which the state government has a major stake, may have been the source of detonators in the 27 bombs defused in Surat. The RECL has already given a list of detonator buyers to

the Gujarat Police (*The Times of India*, Pune, 2 August 2008).
4) The LPG cylinders, which were used in the blasts at I.G Hospital and Civil Hospital, were found to be manufactured in Meerut, U.P. with their distributors traced to Kalupur, Ahmedabad. Sources said Ahmedabad's Detection of Crime Branch (DCB) has been inquiring into this matter (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 4 August 2008).
5) An accountant, Deepka Pandey, was arrested by Mumbai's Crime Branch officials on 31 July 2008 for allegedly sending an email to a news channel making threat of more blasts (*Asian Age*, Mumbai, 1 August 2008).
6) The Gujarat Police prepared three sketches of suspects based on the description given by an eyewitness who saw them planting the bombs in different parts of the city, the Jt. Commissioner of Police Ashish Bhatia said (*Rediff.com*, 2 August 2008).
7) The Gujarat Police released four sketches of three persons who were suspected to have planted bombs in Narol, Hatekeshwar and Raipur areas of the city (*The Statesman*, Mumbai, 7 August 2008).
8) Forensic investigators concluded that the improvised explosive devices (IED) used in the serial bombing in Ahmedabad were prepared by the same bomb makers who were responsible for earlier attacks in Jaipur, UP court-buildings, Gokul Chat Bhandar, Hyderabad and Sankat Mochan temple in Varanasi (*The Hindu*, Mumbai, 7 August 2008).
9) Hoping to get further insights into the threatening email sent a few minutes prior to the serial blasts in Ahmedabad, the city's forensic science laboratory sought opinion from an international facility, *i.e.*, Purdue University Cyber Forensic Lab, informed Ms. Rukmini Krishnamurthy, director of Forensic Science Laboratory (Kalina) (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 7 August 2008).

A team from the Gujarat Crime Branch, headed by ACP Usha

Rada, arrived in Mumbai on 6 August 2008. Ms. Rada said that the team would exclusively look into the email issue over the next few days. It was likely to interview Kenneth Haywood. It would also examine the 10 computers – three seized from Haywood's house and the remaining from the vicinity (*The Hindu*, Mumbai, 7 August 2008).

10) A Hero-Honda motorcycle (No. GJ-AT-4404), suspected to be involved in the Gujarat blast, was taken by a person, who gave his name as P.P. Desai, to a garage in Mahad (Distt. Ramagiri of Maharashtra) on 28 August. The person went away saying that he would come back within two days but never returned. When the Mumbai Police got information from the Gujarat Police about this motorcycle, a team of Mumbai Police came to Mahad on 9 October 2008 to inquire about it. The police contacted the authorised dealer-cum-garage-owner who only informed that the person was staying in a lodge. Further enquiry was going on (daily *Loksatta*, Mumbai (website), 10 October 2008).

E) Joint cracking of the case by Gujarat, Maharashtra and Delhi Police, well orchestrated by the IB: While the general public was expecting that the important clues found in the course of investigation would gradually unravel the mystery of the case, the Gujarat Police followed by Maharashtra and Delhi Police suddenly and dramatically declared the cracking of the case, without any reference to the earlier leads. The police story of the breakthrough is as follows:

1) On 16 August 2008, the Gujarat Police claimed a major breakthrough with the arrest of 11 activists of SIMI. According to the police, one Mufti Abul Bashar Qasmi of Azamgarh district of U.P. was the "mastermind." He had taken over from the former SIMI leader, Safdar Nagori, who had allegedly executed similar blasts in Jaipur, Hyderabad and Bangalore, and was later arrested in Indore in March 2008. One Sajid Mansoori, who was termed as the "coordinator," was arrested by Ahmedabad Police in Bharuch. A lot of information was obtained from

him. He is also said to have helped in getting the stolen cars from Vapi to Ahmedabad. The remaining nine accused, *viz.*, Usman Agarbattiwala, Arif, Imran Shaikh, Yunus Mansoori, Jahid Shaikh, Gyasuddin, Samshuddin, Kamaruddin and Iqbal, were also arrested by the Gujarat Police. Yunus Mansoori is said to have assembled the bombs. The others were allotted different jobs like doing the recce, getting the cycles, planting the bombs and doing other menial jobs. They all belonged to SIMI, but were working in the name of "Indian Mujahideen." The same group is also responsible for placing the bombs at Surat.

The above information was given by the DGP Gujarat, P.C. Pandey at a press conference. *He acknowledged the contribution of the IB*, among others, in cracking the case.

Though the DGP Gujarat did not mention the name of Taufiq Bilal *alias* Abdul Subhan, a resident of Mumbai, as one of the "masterminds," in the news reports emanating from Delhi and Mumbai, newspapers, quoting Addl. Commissioner, Crime Branch Gujarat Police and the officers of Crime Branch Mumbai, mentioned his name as one of the "masterminds" of the Ahmedabad terror plot. It is stated in the reports that he was a computer engineer and was conversant with the latest computer technology and suspected to have hacked into U.S. national Ken Haywood's computer to send the email minutes before the blasts. But from the report in *The Times of India*, Pune, 18 August 2008, it appeared that there was no unanimity between the Ahmedabad Police and the Crime Branch Mumbai whether Taufiq Bilal and Abdul Subhan were one and the same person or two different persons. There was no mention of his name in Abul Bashar's so-called "confessional" statement.

There are three versions as to how the police got information about Abul Bashar's gang:

i. While keeping an eye on unusual details, the cops managed to track down the "mastermind" and his entire group by tracing their mobile phones. Five pre-paid mobile phone

cards purchased at the same time, getting only incoming calls from different PCOs, were suddenly switched off on the day of the blasts (July 26) and this presented a vital clue to the cops. Alerted as a coincidence by a source, the investigators took pains to sift through details to reach the perpetrators. In one newspaper, it is stated that while searching a place police got the SIM cards.

ii. It was the arrest of one SIMI activist, Riyajuddin Nasir, at Honnali in Davangiri district of Karnataka during a routine traffic check by cops that led to the information about the network of terrorists.

iii. After the arrest of Sajid Mansoori, who had been absconding for seven years, the police got the clue about the serial bomb blast case (*Sakal*, Pune, *The Times of India*, Pune, and *Pudhari*, Pune, all dated 17 August 2008 and *The Times of India*, Pune, 18 August 2008).

In none of these newspaper reports, the dates of the above incidents, *viz.*, recovery of SIM cards, arrest of Riyajuddin Nasir and arrest of Sajid Mansoori have been mentioned and, hence, it is not known which was the first incident and which of the three "incidents" really led to the cracking of the case.

2) On 17 August 2008, the Maharashtra Police claimed that before the Gujarat Police announced cracking the Ahmedabad blasts, the ATS in Maharashtra had arrested Ayaz Shaikh and Nadeem Shaikh while the Crime Branch picked up Bilal Kagzi for suspected roles in the terror attack. However, on record, Ayaz and Nadeem were shown arrested in a fake-currency racket while Kagzi in an old extortion case. They and 10 others were allegedly a part of SIMI sleeper cell. One Yusuf Khan used to indoctrinate them. They had gone underground after Ahmedabad blasts (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 August 2008).

3) On 19 September 2008, the Delhi Police gunned down two

blast suspects in an "encounter" at Batla House, and arrested another while two others managed to escape. Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma of Delhi Police's Special Cell died after sustaining bullet injuries in the encounter. Of the two alleged terrorists shot dead, one has been identified as Atif, said to be a close aide of prime suspect Abdus Subhan Qureshi *alias* Tauqeer. The man arrested has been identified as Saif. This operation was carried out on the tip-off given by Mufti Abul Bashar, arrested earlier by the Ahmedabad Police.

The Delhi Police arrested three more blast suspects, *viz.*, Zia-ur-Rehman, Shakir Nisar and Mohammad Shakir on 21 September 2008, from the Jamia Nagar locality where the encounter had taken place on 19 September. The three arrested persons allegedly belonged to the "Indian Mujahideen" and were planning to explode at least 20 bombs in the city. They had at least four years association with Atif who was killed in the encounter (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 20 September 2008).

4) On 24 September 2008, the Mumbai Police declared that they had arrested five alleged "Indian Mujahideen" operatives from four different places in and around Mumbai over the past few days. They were Mohammad Sadiq, Afzal Usman, Mohammad Arif Shaikh, Mohammad Zakir Shaikh and Shaikh Mohammad Ansar. The five were allegedly responsible for stealing four cars from Navi Mumbai, two of which were used in the July blasts in Ahmedabad and the remaining two were recovered from Surat streets, laden with explosives. One of the five arrested, Mohammad Sadiq Shaikh, was one of the founder-members of the "IM" and it was he who "controlled" the Delhi module head Atif (who was gunned down during the Batla House "encounter" in Delhi). These five also "confessed" that they had planted some of the bombs on Mumbai trains in July 2006, giving a new twist to the 2006 serial blasts case.

All the five persons arrested are from Azamgarh in Uttar

Pradesh. Sadiq, the undisputed leader of the module, was a programme engineer in an electronic company. But the e-expert in the group was software engineer Ansar who was among the five arrested. But on 26 September the Jt. C.P. (Crime) Mumbai, Rakesh Maria, said that the idea of sending the email was of Roshan Khan *alias* Riyaz Bhatkal, an ideologue of the "IM." According to the police, the organisation was backed by HuJI and LeT (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 August 2008; *Sakal*, Pune, 27 August 2008).

5) On 6 October 2008, the Mumbai Police claimed to have nabbed key members of the terror module allegedly responsible for the bomb blasts in Ahmedabad, Hyderabad and planting bombs in Surat. They declared that 11 suspected "IM" terrorists from Pune, Mangalore and Mumbai had been arrested, out of whom three were directly involved in sending terror emails that had shocked the country. These are highly qualified, computer savvy people belonging to good and educated families. One of the suspects, Mohammad Mansoor Peerbhoy *alias* Mannu, a resident of Pune, was employed with Yahoo as a principal software engineer and was responsible for finalising the draft emails before they were sent from three different locations in Mumbai. The two others are Mubin Shaikh, a senior technical advisor in an IT company and Asif Bashir Shaikh *alias* Mehmood, a mechanical engineer, both from Pune.

Mumbai Police Jt. CP, Maria, claimed that the interrogation of five members of "IM" arrested on September 23 led to the arrest of the above eleven persons. The police have seized two revolvers, 45 bullets, bullet-proof jackets, life jackets, six laptops, wi-fi router and Rs 11.5 lakh in cash (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 7 October 2008).

F) Sudden departure of the U.S. national Ken Haywood

1) While the investigations were on, Kenneth Haywood suddenly left for America from Delhi airport by an early morning flight on Monday, 18 August 2008. The ATS Chief Hemant Karkare said that he was asked not to leave the country till the enquiry was completed. Haywood had said that he would come for enquiry on Monday, but he left the country early morning of that day. It seems there was an error at Delhi airport in not following the look-out notice in respect of him. The Mumbai Police claimed that the look-out notice was sent to the Immigration Branch at Indira Gandhi International (IGI) airport Delhi and the Foreign Regional Registration Office (FRRO) was intimated about it. This has led to the speculation that the Indian Government allowed him to leave the country (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, 19 August 2008).

2) *Clean chit to Kenneth Haywood:* As nothing objectionable was noticed in the brain-mapping and polygraph tests of Ken Haywood, the ATS has decided to cancel the look-out notice issued against him (daily *Sakal*, Pune, 21 August 2008).
3) The intelligence agencies claim that Campbell White executive Ken Haywood was more a preacher than a communicator.
4) There had been conjecture in the media that one of the reasons for his "slipping out" of the country was the ATS's intention to carry out narco-analysis test on him (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 September 2008).
5) Haywood landed at Mumbai airport on Wednesday midnight (11 September 2008) after spending nearly a month in his home town in Arizona. There, according to him, he was trying to get over the trauma of being investigated by the ATS (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 September 2008).

G) The issue of ban on SIMI

While the 6 August 2008 relief by the Special Tribunal for SIMI had been immediately challenged by the Centre before the apex court which ordered a freeze on the tribunal's order, the intervening period has seen the Gujarat Police in coordination with the police of state governments of different stripes as well as the Intelligence Bureau (IB)

unearthing the involvement of the fundamentalist organisations in the terror attack on Ahmedabad. The investigation in this case provided "strong evidence" that SIMI and its hardline version "Indian Mujahideen" were involved in the blasts across the country (*The Times of India*, Pune, 21 August 2008).

H) Serious loopholes, shortcomings, anomalies and doubts

It is surprising that the case was suddenly detected, even without following the leads found during the investigation. In order to satisfy the natural curiosity of the laymen, the investigation agencies should declare what happened to those leads and should also clear some other logical doubts concerning the investigation, some of which are mentioned below:

1) The CCTV data at the Talasari toll *naka* was an extremely important piece of evidence. But the hard discs seized by the ATS were suspected to be corrupted. The matter needed to be probed deep as to whether the discs were corrupted intentionally or otherwise. The ATS was supposed to inquire on following points among others, *viz.*,
   i) Whether the CCTV was functioning on 9 and 20 July?
   ii) Whether pictures of other vehicles crossing the *naka* on those two days have been recorded?
   iii) Who was operating the CCTV – the police or the toll *naka* employees?
   iv) When did the Thane Police receive the complaint about malfunctioning of the CCTV apparatus? Is there any record of that complaint? What action was taken thereon?
   v) Whether anybody right from the main contractor to the lowest employee, connected with the toll *naka* was associated with any communal organisation?

   As months have passed, the above enquiry must have been completed by now. If so, what is the finding of the enquiry?
2) Some persons who had been detained in connection with car-thefts had said during the interrogation that the stolen cars used for blasts had passed through the Talasari toll *naka* on 9 and 20 July (*The Times of India*, Pune, 1 August 2008). Who were the detained persons? What happened to them next? What other information did they give about the terrorists?
3) The source of detonators in 27 bombs defused by the police in Surat was suspected to be Dholpur-based RECL. What further investigation was made in this matter? What was the finding?
4) Similarly, what enquiry was made about the connection between the detonators and the A.P. Explosives (P.) Ltd., based in Andhra Pradesh?
5) Ahmedabad's Detection of Crime Branch (DCB) was inquiring into the source of gas cylinders used in the blasts? What is the outcome of the enquiry?
6) One Deepak Pandey was arrested by Mumbai Crime Branch officials on 31 July 2008 for allegedly sending an email to a news channel making threat of more blasts. What enquiry was made about his connection and associations?
7) The Gujarat Police had prepared three sketches of suspects based on the description given by an eyewitness. This information was published rediff.com on 2 August 2008. Again, in *The Statesman* (Mumbai) of 7 August 2008, a news item was published saying that the Gujarat Police released four sketches of three persons who were suspected to have planted bombs. It is not clear whether the same news was published twice or the Gujarat Police withdrew its earlier sketches and released fresh ones? If latter is the case, what prompted the police to do so? Was there any similarity between the earlier and later sketches or were they totally different? Or were the later sketches prepared as per the description of the suspects pre-decided by the IB and the police?
8) It appears that the IB, the Gujarat Police, the Maharashtra Police and the Delhi Police adopted a trial and error method of investigation and after trying out various theories, zeroed in on

the Mufti Abul Bashar theory, which was declared to the media by DGP Gujarat, PC Pandey, who claimed that the case was fully cracked. But how the case was detected still remains a mystery. Whether the arrest of Riyajuddin Nasir in Karnataka or the arrest of Sajid Mansoori at Bharuch or the recovery of mobile phone cards at some place led to the cracking of the case is not clear. As the police have not given the dates of these three incidents, it cannot be said which was the first incident that led to the detection. The theory of mobile phone SIM cards is incomprehensible. The police said, "Five pre-paid SIM cards purchased at the same time getting only incoming calls from different PCOs suddenly switched off on the day of the blast presented a vital clue." In one newspaper it was stated that while keeping an eye on unusual details, the cops managed to track down the gang by tracking their mobile phones, while another newspaper reported that while searching a place the police found the SIM cards.

As an experienced police officer, I fail to understand what came first. Whether the cards were recovered first which led to the information that they had been purchased at the same time and were suddenly switched off after the blasts or is it the other way round, *i.e.*, the information about the cards being purchased at the same time, etc., was obtained first and then the mobile phone cards were recovered. If the cards were recovered first then the question arises as to where were they recovered from and how the police came to know that place? It is also not clear as to what were the unusual details which the police had kept an eye on; how those details led the police to the "masterminds"; and what information the source gave to the police by "coincidence" and which were the details that the police took pains to sift through.

Unless the above questions are satisfactorily answered, the theory of the police (read IB) will not be believed by anybody, least of all, the court.

9) The Forensic Science Laboratory (Kalina) had sought opinion from Purdue University Cyber Forensic Lab about the threatening email sent through Ken Haywood's computer. Moreover, a team from the Gujarat Crime Branch had arrived in Mumbai to exclusively look into the email issue. What opinion did the Purdue University give? And what were the findings of the enquiry by the team of the Gujarat Crime Branch?

10) What is most surprising is the sudden departure of Ken Haywood from India and the promptness and keenness on the part of the Mumbai Police and the IB to give a clean chit to a fugitive. A lot of questions arise in this regard:

   a. When his role was suspected in such a sensational case, why didn't the Mumbai Police keep surveillance over him?
   b. Could a person against whom a look-out notice had been issued leave the country without the active connivance of the immigration authority which, in case of India, is IB?
   c. What was the hurry for ATS Mumbai to give him a clean chit within two days of his sudden flight, when the enquiry against him was not completed; when the police had not come to a definite conclusion whether his computer had been hacked or he himself had sent that email; when his conduct of leaving the country while enquiry against him in a serious matter was going on was highly suspicious? Or was there some pressure from IB to do so under the pretext of international relations?
   d. When he returned to India after a month, why was the IB so prompt to declare that he was more a preacher than a computer expert even though he was working as an IT trainer? Was the IB apprehensive that their game plan would be exposed if a thorough probe was made in Haywood's case?
   e. What did he do in America for a month? Was he being tutored by the IB and some American experts how to answer the queries, how to get over the narco-analysis test,

if done, and how to wriggle out of the imbroglio?

11) Over-enthusiasm to implicate computer savvy Muslim boys – IB's guilty conscience

The above theory of utter anxiety on the part of the IB is confirmed by the eagerness of the investigating agencies, especially the Mumbai Police, to implicate a highly computer-savvy person as an accused in a group of terrorists so that Haywood could be absolved. But curiously enough, initially the Gujarat Police did not appear very keen to give him a clean chit, whereas the Mumbai Crime Branch, apparently working at the behest of the IB, was extremely keen on this count. The Gujarat DGP, while announcing the cracking of the case, did not even mention the name of the so-called "computer expert" and "master hacker" Taufiq as one of the accused in the case, but the Mumbai Police declared on the same day that "one of the persons picked up by them (Mumbai Police) could be Taufiq, the man Gujarat Police suspects to be one of the "masterminds," but we are not announcing anything till we ascertain his antecedents." But, in the same breath, they declared, "Taufiq was conversant with the latest technology, he is a master hacker and that he is suspected to have hacked into Haywood's computer to send the email."

It seems that the Gujarat Police was keen to do the real investigation and to go to the root of it as the blasts in Ahmedabad and bombs in Surat were a heavy blow to the Gujarat Government's oft-repeated tall claims that terrorist could not dare enter their territory and a heavier blow to the image of its Chief Minister, Narendra Modi. But the IB, on the other hand, for obvious reasons, did not want a thorough probe into the matter and wanted the investigating agencies to do investigation as per its diktat. Though the difference in approach of the Gujarat Police and IB had been evident in the beginning, it appears that through somebody's intervention, the

Gujarat Government was brought round to toeing the line of the IB. That somebody, could most probably be the senior leaders of RSS and the reason given for convincing Narendra Modi could be "national interest" or "international relations", which, in fact, are very vague terms and nobody spells out their details, and no politician bothers to know about them. The long and short of it is that ultimately there was unanimity among various agencies for accepting the IB's theory of investigation, to give a clean chit to Ken Haywood, and to make some Muslim boys a scapegoat by manipulating evidence to prove that they hacked into Haywood's computer and sent the email. But to substantiate this theory, the investigation agencies required a highly sophisticated computer expert capable of hacking into others' computers so that nobody should suspect the credentials of the investigating agency. The IB seemed to have allotted this important task to Mumbai Crime Branch as it might have marked some officer in the Crime Branch as a soft target who could be easily manoevered.

Accordingly, the Mumbai Police got on the job and adopted a trial and error method. They had already declared Taufiq's name as a person who sent the emails through Haywood's computer without getting to know his expertise. Suddenly his name was dropped and names of Mohammad Sadiq and Ansar were declared by the Mumbai Police but the very next day it was clarified by the Crime Branch Mumbai that one Riyaz Bhatkal was the brain behind sending the email. But it appears that none of them were found to be up to the mark and expert enough to hack into others' computers. Therefore, the Mumbai Police, after thorough "enquiry" zeroed in on three highly qualified computer experts from Pune, *viz.*, Mansoor Peerbhoy, Mubin Shaikh and Asif Bashir Shaikh and arrested them all. While arresting them, they also seized, among other things, six computers and a wi-fi router so that they could manipulate the computer records during the period of their police custody in order

to show that they hacked Haywood's computer and sent the email through it and thereby the police could give Haywood a final clean chit.

Some more points have remained unanswered, *viz.*,

12) What transpired in the enquiry of the Hero Honda motorcycle, found in Mahad, which was suspected to be involved in Gujarat blasts?
13) Was the encounter at Batla House, Delhi, on 19 September 2008, in which two suspects were killed and two managed to escape, a part of the investigation to plug the loopholes in the investigation by showing the hand-written diaries with detailed information, mobile phones, computers, explosives, weapons, etc., on the persons of the dead?
14) Has the whole episode, including the investigation, anything to do with the verdict given by the Special Tribunal against the continuance of the ban on SIMI on the ground that there is no sufficient evidence against SIMI?

I) Arresting a "reserved accused" with six names

In spite of the joint efforts of the Gujarat Police, Delhi Police and Crime Branch Mumbai under stewardship of the IB, the police did not seem to be confident and there still appeared to be some missing links in the investigation as seen from the following news report: "Madhya Pradesh ATS has arrested Quyamuddin Kapadia, a key conspirator and executor of Ahmedabad blast on 9 November 2008. He was in constant touch with the alleged terrorists killed and held in Batla House encounter. He has nearly half a dozen names – Qayamuddin Kapadia *alias* Moosa *alias* Ashfaq *alias* Abdul Qadir *alias* Rizwan. He identified all those in Ahmedabad and Delhi blasts. He is a resident of Taiwade in Vadodara. He and his brother are running a DTP business in Vadodara. His father is an "imam" there (*The Times of India*, Pune, 11 November 2008).

In fact, the name of this person never appeared in the investigation.

He seems to have been arrested merely as a "reserved accused," as a precautionary measure, so that if in future some link is found missing, he could be substituted by the name which would suit the police best out of his six *aliases*. There can be no other explanation for his arbitrary arrest. His father was an "imam" and he ran a computer-related business were reasons enough for the police to justify his arrest.

J) "Mastermind" Tauqueer dropped

It is not for the first time that the police assigned many *aliases* to blast-case suspects in order to confuse the public, the media and the government, and also to have a leeway for manoeuvering in future. But in the process, they lost track of the main objective and got themselves further confused.

As discussed earlier, the Crime Branch Mumbai, apparently at the instance of the IB, and later followed by Gujarat Crime Branch and Delhi Police, declared one Tauqueer *alias* Abdul Subhan *alias* Taufiq Bilal *alias* Abdul Subhan Qureshi *alias* Kasim as the "bomb-making expert," "master hacker" and the "mastermind" behind the Ahmedabad and many other blasts. The main intention of the Crime Branch Mumbai in touting him as such was to show him as the person who sent emails using Ken Haywood's account and hacking into his computer so that Haywood could be given a clean chit. But in their enthusiasm they failed to verify whether he was qualified enough for the role being assigned to him – a computer wizard capable of sending emails by hacking into others' computers. Later, as he was found to be far below the mark, the Crime Branch Mumbai had to eat humble pie and drop his name altogether (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 19 February 2009). Indeed, Crime Branch Mumbai described Tauqeer as "Media Creation" and his name did not figure in the chargesheet (*The Times of India*, 7 October 2008; *The Indian Express*, 19 February 2009). This point has been dealt with in more detail in the note concerning the Delhi blasts.

K) Logical conclusion

The above observations are based on the reports appearing in leading

newspapers in respect of the Ahmedabad blasts and the recovery of unexploded bombs in Surat and the investigations thereof. If one reads the news reports between the lines, one is constrained to come to a reasonable and logical conclusion that the explosions in Ahmedabad and planting of bombs in Surat were the handiwork of the IB at the instance of the inner core leadership of the RSS and in conjuction with some American agency of which Ken Haywood was the agent, with the dual objective of giving a heavy blow to Gujarat Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, who had become too big for his boots and had the audacity to challenge the Brahminist RSS leadership, and of creating evidence against SIMI by implicating Muslim boys, and manipulating evidence against them so that the Tribunal's order could be effectively challenged in the Supreme Court. The central government, as usual, must be unaware of this IB conspiracy and must be swallowing whatever is fed to it by the IB.

iv) Delhi bomb blast 2008 (13 September 2008)

Batla House "encounter" to fill in all the gaps
Suspicious death of Inspector Sharma
Terrorists' SIM cards traced to Aurangabad (Maharashtra), but not followed up
Falsely implicating Muslim techies to save Ken Haywood

A) Initial Reports

I) Indictment of "Muslim" outfits/persons from day one

1) "Indian Mujahideen," a shadow amalgam of banned SIMI and LeT claimed responsibility through an email sent to media organisations around the same time when blasts occurred (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 14 September 2008).
2) An official of the Gujarat Police said that SIMI activists Qayamuddin, wanted for serial blasts in Ahmedabad, could be the terrorist behind the attack in New Delhi along with Abdul Subhan *alias* Tauqeer (*The Times of India*, Pune, 16 September 2008; *Sakal*, Pune 16 September 2008).
3) Subhan, who was working with a multi-national firm in Mumbai, had left the job and allegedly joined SIMI. He also had wide knowledge about making of bombs, as per the Gujarat Police (*The Times of India*, Pune, 16 September 2008; *Sakal*, Pune, 16 September 2008).

II) Other Reports

1) At least 18 people were killed and 70 injured in five serial blasts. The blasts rocked Connaught Place, Ghaffar Market in Karol Bagh and M-Block Market in Greater Kailash (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 14 September 2008).
2) Explosives were planted in dustbins in Connaught Place area while in Greater Kailash, one was in a dustbin and another on a bicycle (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 14 September 2008).
3) At least two unexploded bombs were recovered outside Regal Cinema in Connaught Place and near India Gate (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 14 September 2008).
4) Ammonium nitrate and timers were used in the bombs (*Pudhari*, Pune, 14 September 2008).
5) The email received by IBN7 channel was sent from Chembur area of Mumbai (*Pudhari*, Pune, 14 September 2008; *Sakal*, Pune, 14 September 2008).

B) The claim of Delhi Police – important clues found

1) The Delhi Police claimed to have found important clues in connection with the blasts and to have detained 20 suspects in this connection (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 September 2008).
2) The name of a Mumbai-based SIMI operative has emerged as the "mastermind" behind these blasts and three persons from U.P. are suspected in this case (*Pudhari*, Pune,

16 September 2008).

3) According to a Delhi Police spokesperson, there is a similarity between Delhi and Ahmedabad blasts (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 September 2008).
4) Investigation is being done about the role of Mumbai blast "mastermind," Tauqueer. He is suspected to have sent emails to media offices in the name of "Indian Mujahideen" by hacking into a wi-fi system in Mumbai (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 September 2008).
5) Tauqueer *alias* Abdus Subhan Qureshi, *alias* Tauqueer Bilal is suspected to be in Mumbai and the police have launched a massive drive to arrest him (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 September 2008).
6) He was learnt to have graduated from Vidya Bhavan in Navi Mumbai and had taken computer training at a private institute in Andheri (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 September 2008).

C) An encounter by Delhi Police, followed by the detection of the case

1) In an "encounter" by the Delhi Police at Batla House, two alleged terrorists, *viz*., Atif and Sajid were killed, two "terrorists" escaped, one by the name of Saif, was arrested and more importantly, Delhi Police's encounter specialist, Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma lost his life. This information was given by the Jt. Commissioner of Special Cell Delhi Police (*The Times of India*, Pune, 20 September 2008; *Sakal*, Pune, 20 September 2008).
2) According to the police, the main accused in Ahmedabad blast case, Abul Bashar, had repeatedly mentioned the name of Atiq [Atif] *alias* Bashar and he himself (Abul Bashar) was staying near Batla House in Jamia Nagar for some time along with Atiq [Atif] and the "mastermind" behind Delhi blasts, Tauqeer. He was brought in the area on Thursday (18 September 2008) for identifying the place. On being convinced that Atiq [Atif] had holed up on the third floor of a building in this area, the police started the operation the next morning (*Sakal*, Pune, 20 September 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, 20 September 2008).

D) Within hours of the encounter, the police were ready with all the information about the terrorists, their terror outfits and their misdemeanours

1) The Delhi Police claimed that Pakistan-based LeT was a vital link of the banned SIMI and "Indian Mujahindeen," which were behind the serial blasts in various parts of the country.
2) Atif (Atiq) *alias* Bashir was the "main man" from "Indian Mujahideen" and seemed to have been inspired by Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden, Jt. C.P. (Special Cell) of Delhi Police, Karnal Singh said.
3) Police seized the laptop of Atif which contained material about Al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden.
4) Singh said, with the arrest of Saif from Jamia Nagar during Friday's shootout and of Zeeshan later in the night, the serial-blasts case in U.P. courts last year had been cracked. Singh said, Saif had planted the bomb in Varanasi court along with one Sajjad, suspected to be the main bomb maker of "Indian Mujahideen."
5) Singh said, the explosive material for the serial blasts in the national capital had come from Karnataka.
6) Acting on a tip-off, police arrested Zeeshan, a suspected militant, from the premises of a news channel, where he had gone for giving an interview.
7) Investigators are on a lookout for at least ten people who planted bombs following the disclosure by Mohammad Saif.
8) The officials claimed that Saif has confessed to his role – he had allegedly planted the bomb near Regal Cinema in Connaught Place.

9) Saif also told investigators that Atif was the "mastermind" behind the blasts. Atif planted the bomb in Greater Kailash Market (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 21 September 2008 for all the above 1-9 points).

E) Further Investigation

1) At the instance of Saif and Zeeshan, three more suspects, Zia-ur-Rehman, Shakir Nisar and Mohammad Shakil were arrested early on Sunday (21 September 2008) from Jamia Nagar (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 22 September 2008).
2) These three persons disclosed that the "Indian Mujahideen" was planning to strike terror in the national capital in a big way by exploding at least 20 bombs in several parts of the city (*The Times of India*, Pune, 22 September 2008).
3) The police also arrested Abdul Rehman, the care-taker of Batla House [flat] and the father of the arrested Zia, for allegedly forging the signature of the owner of the house (*The Times of India*, Pune, 22 September 2008).
4) The Delhi Police raided an engineering college (at Lucknow) and verified the bank accounts of Atif and his accomplice Sakib in a Bank of India branch. The reports earlier on the day that Sakib's bank accounts had exposed transactions of "around three crores" proved extremely exaggerated as there was a total balance of only Rs 1,437 in the account and there were three to four transactions of not more than Rs. 20,000 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 24 September 2008).
5) Nine of the 13 accused involved in Delhi blasts were i) Atif Amin *alias* Bashir (22), ii) Mohammad Shakil (24), iii) Mohammad Saif (22), iv) Mohammad Sajid *alias* Pankaj (17) v) Zeeshan (24), vi) Saquib Nisar (23), vii) Zia-ur-Rehman (22) viii) Arif (21) and ix) Sajid, out of whom Atif was claimed to be involved in Ahmedabad, Varanasi, Jaipur and Hyderabad blasts; Mohammad Shakil and Mohammad Sajid *alias* Pankaj in

Ahmedabad blasts and Mohammad Saif in Ahmedabad and Varanasi blasts, in addition to Delhi blasts (*The Times of India*, Pune, 24 September 2008).
6) The Kolkata Police claimed that Mohammad Sadiq *alias* Sadaqat, one of the terror suspect held for the recent string of blasts across the country, had a role in the Delhi and Ahmedabad blasts also (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 11 November 2008).
7) The SIM cards found with the associates of the terrorists killed in Batla House encounter at Delhi, two months ago, are found to have been procured from a Mobile Shop called "Gauri Enterprises" at Chitte Pimpalgaon near Aurangabad by using forged documents. This has transpired in the investigation of the ATS. It has also been disclosed that 15 more such SIM cards have been obtained and all these cards had been in use since April 2007 (Marathi daily *Lokmat*, Nagpur, 8 December 2008).

What is more surprising is the fact that when the encounter was in progress at Batla House, contact was being made by one of the terrorists using one of these SIM cards to a mobile phone number in Aurangabad. This was revealed from the call details of the mobile phones found with one of the terrorists. These cards were obtained in the name of one "Nawaz Aziz Shaikh" of Chitte Pimpalgaon. The police searched the area and made a thorough enquiry, but no person by that name was found to be residing in that locality.

Further enquiry by the ATS revealed that the owner of the mobile phone shop "Gauri Enterprises," Mangesh Doiphode, had himself acquired the SIM cards by using forged documents, had got them activated and given them to the terrorists. The police have registered a case against him, have arrested him and are investigating the matter. Still it is not clear as to who really received the SIM cards, who ordered and paid for them, who used them and with whom they are at present (*Lokmat*, Nagpur, 8 December 2008).

F) Part chargesheet filed

1) A chargesheet limited to Karol Bagh blasts was filed in the court against five suspected "Indian Mujahideen" terrorists, ज़ै, Mohammad Saif, Zeeshan Ahmed, Saquib Nisar, Zia-ur-Rehman and Mohammad Shakeel.
2) According to the chargesheet, the investigators have revealed that 22 persons were involved in the blasts at Karol Bagh. Two of them were killed by the police at Jamia Nagar, and 13 are still at large. One of the accused, Mohammad Mansur Peerbhoy, is in the custody of the Mumbai Police. The police told the court that it would file another chargesheet against two other accused – Sadiq Shaikh and Qayamuddin.
3) In the chargesheet, the police have admitted that they could have averted the terror-strike had they been able to decode the telephone conversation they had intercepted. The mobile phone under interception (9811004309) was that of Mohammad Atif Ameen, alleged to be the leader of the "IM" module. Atif's number came to the notice of the police because of the investigation into an East Delhi cyber café from where emails had been sent in connection with the 2007 serial blasts in U.P. courts. The police happened to intercept his mobile phone from 2 to 19 September, a few days before and after Delhi blasts.
4) In the chargesheet, the police have listed the mobile phone numbers of the alleged terrorists who were arrested and this showed their presence at blast sites when they were making recce along with Atif before the blasts.
5) The police said they had seized the laptop of Atif which had a lot of Jihadi songs and literature. Data had also been extracted from the mobile phone and the memory card of his mobile phone. Video clippings of explosive material, vehicles and sites of blasts in Ahmedabad were also taken as evidence.
6) Interrogation of five accused have revealed that Atif was also involved in various blasts across the country since 2005.
7) The chargesheet said that one Amir Raja Khan of Pakistan, assisted by SIMI and LeT, had formed The "Indian Mujahideen" which allegedly had four wings – two for terror attacks in South and North, one for attacking VVIPs and the fourth for media coordination (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 December 2008).

G) The Evidence on record

From the part of the chargesheet reproduced in the Pune edition of *The Times of India* (18 December 2008), the following appears to be the main evidence in the case:

i) The taped telephone conversation purportedly intercepted by the police from mobile phone No. 9811004309, which allegedly belonged to Atif, from 2 to 19 September 2008.
ii) Mobile numbers of alleged terrorists to show their presence at blast sites.
iii) The laptop, mobile phone, video clippings and memory card of the mobile phone allegedly seized from Atif; and
iv) Confessional statements of the arrested accused.

H) What legal value do the above pieces of evidence have?

i) Interception of mobile phone conversation

The extraordinary aspect of the chargesheet was the *suo moto* and needless admission by the police of their failure to decode the intercepted conversation of the mobile phone *before* the Delhi blast took place. This speaks of their guilty conscience. It means either that they want to hide some facts or that they want to prove something which does not exist. On the face of it, this piece of evidence appears fabricated and false. If a fair trial is conducted in this case, the police will be hard put to clarify the following points:

a) When did the police inquire into the email sent in connection with the 2007 blasts in U.P. courts?

b) When did the police get Atif's mobile phone number?
c) Where was Atif's SIM card purchased from and in whose name was it purchased?
d) Why didn't the police keep the number under surveillance for over a year?
e) Are the call records of this number available? If so, whether they match with the periods of each conversation and with the phone numbers on the other side?
f) In which coded language were the conversations conducted? How and when were they decoded?

ii) Mobile numbers of other arrested accused

Before accepting their evidence, the court has to be satisfied on the following points:

a) In whose names were the SIM cards?
b) Who had purchased them? And from whom?
c) Are the call records of all these numbers available?

iii) Laptop, mobile phone, memory card and video clippings of Atif

Isn't it possible to manipulate the data in the laptop, mobile phone and memory card and prepare video clippings? It is very difficult to establish the authenticity of this evidence unless the police prove beyond reasonable doubt that all these materials were seized on the spot in the presence of respectable residents of that locality. It is all the more difficult for the police to prove this, given the serious controversy surrounding the Batla House shootout.

iv) The confessional statements of arrested accused

As most of these statements have been recorded by police officers, they are not admissible under the Indian Evidence Act. Though under some draconian law they have been made admissible, many petitions challenging these extraordinary provisions are under the consideration of superior courts. Therefore, such confessional statements are unlikely to stand judicial scrutiny at this stage.

I) The gaping hole in the investigation

There is a football-size gaping hole called "Batla House shootout" in this investigation. In this shootout two "terrorists," Atif and Sajid, were killed, two escaped, one by name of Saif was caught alive and, more importantly, Delhi Police's encounter specialist Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma lost his life in circumstances shrouded in deep mystery. While all important newspapers gave this incident a very wide publicity, the local residents criticised it as a fake encounter and demanded judicial enquiry into the incident. Though it is very difficult to say which version is correct, there are reasonable grounds to suspect the veracity of the incident. The following points need to the considered before coming to any definite conclusion:

1) Whether the Delhi "Special Cell" Police knew that the terrorists had been residing at L-18, Batla House, Jamia Nagar or they went there for investigation and were taken by surprise by the terrorists and were ambushed?

From the analysis of reports published in the newspapers and periodicals, it is seen that the police knew before hand that the "terrorists" had been residing at L-18, Batla House.

As claimed by the police, if they went to L-18, Batla House for *investigation* and were taken by surprise by the "terrorists," then how is it that it took them only a few hours to crack neatly *all* the cases of bomb blasts that have occurred during the last couple of years? In the news conference on the same day, Delhi Police Commissioner, YS Dadwal, declared Atif as the "mastermind" behind all recent bomb blasts and described Sajid as the bomb maker. "Explosives made by him and his team bore their "signature" – two detonators, wooden frame, ammonium nitrate and analog quartz clock," Dadwal said (*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 20 September 2008). The question is how the police, which did not even expect an encounter in the morning, was able to say with confidence only hours later that the bombs used in Delhi blasts bore the

"signature" of the slain Sajid.

The reports published in leading newspapers quoting reliable sources also suggest that the police knew beforehand that the "terrorists" had been hiding at L-18, Batla House.

i) Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune, reported on 20 September 2008, that "He [Abul Bashar, an accused in Ahmedabad blasts], was brought in the area on Thursday [18 September] for identifying the place. On getting information that Atif had holed up on the third floor of the building in this area, the police started the operation next morning.

ii) *The Times of India*, Pune (20 September 2008) also reported, "Police helped by NSG commandos surrounded the house L-18 in the crowded Jamia Nagar neighbourhood after a tip-off from Abul Bashar, the Ahmedabad-blast suspect, who was brought to the capital on Thursday. If, thus, the Special Cell Police definitely knew that a "top commander" and his team of terrorists were residing at L-18 then the question is: why couldn't they use the usual and better methods such as surrounding the building, making public announcement asking the terrorists to surrender and, with the help of the local police station staff and the respectable people of the area, make them surrender?

2) Whether the conduct of the terrorists showed their guilty conscience?

If the reports published in various newspapers and periodicals are to be believed, the answer is an emphatic "no", *e.g.*:

a) Atif, who was killed in the encounter had, while taking the flat on hire in August personally visited the local police station, furnished the identity cards and rent receipts in respect of him and his partner and obtained the seal of the police station on the tenancy agreement (Marathi Weekly *Shodhan*, 14-20 November 2008, *The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

b) Atif had his driving licence made by providing his true and correct details (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

c) Zeeshan was living in the same flat with Atif. On the day of encounter he had gone for work. As he came to know about the incident, he did not abscond, but went to the office of Aaj Tak TV channel to prove his innocence. From there he was arrested by the police (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, 14-20 November 2008).

d) Sakib, who had also been arrested in Ahmedabad blast-case, was appearing in his examination in Delhi at the time of the blasts (Marathi weekly *Shodhan*, 14-20 November 2008)

e) They had bought the SIM cards in their own names by furnishing true information (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

f) Those who were studying had got their true names and addresses registered in their schools and institutions (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

g) They did not change their residences frequently nor did they feel the need to flee (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 November 2008).

Thus, there seems to be no trace of a guilty conscience in their previous or subsequent conduct.

3) Had Inspector Mohan Chand Sharma rubbed his seniors in the Special Cell or the IB the wrong way?

There are reasons to suspect that it was so, as otherwise, there was no reason why a much decorated officer like M.C. Sharma should be transferred from the prestigious Special Cell of the Delhi Police to the non-descript Police Training College at Jharoda Kalan, widely perceived to be a punishment posting (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 22 September 2008).

This order had been issued only a few days before the incident and he had also been relieved from the Special Cell. But instead of joining the new post, *he had proceeded on leave*. What could be the reason for his

unceremonious ouster from the Special Cell? Was there any serious lapse on his part or was it that he knew something which the IB or the Delhi Police did not want him to know? In short, he was no longer in good books of the IB and Special Cell. Then the question arises as to why was he so urgently called for the operation, *even though he was on leave?*

4) Why was Inspector Sharma not wearing bullet proof vest (BPV)?

The reasons given by the police at different times are contradictory and hence not convincing. Initially the senior officers of the Special Cell gave the reason for the officers in the operation not wearing BPVs as a precaution "to maintain secrecy in a cramped area like Batla House" (*Tehelka*, 4 October 2008). They also said that "Entering a crowded locality with BPVs would alert suspects and give them time to escape" (*The Indian Express*, Delhi, 9 October 2008). But when they were confronted with the facts that Sajid had been shot repeatedly in the head, they came out with a story that Sajid was lying on the floor when he opened fire at a cop. The cop, *who unlike Inspector Sharma, was wearing a bullet-proof vest*, retaliated by firing a burst from the AK-47 which hit Sajid on the head (*The Times of India*, Delhi, 8 October 2008). Then the question is: if some cops were wearing BPVs, why Inspector Sharma was not allowed to do so under the pretext of maintaining secrecy. This story also falsifies the earlier claim of the Delhi Police that the special team was "armed only with small arms" (*The Hindu*, Delhi, 10 October 2008).

5) Whether Inspector Sharma was hit from the front or from the back? And whether the bullets exited or were removed in the hospital?

In the photograph of Inspector Sharma being escorted from the L-18 building, published in newspapers, no blood stains were visible in the front. However, the police stated that he was hit from the front: "One bullet hit him in the left shoulder and exited through the left-arm, the other hit the right side of the abdomen and exited through the hip" (*The Hindu*, Delhi, 10 October 2008). For this reason, they argued, the bleeding was from the back, the points of exit. But so far as *exiting of the bullet* was concerned there were conflicting views, *e.g.*:

i) According to a senior doctor who conducted the post-mortem on Inspector M.C. Sharma at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, "It was difficult to establish the entry and exit points of the bullets as the conclusive evidence had been wiped out by the intervention of the doctors at Holy Family [Hospital]" (*Tehelka*, 4 October 2008).

ii) Hindi daily *Amar Ujala*, quoting Dr. Rajesh Chawla, said, "the bullets had been removed." Dr. Chawla was said to have been specially called from Apollo Hospital. He reportedly told the paper that there was excessive bleeding as bullets hit the lung and lower part and after "the bullets had been removed," it was felt that Sharma might survive.

iii) As per the post-mortem report, quoted by some dailies, Sharma had been hit by two bullets and both bullets had exited the body and no bullets were removed from the body.

Such material contradictions about the exiting of bullets or their having been removed later give rise to serious doubts about Inspector Sharma's death. The statements of Dr. Rajesh Chawla of Apollo Hospital and the senior doctor at AIIMS are sufficient to order an enquiry into the matter.

6) How could the two "terrorists" escape?

The area was so congested and the building in question and even the surrounding area was so heavily guarded at the time that the claim of the police that two terrorists escaped after the so-called "encounter" seems improbable, nay, impossible. Nobody could escape under these circumstances without the connivance of the police. Wasn't it that these two "terrorists" had been given some "special task" and after accomplishing the same they were allowed to escape?

7) Who gave the information about the "terrorists," having holed up at Batla House?

i) Initially it was given to understand that the operation was carried out on the basis of a tip-off given by Mufti Abul Bashar of Azamgarh, who had been arrested by the Ahmedabad Police on 16 August. Later, it was declared by the Delhi Police that the information was given by the person of the same name, *i.e.*, Abul Bashar, a cleric from Ahmedabad itself, who worked among the city's wretched ghettos providing free water therein and who had also been arrested by Ahmedabad Police. *The Milli Gazette* (1-15 October 2008) reported "(Gujarat) Police claimed national level breakthrough, speculating his (Abul Bashar of Azamgarh's) role as the key conspirator in every other attack, yet Delhi Police repeatedly clarified that he never met his namesake (*i.e.*, Abul Bashar of Ahmedabad) whom they (Delhi Police) zeroed in upon. This controversy has also put a question mark as to which Abul Bashar was the real "mastermind." However, the Delhi Police chief denied having any link with any "Bashar" so far as this operation was concerned. One-upmanship to put the Gujarat Police and Chief Minister, Narendra Modi, in place was evident."

ii) One report hints at a professional rivalry between Mumbai Police and Delhi Police behind this clumsy operation. The operation is said to have been the outcome of a lead provided by the Mumbai Police, who had advised to keep a *watch* on the suspected premises. However, the Delhi Police are said to have gone on an overdrive to carry out the "encounter" even before the Mumbai Police could proceed further with their intelligence gathering. The Delhi Police's attention-grabbing "encounter" is said to have annoyed the Mumbai Police who felt compelled to release their own list of alleged "masterminds" as against the one released by the Delhi Police (*Muslim India*, November 2008). Surprisingly, the names in the two lists were different except the name of Atif (Atiq) (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 September 2008 and *Sakal*, Pune, 27 September 2008), which the Mumbai Police seemed to have been compelled to include to save the face of Delhi Police.

8) The mystery of Aurangabad SIM cards

The SIM cards found with the associates of the "terrorists" killed in the encounter were traced to Aurangabad district (Maharashtra). The ATS enquiry revealed that the SIM cards had been acquired by one Mangesh Doiphode, the owner of mobile phone shop "Gauri Enterprises" of Chitte Pimpalgaon village near Aurangabad by using forged documents. He had obtained the SIM cards in the name of one "Nawaz Aziz Shaikh." The enquiry revealed that no person by that name existed in the area. It had also been found from call details of one of the SIM cards that at the time of the encounter one of the terrorists, by using that SIM card, was in contact with a mobile phone number in Aurangabad (Marathi daily *Lokmat*, Nagpur, 8 December 2008). *A thorough probe in this matter may lead to some bizarre revelation and may change the very complexion of the case.*

In view of the points mentioned above, not only the Batla House encounter, including the death of police Inspector Sharma, needs to be probed deep, but the whole Delhi blast case is required to be reinvestigated by a team of professionals, headed by a sitting judge of the Supreme Court or High Court.

9) Surprise of surprises — the name of Tauqueer, allegedly the most wanted terrorist and master hacker, dropped altogether

Tauqueer *alias* Abdus Subhan Qureshi *alias* Altaf Subhan *alias* Taufiq Bilal, who was declared by the police and the investigating agencies as the "mastermind" of Jaipur, Ahmedabad, Delhi and Bangalore blasts and also the author of the emails sent before the blasts to some media offices allegedly by hacking into the American national Ken Haywood's computer, did not figure in the chargesheet filed by the Mumbai Police

in the terror emails case on 17 February 2009 dismissing him as a "media creation" (The *Indian Express*, Pune, 19 February 2009).

How true was this police claim? The following reports attributed to senior police officials and police sources expose the futility of the claim.

1) His name was first mentioned using his alleged *aliases* "Taufiq Bilal" and "Abdul Subhan" by sources in the Crime Branch of Ahmedabad Police and Crime Branch Mumbai Police on 16 August 2008 as the "mastermind" behind the Ahmedabad blast plot, and also as the author of the emails sent to media offices minutes before the blast (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 17 August 2009).
2) There was no unanimity between Ahmedabad Crime Branch and Mumbai Crime Branch on whether "Taufiq Bilal" and "Abdul Subhan" were one and same person or two different persons. But ultimately they compromised and agreed that they were one and the same person (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 August 2008).
3) On 19 August 2008, in a PTI report published in *The Times of India*, Mumbai, the name "Tauqueer" was used for the first time quoting an official of ATS Mumbai, as the "mastermind" and "master hacker."
4) On 13 September 2008, *i.e.*, the day on which Delhi blasts took place, *The Hindu* declared his long profile quoting "police sources" and "investigators."
5) After the Delhi blast, he was given the title of "Osama bin Laden of India" by the Delhi press.
6) In Delhi blasts, he was suspected by the police to be the "mastermind" (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 16 September 2008).
7) On 17 September 2009, *The Times of India*, Mumbai, reported quoting Param Bir Singh, Addl. Commissioner ATS, Mumbai, that "Subhan" was the most wanted person.
8) On 19 September 2008 after the Batla House encounter, Alok Kumar, DCP, Special Cell Delhi, told reporters that "Tauqueer is the main leader who played an important role in all the blasts, including those of Jaipur, Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Delhi."
9) On 20 September, IB sources were cited by the Delhi press as saying that Tauqueer was in POK.
10) On 26 September, *The Times of India*, Mumbai, carried a PTI report datelined Hyderabad that the A.P. Police had filed a case against Tauqueer for waging war aginst the state.
11) On the same day, TNN (The Times of India News Network) reported from Ahmedabad that the Gujarat Police stated in the court that Tauqueer was the "mastermind" of the Ahmedabad blast.

It is, thus, apparent that Tauqueer was not the creation of the media as claimed by the Mumbai Police but was a creation of the police themselves. The fact is that when the Crime Branch Mumbai was pressurised by the IB to look for some Muslim techie who could substitute Ken Haywood as a person who sent the emails, the Mumbai Crime Branch, in their enthusiasm to please the IB, named Abdul Subhan *alias* Taufiq Bilal *alias* Tauqueer only because he had worked earlier in the IT company, Datamatics, a selling agency of Wipro, without verifying whether he was expert enough to hack into others' computers and send emails. Later, when they found that it required a very high degree of expertise and that "Tauqueer" was not anywhere near it, and that he had only a working knowledge of computers, they adopted the "trial and error" method, and, after some trials, zeroed in on Mansoor Peerbhoy and company of Pune as described earlier in the note on Ahmedabad blasts. Therefore, while sending a chargesheet in the terror email case, the Crime Branch Mumbai dropped the name of "Tauqueer" altogether and blamed it on the media.

The police will continue facing such embarrassment so long as pure untruth remains the basis of their investigations.

v) Samjhauta Express bomb blast case (19 February 2007)

IB threw spanner in the work
when Haryana Police had almost detected it
When ultimately detected by the ATS under Hemant Karkare,
IB hushed it up to save Brahminists
Government put to embarrassment by its earlier declaration
at the behest of IB that ISI was involved

A) Blame game between India and Pakistan

In the bomb blasts that took place on the Samjhauta Express on 19 February 2007, near Panipat in Haryana, 68 persons were killed. Both India and Pakistan started blaming each other for the tragedy. The Indian Government hinted at the involvement of a Pakistan-backed terrorist outfit based across the border for the blast. However, at the first meeting of the Joint Terror Mechanism held on 6 March 2007, it could only hand over a photograph of a suspected Pakistani national believed to be involved in the terror attack and sought cooperation in tracking him down. In fact, the investigation agencies had made no headway in the investigation or had not even come to any *prima facie* conclusion. But the Government of India seemed to have made the serious charge of the involvement of a Pakistan-backed terrorist outfit on the basis of mere conjectures of the IB and RAW which have been bent upon creating anti-Muslim atmosphere within and without the country.

B) Haryana Police almost solved the case

A special investigation team of Haryana, which had been sent to Indore (M.P.) in the first week of March 2007, on the basis of some inputs, made a positive breakthrough in the investigation. They found the following valuable information:

i) the shop at Kothari Market, Indore, from where the suitcases, in which bombs had been kept, were purchased;
ii) the tailors who stitched the covers for the suitcases;

iii) the shops in Naya Bazar of Indore from where all the components used in the bombs were purchased;
iv) the shops in the same area from where other materials such as plastic bags, plastic bottles and batteries were purchased.

The Haryana Police interrogated all the concerned shop-keepers, especially the two tailors, *viz.*, Faqruddin and Iqbal Husain, the owner of the shop from where suitcases had been purchased, *viz.*, Jainuddin and his two employees Huzaifa and Pooran Thakur. The police showed the employees' photographs of the suitcases recovered from the Samjhauta Express and from the rail tracks and asked them whether they sold them to any suspicious looking person and they got a piece of very valuable information from them (*The Statesman*, Mumbai, 11 March; *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 13 and 19 March; *The Hindu*, Mumbai, 14 March and *Mumbai Mirror* [The Times of India], 29 March 2007).

It thus appeared that the Haryana Police had almost cracked the case, but surprisingly, newspaper reportings about further investigation abruptly stopped and nothing was heard about the progress of the investigation.

Seven months later, while reporting that Rajasthan Police had also reached M.P., tracing the trail of Ajmer blast case, *The Indian Express*, Pune (15 October 2007) reported that the Haryana Police in March, 2007, when they were on the verge of solving the case, *did not get cooperation from M.P. Police* and had to beat a retreat. What was that information found by the Haryana Police which the M.P. Police did not want pursued remained a mystery for some time.

C) ATS, Maharashtra headed by Hemant Karkare detected the case

It was only after Sadhvi Pragyasingh and Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, among others, were arrested in connection with the Malegaon bomb blast, that some information started trickling in. The narco-analysis test of Lt. Col. Purohit was conducted on 9 November 2008 at Bangalore Forensic Laboratory (*The Times of India*, Pune, 11 November 2008) and from 13 November onwards, reports about the possible involvement of the accused in Samjhauta Express started appearing in the media (*Sakal*,

Pune, 13 November 2008 and 14 November 2008, *Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 16 November 2008, *Sakal*, Pune, 16 November 2008, *Pudhari* 16 November 2008, *The Indian Express*, Pune, 14 November 2008). Apparently the reports were made on the basis of the statements of Lt. Col. Purohit under narco-analysis test. *Pune Mirror* (19 November 2008) also reported, *"Purohit told the officials who conducted the narco-test that Praveen Togadia was responsible for the Samjhauta Express blast."*

The Anti-Terrorist Squad of Maharashtra while requesting the extension of Lt. Col. Purohit's police custody remand told the Nasik court that he had supplied the RDX that went into making the bombs planted on the Samjhauta Express (*The Times of India*, Pune, 16 November 2008, *Sakal*, Pune, 16 November 2008 and *Pudhari*, Pune, 16 November 2008).

In view of the fresh revelations, the Haryana Police resumed the investigation with the hope to pick it up from Indore where the trail last went cold in March 2007.

D) The IB threw spanner in the work and scuttled the investigation

Thus, as hopes of this sensational case ultimately getting cracked were soaring high, the ATS suddenly retracted its stand. While briefing the press on 17 November 2008, the ATS chief Hemant Karkare apparently under IB's or government's pressure, said that the ATS Advocate Ajay Misar had not made a statement that the RDX stolen by Lt. Col. Purohit was used in the Samjhauta Express bomb, and that Misar had been misquoted (*Pudhari*, Pune and *The Times of India*, Pune, both of 18 November 2008). *The Times of India* further reported that "Soon after Misar made the sensational charge in Nasik, the Intelligence Bureau (IB), which is keeping a close tab on the probe, alerted the Centre about the implication of Misar's statement. When the train blast took place the Centre had blamed Pakistan's ISI for the terror strike on the basis of the Bureau's finding."

The Times of India also quoted a senior bureau officer as saying, "The ATS's charge on Friday would have impaired the Centre's credibility internationally and that forensic examination of the blast site and two unexploded bombs had conclusively proved that RDX was not used" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 November 2008). But on the same day, the S.P. Railways (Ambala), Bharati Arora in whose jurisdiction the blast had

taken place, categorically stated that RDX was used in the blast and that the Forensic Laboratory Test Report had confirmed it (*Sakal Times*, Pune, 18 November 2008, Tribuneindia.com and Zeenews.com, 17 November 2008).

Against this background, now it is anybody's guess as to at whose instance the Madhya Pradesh Police had stopped Haryana Police from investigating the case further when the latter had almost cracked it in March 2007 itself.

E) Intention of the IB is to save the Brahminists

It is thus clear that the IB does not want the ATS to proceed further in the Samjhauta Express bomb blast case, as it does not want its earlier theory disproved. This fact itself is sufficient for the government to take the IB to task and to take stringent action against the officials concerned for having misguided the government, the media and the police by propounding a patently wrong theory of ISI involvement without having any real evidence in support thereof. This action of the IB is perfectly in keeping with its policy of *suppressio veri, suggestio falsi* so far as Brahminists and Muslim issues are involved. Therefore, if the new theory of involvement of Brahminists elements in the Samjhauta Express case, which has almost been proved in the investigation of the ATS, is accepted, the greatest worry of the IB is not, as it wants the government and the public to believe, that India's credibility in the international politics would go down for having propounded and propagated a wrong theory of ISI involvement without verifying the facts, but that the image of the Sangh Parivar would be tarnished beyond repair and more importantly, the new and more credible theory would give a considerable setback to the anti-Muslim atmosphere which it has very meticulously and systematically created and nutured over the last few decades.

The problem with the central government is that over the years it has allowed the IB to grab so much power that the latter has gone beyond its control. No minister, the prime minister included, no bureaucrat, no police organisation can challenge its authority or dare do something against its will. Now as the IB does not want the ATS to expand the scope of the investigation further and to confine it to

whatever has been done so far, the ATS would do exactly the same, unless a very strong public opinion is created against this.

vi) Hyderabad Mecca Masjid Blast (18 May 2007)

Many imaginary theories to derail the real investigation
in order to save Brahminist terrorists
An important clue of SIM card found
by West Bengal Police not followed up intentionally
No enquiry with military authorities about RDX-TNT mix
used mainly by the military

In the blast that took place in Mecca Masjid of Hyderabad on 18 May 2007, nine people died and two bombs which did not explode were defused by the police.

A) Imaginary theories of investigation

This case is a classic example of investigation based on imagination wherein the IB, and at its instance the local police, instead of doing real investigation tried out various imaginary theories sitting in their AC chambers, arrested many innocent boys and intentionally derailed the investigation as the IB apparently knew, and as was later disclosed in Malegaon blast investigation, that a Brahminist terrorist group was involved in the case.

1) Theory No. 1

The blast took place on 18 May 2007. The next day, *i.e.*, on 19 May, the police appeared to have almost solved the case and collected all the details. Top police sources gave the following information:

a. The blast was "masterminded," executed and detonated from Bangladesh, by the HuJI activist Mohammad Abdul Sohel *alias* Bilal, wanted for blasts on Samjhauta Express and for attack on STF headquarters at Hyderabad.

b. Three local youth assisted him in planting the bomb.

c. After detonating the bomb inside the mosque, Bilal's associates present inside the mosque made an MMS recording of the blast and transmitted the same to Bangladesh. With the remote-trigger in his hand, Bilal watched the impact of the blast.

d. He also saw that there were hardly any people next to the grilled gate of the mosque where two more bombs wrapped in a gunny bag were hung. Therefore, he decided not to detonate them.

e. The SIM cards of the cellphones attached to these bombs were purchased in Kolkata. Bilal's brother Jaleel, who runs a mobile phone repair shop in Kolkata, could have provided the SIM cards.

f. The explosives used in the bombs, *i.e.*, RDX and TNT, were not available in India and were imported from Bangladesh (*The Times of India*, Pune, 20 May 2007).

Thus, it appeared from the above report that the police had, within a single day, solved the case fully, so much so that the three local youths suspected in the blast were also picked up by the police.

2) Theory No. 2

On the same day a different version was reported by another newspaper, *viz.*, *Sakal* of Pune. According to this version, the "mastermind" remained the same, *i.e.*, Bilal, but other details differed, *viz.*:

a. Bilal belongs to Jaish-e-Mohammad and not to HuJI.

b. The SIM cards of the two unexploded bombs were purchased by Bilal in Kolkata, and not provided by his brother; both the cards were of Hutch company.

c. The bombs did not explode as these two SIM cards failed to accept the signals and not because Bilal decided not to detonate them after seeing the MMS recording that there were no people near the bombs.

d. These blasts were similar to Mumbai railway blasts and Malegaon blasts and not to the STF headquarters and Samjhauta Express blasts, for which Bilal was allegedly wanted.

3) Theory No. 3

The story of West Bengal's Crime Branch is still different:

i. They unearthed an uncanny link between the Hyderabad blast and Mumbai train blast.

ii. They found a close link between Mumbai attack "mastermind" Sheikh Sameer and Hyderabad blast "mastermind" Bilal.

iii. Sameer was running a Lashkar-e-Toiba module in Central Kolkata under the guise of a fruit-vendor. He sent Bilal back to Bangladesh after the attack on STF headquarters.

iv. Sleuths suspect that Sameer might have helped Bilal get a fake driving licence with which the latter bought the SIM cards that triggered the Mecca Masjid blast (CID sleuths raided the Asansol address mentioned in Bilal's licence but drew a blank. The SIM card and the licence were in the name of one "Babulal Yadav," but no one in the locality could remember any person by that name. The photograph in the document did not match any of the residents of the area and no one could identify him).

v. The CID's hopes hinge on Sameer who is in the custody of Mumbai Police (*The Times of India*, Pune, 21 May 2007).

4) Theory No. 4

According to the bomb experts of National Security Guards (NSG), there was a striking similarity between Hyderabad and Malegaon blasts, for the following reasons:

i) The metal pieces used as shrapnel were exactly the same.

ii) The common explosive material in both the cases was RDX. But in Malegaon it was mixed with ammonium nitrate and in Hyderabad with TNT.

iii) The RDX-TNT mix is commonly used in armaments in the military (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 22 May 2007).

5) Theory No. 5

The story of the Special Task Force (STF) of Hyderabad is altogether different. It revolves around one Sohaib Jagirdar of Jalna. The newspaper reports in this regard are as follows:

i) Sohaib Jagirdar was picked up from Jalna for his suspected involvement in the blast case, but *officially* he was arrested in a theft case.

ii) He confessed that he had obtained about 1.5 kg of explosives and gave a part of it to perpetrators (but from where did he get it and whom did he give it is not mentioned in the news report).

iii) The source of the RDX was from across the border.

iv) Links between Sohaib Jagirdar and Shaikh Sameer, who is in the custody of Mumbai Police, were being probed.

v) Sameer reportedly smuggled four Pakistani nationals into the country and visited Hyderabad in February 2007. He could have brought the Mecca Masjid bombers to the city (Hyderabad Police had obtained his narco-analysis report from Mumbai Police and officials were studying it).

vi) As Bilal of HuJI was suspected in the Hyderabad attack and SIMI was involved in the Malegaon attack, the police were investigating the links between HuJI and SIMI (*The Times of India*, Pune, 26 May 2007 and *The Indian Express*, Pune, 30 May 2007).

6) Theory No. 6

The younger brother of Bilal, *viz*., Majid, had disclosed in the narco-analysis test that Dawood Ibrahim is involved in the conspiracy of carrying out explosions at Mecca Masjid, Lumbini Park and Gokul Chat in Hyderabad; that his brother Bilal was closely associated with Dawood who had promised him all financial help for carrying out explosions in India; that there was a likelihood of more such blasts in Hyderabad and other cities (daily *Pudhari*, Pune, 23 December 2007).

B) Analysis of the investigation

If all the above versions are carefully studied, it is seen that they seem to have been based on mere guesswork and prejudices, that there were material contradictions between them and that there was no concrete or reliable evidence available in support of any of the theories.

On the other hand, the important leads disclosed in the investigation did not seem to have been pursued meticulously, *viz.*:

i) No in-depth enquiry was made about the fake driving licence on the basis of which the SIM cards used in the blasts were obtained (*The Times of India*, Pune, 21 May 2007). The police left the enquiry inconclusive saying that nobody in the locality of which the address was given on the licence could identify the photographs. In fact, they should have grilled the employees of the mobile phone service provider as to how they could issue the cards without verifying the facts. Secondly, and more importantly, the police could have published the photograph in important newspapers. But they did not pursue an extremely important clue to its logical end, apparently under some pressure.

ii) NSG's bomb experts had found that a mixture of RDX-TNT was used for the blast and that RDX-TNT mix is commonly used in armaments in the military (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 22 May 2007). The investigation agencies don't seem to have followed this important clue and don't seem to have brought this fact to the notice of the senior officials of the army. Either they did not take this matter seriously or somebody intentionally stopped them from following up this clue.

iii. The Hyderabad Police were studying the narco-analysis test report of Shaikh Sameer who had been arrested by Mumbai Police in Mumbai train bomb blast case. It was not known what transpired in the scrutiny of the report.

C) The revelations in Malegaon blast case, 2008

1) In the recent investigation of Malegaon bomb blasts of July 2008, it has been disclosed that one of the accused in that case, Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, had stolen RDX from army depots and supplied the same to the terrorists belonging to Sangh Parivar for causing blasts on Samjhauta Express, and at Ajmer Dargah, Mecca Masjid and other places.

2) During his interrogation, Lt. Col. Purohit admitted his role in Ajmer Sharif blast and Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) blast.

3) In the transcript of the conversation between Mahant Dayanand Pandey and Major (retd) Ramesh Upadhyay, enclosed with the Malegaon blast case chargesheet, Dayanand Pandey is quoted as telling Upadhyaya, "Mecca Masjid blast case was the job of our men."

The above facts, revealed in the Malegaon case, confirm that this blast is also the handiwork of the Abhinav Bharat group which is responsible for Malegaon, Nanded, Ajmer, Samjhauta Express and many other blasts. However, why all these cases were not investigated along with the Malegaon case as a larger terror conspiracy and chargesheeted as such is a mystery which could be resolved only after a thorough and impartial investigation by an independent team headed by a High Court or a Supreme Court judge.

D) How would the sufferings of innocent Muslim boys be compensated?

Hopefully, the truth will ultimately prevail and the terrorists who have been masquerading as "patriots" and "nationalists" would be exposed. However, the painful history of the investigation of Mecca Masjid case cannot be forgotten. From day one "Muslim outfits" like HuJI, SIMI, LeT were blamed and hundreds of Muslim youths from Hyderabad and other parts of the country were illegally apprehended, made to languish in jail for months and years and subjected to torture by using inhuman methods for extracting "confessions." But later, following the *habeas corpus* petitions filed by many secular, human rights, democratic and civil liberties organisations and after their raising a hue and cry, the case was transferred to the CBI, which after verification released most of the persons arrested.

Those against whom the Hyderabad Police had filed chargesheets were either discharged or acquitted by courts. *The Sunday Express*, Pune (25 January 2009) reported, "The Mecca Masjid blast case was initially investigated by Hyderabad Police, but later handed over to CBI. The police had picked up 78 Muslim youths on suspicion of being involved. However, the CBI, after a few hours of questioning asked the police to release most of them. Cases were filed against 32, but over the last few months the local court threw out the chargesheet for lack of evidence."

The boys ultimately got justice and their near and dear ones may have heaved a sigh of relief. But the case doesn't end here. What about the police officers who gave them hell for months on end and what about the lower judiciary, which liberally and indiscriminately granted and extended police custody remands, throwing law, human rights and civil liberties to the winds and the invisible forces acting from behind the curtain egging on the police and the judiciary to do what they did? They have to be identified, exposed, meted out deterrent punishment and their victims must be suitably compensated. That will be the logical end.

vii) Ajmer Sharif Dargah Blast (11 October 2007)

Wild guesses indicting Muslims and inventing
different theories sitting in AC chambers
Gujarat-Rajasthan-M.P. connections not pursued
Important clue of SIM card traced to Guwahati
but not followed
Ultimately, the cat came out of the bag
in Malegaon investigation

A) The very first day's wild guess of the central government, apparently at the instance of IB

On the first day, *i.e.*, on the day of the blast itself, the central government declared that,

i) The needle of suspicion pointed to terror architects blamed for Hyderabad and Malegaon blasts.

ii) Lashkar-e-Toiba was a clear suspect in collaboration with Jaish-e-Mohammed and HuJI.

iii) They targeted Muslims during festive periods as they had hatred for brands of Islam which did not subscribe to the hardline Sunni doctrine.

iv) The bomb was packed inside a tiffin box and appeared to be similar to that of Hyderabad blast (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 October 2007).

On the point of targeting Muslims by alleged "Muslim" terrorists, the Union Home Secretary had an ingenious explanation. He stated that Lashkar-e-Toiba had always been against Sufi saints and hence they might have carried out these explosions (*Sakal*, Pune, 12 October 2007).

The above-mentioned statements of the central government and its officials are ridiculous, to say the least, for the following reasons:

i) When the investigating agencies had not yet come to any definite conclusion as to who caused the Hyderabad and Malegaon blasts, and when the investigations of those cases were still going on, how could the Centre make an irresponsible statement that the needle of suspicion points to the terrorists allegedly involved in those cases.

ii) On what basis the government came to the conclusion that it was the work of LeT, JeM and HuJI? Had they any positive evidence in hand?

iii) Could even a child believe that Muslims kill Muslims only for small differences in religious practices and that, too, on important festival days?

iv) On what basis did a very senior officer like the Union Home Secretary say that LeT had always been against Sufi saints?

Apparently, the statements of the central government and its Home Secretary were not based on any evidence. Either they made these statements merely as a wild guess or, more probably, they were prompted by the central intelligence agencies whose main agenda was to create

anti-Muslim atmosphere in the country so that the RSS and its political wing, BJP, were immensely benefited, both socially and politically.

B) The second day's more specific guesswork without any evidence

On the next day, without doing any in-depth investigation, the police, the intelligence agencies and the Home Secretary came to the following more specific conclusions:

i) One Shahid Bilal of Bangladesh-based outfit HuJI engineered the attack in league with some "sleeper cells" of Jaish-e-Mohammad.

ii) Bilal, who was based in Karachi and who was also wanted in Samjhauta Express blast, was an associate of Gujarat resident Rasool Khan "Party" and had been instrumental in sending youths for arms training to Pakistan through Dhaka and Gulf states.

iii) Like in Hyderabad, mobile phone and TNT explosive had been used.

Neither the police, nor the intellegance agencies nor the Union Home Secretary clarified what evidence they had obtained in support of the above conclusions.

It was also reported that at the place of the incident, the police had found a live bomb, a bag containing explosives, two SIM cards and pieces of a mobile phone (*The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 13 October 2007).

C) The third day's different theory

The police and intelligence agencies now suspected that there was a link between Ajmer blast and Hyderabad Mecca Masjid blast and that the bomb was manufactured in Hyderabad. Their inferences were based on the following facts:

a) A SIM card found near the site of blast which was believed to be from the phone used as a trigger to detonate the bomb was similar to the one used in Hyderabad blast, and in both the cases phones of Nokia make were used.

b) In both the blasts a cocktail of TNT and RDX was used.

c) One of the victims of the blast, by name Sayeed Saleem, belonged to Hyderabad. He had shifted to Ajmer a few months ago and had set up a shop near the Dargah selling watches, perfumes, etc. The intelligence agencies suspected his involvement for the following reasons:

i. He belonged to Hyderabad. Though he had shifted to Ajmer for doing small business, his family was still in Hyderabad.

ii. He had a woman visitor a few days before the blast and she had a bag with her. She left Ajmer two days before the blast. The police suspected that the bag might be containing explosives and she might have given the bag to Saleem.

iii. Some pieces of wire were found in his pocket (*The Times of India*, Pune, 14 October 2007).

The above-mentioned reasonings only go on to confirm that prejudices ruled high in bomb blast investigations. It's common knowledge that most of the poor persons doing small business in big cities can't afford to carry their families along and that almost all the travellers and pilgrims carry a bag or two with them as the woman visitor had carried with her. Isn't it ridiculous to jump to the conclusion that the deceased was involved in the blast only on the basis of above facts? Nobody even pointed a finger at Brahminist elements although the blasts had taken place at a sacred Muslim place and, that too, on the eve of an important festival and in which only Muslims had died.

D) Gujarat-Rajasthan-M.P. connection

1) The police recovered newspapers of 10 May and 12 May published from Ahmedabad and Udaipur from a bag containing a live bomb; one newspaper was Hindi and the other was Gujarati.

2) The explosives were wrapped in evening newspapers published

from Ujjain and Indore.

3) The Rajasthan Police team arrived in M.P. to do further investigation, but did not seek any help from the Indore Police. However, a senior officer of Indore said the Rajasthan Police did not have any concrete information, but were in M.P. to explore a possible angle.

4) After the Samjhauta Express blast, a team of Haryana Police had spent a long time in Indore from where material for the six timer-fitted bombs used in Samjhauta Express blasts was probably purchased. Nothing concrete emerged, but months after the blasts the police from the two states traded charges. While the Haryana Police accused the local police of not cooperating, the M.P. Police maintained that they extended all possible help, but the Haryana Police were bent upon exploring an angle which was not there (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 15 October 2007).

From the above news item, many important questions emerge:

(i) Other than the two evening newspapers, what additional clue the Rajasthan Police had got that brought them to Indore?

(ii) Why didn't they seek help from the Indore Police when the normal practice is to get the help of the local police?

(iii) Didn't they have faith in the Indore Police? If so, why?

(iv) Why had the M.P. Police been reluctant to cooperate with the Haryana Police in Samjhauta Express blast case? Why didn't they want the Haryana Police to pursue the clue they had?

(v) Did the M.P. Police not want the case to be detected for some reason, or was it under pressure from some politicians or the IB in this regard?

E) Important clues intentionally not pursued

Sources in the delegation accompanying the prime minister on his visit to Africa, while repeating the story of the involvement of Bilal and HuJI in Ajmer blasts on the premise that the SIM card in the unexploded bomb of Ajmer was of the same lot used in Hyderabad, disclosed an extremely important fact, which was not given due prominence by the media, *viz.*, the SIM card was bought in Guwahati on the basis of a forged driver's licence with the photo of a well-known ayurvedic practitioner (*The Times of India*, Pune, 15 October 2007).

Drawing the conclusion that Bilal and HuJI were involved in Ajmer blast only on the assumption that the Hyderabad blasts had been caused by them, when the investigating agencies had not come to any definite conclusion in the latter case was a logical fallacy. But for reasons best known to themselves, the investigating agencies and intelligence agencies had been emphasising this aspect repeatedly whereas one of the most important clues that the police had got, *viz.*, the SIM card used for detonating the blast, was obtained in Guwahati on the basis of a forged driving licence with the photo of a well-known ayurvedic practitioner was not followed meticulously. The following points ought to have been inquired into thoroughly:

In whose name the driving licence was obtained? How come the photo of an ayurvedic practitioner was on the licence? Have these persons any connection with any communal organisation? How could the mobile phone company issue the SIM card without verifying the facts? And so on. But it is a mystery why such an important clue has not been followed up.

Apart from this very significant clue, two more equally important clues did not seem to have been pursued with the seriousness they deserved, *viz.*:

1) The police had come to a conclusion that a cocktail of TNT and RDX was used for the blast, as in the case of Hyderabad Mecca Masjid blast. Bomb experts of the National Security Guards (NSG), while opining that a mix of RDX and TNT had been used in Hyderabad blast, had informed that *such a mix is commonly used in the armaments in the army*. Therefore, the officers investigating the Ajmer blast should have taken up this matter with the higher authorities in the army and sought their help in the investigation. But they did not seem to have done so. Either

they did not take this aspect seriously or somebody stopped them from doing an in-depth investigation.

In the investigation of the Malegaon bomb blast of July 2008, it has been disclosed that one of the accused in that case, Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, had stolen RDX from army depots and had supplied the same to the terrorists belonging to the Sangh Parivar. Had the clue, provided by the NSG, been seriously followed up, the offence would have been detected. It is hoped that at least now the investigation agencies will follow up this clue and take the case to its logical end.

2) The Rajasthan Police found that the explosives had been wrapped in evening newspapers published from Ujjain and Indore, and probably they got some more clues concerning the Indore connection and hence they went to Indore. But it appears that they did not get any cooperation from the Indore Police, as in the case of Samjhauta Express blast case. Either the M.P. Police did not want the case to be detected or they were being pressurised by some politicians or the IB in this regard. Now, in view of the fresh revelations in the Malegaon blast of July 2008, the Indore angle needs to be pursued further.

F) Finally, the cat comes out of the bag: it was the handiwork of "Hindu [read Brahminist] Rashtra" terrorists

In the investigation of the Malegaon bomb blast case of 2008, the following facts came to light:

1) In his narco analysis test, Lt. Col. Purohit admitted that he supplied explosives for Ajmer and Malegaon blasts at the instance of Mahant Dayanand Pandey (*Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 15 November 2008).
2) An IPS officer, connected with the investigation of Malegaon case confirmed the involvement of the Malegaon accused in Ajmer blast case (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 November 2008).

3) Sadhvi Pragyasingh and Ajay Rahirkar of Abhinav Bharat said in the police statement that Purohit also "masterminded" blasts in Orissa, Karnataka and at Ajmer Sharif Dargah in 2007. Rahirkar, Purohit's childhood friend said, "In January 2008, I was with Purohit when he turned tense after receiving a call. When I asked what had happened, he said, his people had bombed Ajmer" (*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 24 January 2009).

In spite of the above revelations and supporting evidence, it is incomprensible why the Ajmer blast case was not investigated as a part of a wider conspiracy and why it was not included in the chargesheet in the Malegaon case of 2008 as a part of the conspiracy.

It, however, appears from the following newspaper reports that the Rajasthan ATS has been following the leads and doing further investigation in the case:

1) Investigation into 2007 Ajmer Sharif blast has led the Rajasthan Police to members of the self-styled militant Hindu group Abhinav Bharat which was alleged to be behind the Malegaon blast, official sources said (*The Times of India*, Pune, 13 April 2009).
2) Rajasthan ATS investigations have revealed that the self-styled Hindu leaders of Abhinav Bharat, responsible for the Malegaon blast, were also involved in Ajmer Dargah and Mecca Masjid blasts. After visiting Mumbai recently to get all the statements and reports of narco-analysis and brain mapping tests done on Lt. Col. Purohit and other accused in the Malegaon blast case, officers of the Rajasthan ATS said that the same accused were involved in the Ajmer blasts (*Lokmat*, Mumbai, 14 August 2009).

In fact, the Ajmer blast case was completely cracked during the investigation of the 2008 Malegaon blast case itself, as is apparent from the above reports. But in order not to show it as a part of a wider Brahminist conspiracy, it is being shown as investigated and detected as

an isolated case.

Whatever, may be the outcome of the case, an important issue which, in course of time, seems to have been forgotten is the mental, physical, financial, social, and psychological trauma, undergone by the wife, children, parents and other family members of Sayed Saleem, one of the two persons killed in the blast, when the police and the investigating agencies alleged that he himself was the perpetrator of the blast. How would the government compensate the pain and agony suffered by them for almost two years? Would a few lakhs of rupees make up for this? The only way the government can compensate the loss of Saleem's life and the sufferings of his family members to some extent is to ensure that the case is investigated and chargesheeted as a wider Brahminist conspiracy and all the accused, however high and mighty, are brought to book and punished in the court of law.

viii) Serial Blasts in U.P. courts (23 November 2007)

IB's desk-investigation through STF (U.P.)
High-handedness of police
Sketches and eyewitnesses thrown to the winds
New parallel theory of "IM" involvement

Six blasts took place on the premises of the courts in Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow in which 15 persons were killed and about 80 injured.

A) First day's reports and wild guesses indicting Muslims

1) The police suspected that the explosions were carried out by HuJI to avenge the attack by advocates on Jaish terrorists, as these two terrorist organisations are connected to Deoband (*Pudhari*, Kolhapur and *Lokmat*, Kolhapur, both of 24 November 2007).
2) Police sources informed that "Indian Mujahideen" has accepted the responsibility (*Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 24 November 2007).
3) The Union Home Ministry said that ammonium nitrate and timers were used in the explosions and that it was a pre-planned act (*Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 24 November 2007).

B) Second day's reports: IB's precursor of future story and the objective, and professional investigation of the local police

1) Intelligence agencies suspect that HuJI pointsman Guru may have planned the attack, executed by the sleeper cells of LeT and Jaish possibly under the banner of "Al Qaida-Fi-al-Hind" (*i.e.*, Al Qaida in India), as the email warning about the blasts was sent to news agencies moments before the blasts, using Guru's email ID (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 November 2007).
2) According to intelligence agencies, Guru's name first figured in the interrogation of HuJI's India chief Babu Bhai who had been arrested by the STF of U.P. Police in June last. Babu Bhai had then stated that he had delivered 20 kgs of RDX to Guru in August-September 2005 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 November 2007).
3) The investigating agencies, however, have not confirmed the involvement of Jaish and HuJI (*Sakal*, Pune, 25 November 2007).
4) The police have traced the cycle shop from where the culprits had hired cycles used for the blast. The cycle shop owner has been arrested. The police feel that the information may lead to the culprits (*Sakal*, Pune, 25 November 2007).
5) The police have published sketches of four suspects (*Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 25 November 2007).
6) The owner of the cyber café from where the email was sent has been arrested (*Pudhari*, Pune,

25 November 2007).

7) 100 other persons have been arrested on suspicion (*Pudhari*, Pune, 25 November 2007).

C) Third day's reports, eager wait for IB's recipe

1) Even after releasing the sketches of four suspects on the basis of eyewitness accounts virtually there was no breakthrough.
2) Recovery of an abandoned car from near Durga Mandir Park in Azamgarh on Saturday morning (24 November 2007), reached a dead end.
3) Investigators continued to wait for a lead either from the central intelligence agencies or the state STF (*The Times of India*, Pune, 26 November 2007).

D) A month later – the wait of investigators is over, the central intelligence agencies are ready with their script

1) On a tip-off from a central intelligence agency, the STF of U.P. police on Saturday morning, *i.e.*, on 22 December 2007 arrested two suspected terrorists (Mohammad Tariq and Khalid Mujahid) near Barabanki railway station for their "involvement" in the blasts.
2) Another "HuJI terrorist," Sajjad, was arrested by the J&K police, also on the IB's tip-off. Sajjad is suspected to have provided explosives for the blasts.
3) Three cell phones, SIM cards and HuJI literature have been seized from the above three terrorists.
4) According to the police, Tariq and Khalid were arrested while they were going to deliver 1.25 kg. of RDX, six detonators and ammonium nitrate rods to an accomplice for making bombs. The two terrorists had planned to take delivery of the bombs from their accomplice who was to arrive by a train at the Barabanki railway station on Saturday (22 December 2007) morning.
5) According to the police, the blasts in Lucknow court were executed by Khalid; Tariq supervised Faizabad blasts while Mukhtar *alias* Raju, a Bangladeshi, was behind the Varanasi blast.
6) The Addl. DGP (Law and Order) U.P. said, Tariq and Khalid were also involved in Gorakhpur blast of May 22 and the Sankat Mochan temple blast last year (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 December 2007).

E) High-handedness of police apparently under IB pressure

1) One Aftab Alam Ansari, an electrician in Kolkata, was arrested by STF, U.P. on 27 Dec. 2007 only because he shared the nick-name "Mukhtar" who, according to the two arrested accused Tariq and Khalid, was the "mastermind" of the blast. The court, however, released him and pulled up the police for having arrested the wrong person without verification (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 February 2008).
2) One Abdul Rehman of Pakistan, a top LeT militant involved in last year's serial blasts in U.P., was killed along with another ultra of the outfit in an encounter with police in Pulwama district of J&K on Friday, *i.e.*,15 February 2008 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 16 February 2008).
3) The manner in which Khalid and Tariq were arrested indicated a well-planned conspiracy of the U.P. STF to implicate innocents. Khalid was arrested on 16 December in Mohalla Sadarganj (Maryahu, district Jaunpur), while he was eating *chat* in a shop. The STF forcibly put him in their Tata Sumo car and carried him away. He had no arms or explosives with him at the time of the arrest in a congested market. Hundreds of people were witness to this incident which was reported in the local press and an FIR was lodged with the local police. Tariq was arrested on December 12 while he was going to a Tablighi congregation at Sherwan in Azamgarh on his motorcycle. Local newspapers had immediately published reports of

their arrest, but there was no mention of arms and explosives in any of the reports.

Family members of the two had lodged complaints in writing with the district magistrate and the higher authority against their arrest. But the information about their whereabouts was not disclosed by the police (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 March 2008). Later, they were shown as arrested at Barabanki on 22 December 2007 as reported in *The Times of India* of 23 December 2007.

F) Some logical queries concerning the investigation

1) What was the outcome of the enquiry into the email purported to have been sent in the name of "Indian Mujahideen" using Guru's email ID? Who had actually sent it?
2) What happened to the four sketches of the suspected terrorists prepared on the basis of the descriptions given by the eyewitnesses? Did they match the arrested accused? Were the accused got identified by the eyewitnesses?
3) Did the cycle shopkeeper give any information? Normally, cycles are not given on hire unless the shopkeeper personally knows the persons hiring the cycles, or if the persons are unknown, unless they give some introduction or identification. In either case, there was a fair chance of persons getting identified. Where did the trace lead?
4) What enquiry was made in respect of the car found abandoned near Durga Mandir Park in Azamgarh?
5) What specific information did the central intelligence agency have about the involvement of Tariq and Khalid in the case? Their arrest by police is also shrouded in mystery. The police say that they were arrested on 22 December 2007 morning near Barabanki railway station while they were going to deliver the explosives to their accomplice for making bombs. In the same breath they say that they were to take delivery of bombs from their accomplice who was

to arrive by train at Barabanki railway station. Which version is correct?

Moreover, the police say that they were arrested on 22 December 2007 morning, but their family members and hundreds of witnesses say that Khalid was arrested on 16 December while Tariq was arrested on 12 December. The fact that reports about their arrest had been published in local newspapers immediately after the arrest and FIRS/complaints lodged with the police and local administration bear out the version of their family-members and contradict the claim of the police. If that is so, the recovery of cell-phones, SIM cards, HuJI literature, etc., shown from the accused becomes infructuous and would be construed as a manipulation to frame them in the case. Moreover, the information given by the Addl. DGP (Law & order) U.P. after their arrest that they had also been involved in Sankat Mochan blasts is absolutely false as their names did not appear in the chargesheet of that case.

The above fact is further confirmed by the news reports published on the very next day of their arrest, *i.e.*, on 23 December 2007, wherein details such as the individual roles played by each of the accused in the act, their activities and movements since 2001-2002, their involvement in some previous blasts, etc., had been published. Nobody would believe that the police got these minute details within hours of their arrest.

6) The same is the case with one Sajjad, who was shown arrested by the J&K Police on the same day, *i.e.*, on 22 December 2007 on a tip-off by the central intelligence agency. What specific information did the IB have in respect of this person?
7) One Abdul Rehman of Pakistan, an alleged "top LeT militant" and his accomplice were killed on 15 February 2008 in an encounter in Pulwama district of J&K for their

alleged involvement in the UP serial blasts case. Was there any positive evidence about their involvement in the case? Or were they killed only to show some diaries, mobile phones, some literature and even explosives on their persons so that the missing links in the IB's story could be filled in?

In short, the investigation of this case is only an eye-wash. It is nothing but a script written by the IB and executed by the STF of U.P. under the IB's pressure, the only intention of the IB being to show the involvement of some existent or non-existent Muslim organisations in the case so that the Indian Muslims are perennially kept under psychological pressure and common Hindus get prejudiced against them, and continue fighting with Muslims so that Brahminist forces could continue their agenda of subjugating the society without hindrance.

G) A new theory of "IM" involvement

Whatever might be the motive of the IB and STF U.P. for doing so, but while they had been claiming to have cracked the case completely with the arrest of three HuJI operatives and the killing in an encounter of two alleged LeT militants, the Delhi Police, in their investigation of the September 2008 Delhi blasts found that the "Indian Mujahideen" module headed by Atif Ameen was responsible for the serial blasts in U.P. courts. As reported in *The Times of India*, Pune (21 September 2008), the Jt. C.P. (Special Cell) of Delhi Police, Karnal Singh, claimed that with the arrest of Saif from Batla House during Friday's (19 September 2008) shootout and of Zeeshan later in the night from central Delhi, the serial blast case in U.P. courts last year had been cracked. He said, Saif had planted the bomb in Varanasi court along with one Sajid. Moreover, in the chargesheet of Delhi blast case filed on 17 December 2008, the Delhi Police stated, "Interrogation of five accused have revealed that Atif [who was killed in the Batla House shootout on 19 September 2008 and was suspected to be the "mastermind" of Delhi blasts] was also

involved in various blasts across the country since 2005, including those at Sankat Mochan Temple, U.P. courts, Jaipur and Ahmedabad" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 20 September 2008).

It is difficult to believe that the Special Cell of Delhi Police, which was considered to be one of the "darlings" of the IB, made this claim and announcement without the knowledge and consent of their mentor. But the intriguing question is: why this sudden paradigm shift from HuJI to "Indian Mujahideen" and how the IB and investigation agencies are going to reconcile these two conflicting theories?

The new theory could have been prompted either by the change in the government's foreign policy (as HuJI is said to be based in Bangladesh where a friendly government is ruling now), or dictated by some foreign power, or that the IB must be striving to prove that all the cases in which emails had been sent minutes before the blast, including the email traced to the American national Ken Haywood's computer, were actually sent by the computer experts of the "IM." It appears that the IB has been under tremendous pressure from some quarter to give Ken Haywood a clean chit, with the result that it has been taking turns and twists and has been changing the investigation theories of even earlier blasts by 180 degrees in order to prove that somebody else had sent the emails. The truth will come out only when all such cases are thoroughly investigated by a professional and impartial agency, not even remotely connected to IB.

ix) Jaipur Blasts (13 May 2008)

One "Meena" suspected in the case not traced
Seven sketches of suspects mysteriously withdrawn and fresh ones issued
IB pushed its theory through

Terrorists struck in Jaipur triggering nine serial blasts in a crowded market area and near a Hanuman temple leaving 68 dead and about 200 injured.

A) Initial reports

I) Indictment of a "Muslim" organisation and/or persons from day one

1) Union Home Ministry sources said Bangladesh based HuJI was suspected to be behind the blasts.
2) According to sources, the blasts showed that HuJI had managed to establish cells in Rajasthan and that the outfit was responsible for previous major attacks including the attack on CRPF camp in Rampur and serial blasts in three cities in U.P.
3) HuJI, suspected to be behind the Ajmer blast, had used a mixture of Tri-Nitro Toluene (TNT) as the explosive material.
4) *Modus operandi* similar to Malegaon blasts (of 2006) in which also cycles were used. But the CBI, which was investigating the Malegaon blast clarified that there were no similarities between the two blasts.
5) HuJI was also suspected in Mumbai train serial blasts (of 2006).
6) The method of using new cycles was close to that of LTTE, which suggest that terrorists have links with groups in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal (*The Times of India*, Pune, *Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, all of 14 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, *Sakal* Pune, *Pudhari*, Pune and *Asian Age*, Mumbai, all of 15 May 2008).

II) IB's uncalled for interference in the investigation

1) According to the intelligence sources a foreign hand is suspected (*Sakal*, Pune, 14 May 2008).
2) Intelligence sources say the RDX may have been smuggled from Bangladesh through the porous international border in West Bengal (*The Times of India*, Pune, 15 May 2008).

III) Other reports

1) Sources ruled out the use of RDX. The use of low-intensity explosives was suspected, having been set off from bicycles. The DGP Rajasthan Police, however, said RDX had been used.
2) The police said one explosive was defused near the Hanuman temple.
3) A timer and remote control were suspected to have been used in this case.
4) A clock-timer had been found near the blast site.
5) According to Home Ministry sources, the objective of the blasts was threefold: to send a terror message to the world, to disturb the communal harmony in India, and to adversely affect the economy of Rajasthan by discouraging tourists.
6) On Wednesday night (*i.e.*, the next night), various news channels received emails purported to be sent out by "Indian Mujahideen" accepting the responsibility of the blasts. Alongwith the email, a video clip of the preparations of the blasts was also sent.
7) The email had been sent from a cyber café located in Ghaziabad (U.P.), using the mail account of one Guru Mehadi. The owner of the cyber café, Shamveer *alias* Madhukar Mishra, was arrested.
8) The police said that the bicycle shown in the video clip may not be the same which was actually used in the blast, and that the video clip appear to have been sent to misguide the police.

(*The Times of India*, Pune, *Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, all of 14 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune and *Sakal* Pune, both of 15 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, *Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, all of 16 May 2008)

B) Trial and error methods of investigation

1) Sketches of four suspects were prepared on the basis of the description given by the cycle shop owner and were

released by the police. Thereafter, three persons, *viz*, a dairy owner in Ajmer, a civic body officer of Pushkar and an employee of a motel-cum-restaurant of Udaipur, claimed to have spotted persons resembling the sketches. The police have been inquiring into their claims. Later three more sketches were released.

2) Two days after the incident, the railway police discovered an abandoned car in suspicious circumstances. It belonged to one Afzal Khan. The police enquiry in this matter has not led them to any conclusion.
3) The National Security Guard (NSG) and the Rajasthan Forensic Laboratory have clarified that RDX was not used in Jaipur blasts.
4) On a tip-off from intelligence agencies, the Delhi Police arrested a suspected militant of HuJI on Wednesday night (21 May 2008) and 3.1 kgs of deadly RDX was recovered from him.
5) Hundreds of Bangladeshis, SIMI activists and other suspects have been picked up for interrogation in Rajasthan, Maharashtra and elsewhere, the important one being Imran Kazi, arrested from Mangaon on Mumbai-Goa road in Maharashtra on 21 May 2008).
6) The Jaipur Police withdrew seven sketches of likely suspects as they failed to match the description of the suspects given by the cycle shop owners and consequently failed to provide any lead. Hence they decided to go in for 3-dimensional computer sketches.
7) The police claimed that with the arrest of two suspects, one in Delhi and another in Maharashtra, they had reached a "near-breakthrough" in the case.
8) However, the SIT's decision to withdraw seven earlier sketches and to issue fresh ones, and the NSG experts ruling out the possibility of RDX having been used in the blast put the government in an embarassing situation, giving rise to the possibility of handing over the investigation to CBI.
9) While the anti-terror wing of the central agencies drew a blank, the Rajasthan Police started scanning some 8000 mobile phone calls to determine if one of those was made by the bombers before explosion (*The Times of India*, Pune, 17 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 16 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, 18 May 2008; *Sakal*, Pune and *The Times of India*, Mumbai, both of 21 May 2008; *Asian Age*, 20 May 2008, *Hindu*, Mumbai, 22 May 2008; *Pioneer*, Mumbai, 21 May 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, 23 May 2008, *Pudhari*, Pune, 19 May 2008; *Pudhari*, Pune, 23 May 2008; *Sakal*, Pune, 22 May 2008, *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 14 June 2008).

C) Clues: some verified, some left unverified

1) One of the main reasons why Bangladesh-based HuJI is suspected in the blasts is that one of the cycle shopkeepers from where terrorists had purchased cycles described one of the persons *as having parted his hair in the middle and spoke in a Bengali accent*. According to intelligence officials, this is the only authentic source for their claim.
2) An air ticket found at one of the blast sites had been procured through Internet from a cyber café in Muzaffarpur. It was alleged that one Shamim Islam had purchased the ticket from Patna to Kolkata during his stay in Muzaffarpur. Police were in search of Shamim Islam.
3) A rickshaw puller, identified as Vijay, was injured in the blast. He was later questioned by the police. Vijay told them that he was hired by a woman called Meena who lived near the site of one of the blasts, to carry a new cycle to an area near Hawa Mahal, one of the sites of the attack for which she had offered him Rs. 1 lakh. He was shown saying so on Aaj Tak TV channel, while he was being whisked

away by the police the same evening. According to early reports the police launched a massive hunt for the woman. But, thereafter, there was no talk of either Vijay or Meena.

4) Enquiry was also being made whether the word "Guru" in the email has anything to do with Afzal Guru.
5) The officials connected with the investigation made it clear that the investigation would proceed only when they got inputs from central agencies as the network of terrorists was national and international (*The Milli Gazette*, 1-15 June 2008).

D) The inputs [readymade script] received from IB and investigation proceeded and completed

1) One Shahbaz Husain, a "prime suspect," was arrested and remanded to police custody. He is a native of Bhadohi district of U.P. According to the police, he was one of the "masterminds" in the terror attacks in five states, including Gujarat. He had strong linkage with Abul Bashar of Azamgarh (U.P.) and Sajid Mansoori of Gujarat in connection with the Ahmedabad blasts. He was arrested in a joint operation of ATS U.P. and ATS Rajasthan (*The Times of India*, Pune, 27 August 2008).
2) The SIT Rajasthan claimed on 22 September 2008 that they had unravelled all the threads of the Jaipur serial blasts. Their story goes as follows:
   i. Ten terrorists, eight of whom identified, reached Jaipur on May 13, in three groups. They had readymade bombs in bags and Rs. 4,500 in cash to buy bicycles and for travel expenses.
   ii. They had also come to Jaipur on May 11 for a recce of the blast sites.
   iii. The executioners and planters of explosives were Atif, Sajid (both killed in Delhi's Batla House encounter), Saif (in Delhi Police custody), Shadab (escaped during Delhi

encounter), Khalid, Arif, Sajid Bhai, Salman and two other unidentified terrorists. Shadab is believed to know the two unidentified terrorists. Their names will become known only after Shadab is arrested.

   iv. They divided themselves into three groups: Arif, Salman and one unidentified terrorist formed one group. This was headed by Atif. Shadab headed the other group which included Khalid and one unidentified terrorist. Sajid Bhai, Saif and Sajid were in the third group.
   v. After placing the bombs, they dispersed and reached Jaipur railway station separately, and from there went to Delhi by Shatabdi Express.
   vi. Atif, who was the head of the execution part, had come to Jaipur on 9 May also to meet Qyamuddin, who was the link between planners and executioners.
   vii. Atif might know some of the planners, including Tauqeer *alias* Subhan, Sajid Mansoori, Shahbaz Husain and some others (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 September 2008).

E) Loopholes in and serious doubts about the investigation

1) No serious efforts were made to trace the origin of the email purported to have been sent by "Indian Mujahideen."
2) It is not known what enquiry was made in respect of Vijay and Meena, whose role was seriously suspected in the blasts; and if at all the enquiry was made, what its finding was.
3) It is not understood, what prevented the local police from proceeding with the investigation on the basis of the clues they had obtained and why they were waiting for the IB's inputs. Or did the police have standing instructions that in blast cases they should not proceed with the investigation as per the provisions of Cr. P.C., unless they had a green

signal from the central intelligence agencies?

4) It is also not known what happened to the HuJI militant who had been arrested by the Delhi Police on 21 May 2008 on the IB's tip-off. It appears that the IB was working on the theory of RDX having been smuggled by some HuJI operative through the porous Bangladesh borders (*The Times of India*, Pune, 15 May 2008) and that, in keeping with this theory, they got a "HuJI militant" arrested with 3.1 kg of RDX on 21 May 2008 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 23 May 2008). But at about the same time, the NSG and Forensic experts declared that RDX was *not* used in the Jaipur blast (*Sakal*, Pune, 21 May 2008). By the time they knew about the experts' report, they had already arrested a "HuJI operative" with RDX. This put them in an embarrassing situation and, therefore, they quickly dropped this theory and started pursuing another one.

5) The sudden withdrawal of the sketches of the suspects by the local police gave rise to many logical questions, *viz.*,

   i. Why were the seven sketches of the suspects prepared so diligently and promptly by the local police on the basis of the description given by the cycle shop owners, withdrawn within two days?

   ii. The reason for withdrawal, as given in the news report of *The Times of India*, Mumbai (16 May 2008), was that the features of the suspects in the sketches did not match the description given by the cycle shop owners. If that was so, then the question is how had the sketches been released in the first place without verifying whether they were prepared as per the descriptions given? Or, did the police want the sketches to match particular persons?

   iii. Did the fact that at about the same time, the Ahmedabad Police, at the instance of the IB, had arrested 10 persons claiming that they had completely

cracked the Ahmedabad blast case as well as some other blast cases, including the Jaipur case, had some connection to the sudden withdrawal of sketches and to the decision to prepare fresh 3-dimentional sketches on computer? To be precise, did the IB want the local police to withdraw the earlier sketches and prepare fresh sketches resembling persons already fixed by them in Ahmedabad?

   iv. When were the so-called 3-dimentional sketches prepared on computer and when were they released? Was there any similarity between the earlier sketches and the later sketches? Or, were they totally different?

   v. How far the 3-dimentional sketches matched the persons who had been transferred to the ATS Rajasthan by the Ahmedabad Police?

   vi. Were the arrested persons got identified by the cycle shop owners? If so, did they identify all or some of them? Or was it that the persons who had gone to the cycle shops were amongst those who had been killed or declared absconding by the Delhi Police in conjunction with the IB and Ahmedabad Police?

6) It is also incomprehensible as to why the ATS Rajasthan declared, as late as 23 September 2008, that the case had been cracked, when the Ahmedabad Police had declared way back on 16 August 2008, *i.e.*, more than a month earlier, that they had busted a gang of terrorists responsible for Ahmedabad blasts and many other blasts including the Jaipur blast. Wasn't it that the IB had told them to wait till a final touch was given to the story by joining the missing links, *i.e.*, till the encounter in Delhi which eventually took place on 19 September in which two persons were killed, two escaped and one was arrested?

And most important, what convincing evidence the ATS has against the accused persons, other than the manipulative evidence such as the confessional statements of the accused, their mobile phone records, diaries written by them, and the recovery of weapons, explosives, diaries and other material from the persons of those killed in the encounter?

IV

Nanded bomb blast (5 April 2006)

A providential self-detection of the case

The Nanded blast case of April 2006 was a self-detected case in which the terrorists, who happened to belong to Brahminist organisations, were literally caught red handed. It was, indeed, a providential detection with IB having had no scope for intervention or manipulation.

Around midnight of 5 April 2006, a bomb exploded in the house of Laxman Gundayya Rajkondwar of Nanded, a retired Executive Engineer of PWD, killing two persons, Naresh Rajkondwar, son of Laxman Rajkondwar and Himanshu Panse, and injuring four persons who were identified as Maruti Keshav Wagh, Yogesh Deshpande *alias* Vidulkar, Gururaj Tuptewar and Rahul Pandey. Senior police officers visited the spot but the FIR in the case was registered by a junior officer of the rank of Asstt. Police Inspector of the local police station on the statement of one of the surviving injured persons. The FIR said that the deceased Naresh Rajkondwar was running an illegal firecracker business from his home and that the blast occurred because Rajkondwar and Wagh were smoking too close to where the firecrackers had been stored, thus, indicating that it was an accident. To give this story a semblance of some truth, a large quantity of firecrackers valued at Rs. 120,000 was shown stored on the site of the explosion, without using simple common sense that an obvious question would be asked as to how this stock of firecrackers remained intact despite the occurrence of a high intensity blast at the place. Even the district magistrate and the superintendent of police started repeating the firecrackers story to the media. But as there were so many cracks in the story, people started suspecting its authenticity from the outset.

It is naïve to believe that a decision as to the registration of the offence in such a sensational case including the recording of its FIR and the sections of law to be applied was taken by a junior officer of the rank of Asstt. Police Inspector, especially when Nanded was the headquarters of the DM, the SP, the Range IGP and even an IB officer. Logically, how things could have moved after the bomb blast is anybody's guess. The district administration would have informed their bosses in Mumbai, and also the government about the incident giving details such as the brief facts of the case, the version of the injured and also the organisations suspected to be involved in the case. The local IB officer would have informed his bosses in Mumbai and Delhi, and the Brahminist leaders would have got in touch with *their* people in the IB. By the time the government took a decision, the IB would have communicated to the state government that some *highly sensitive* matters were involved in the case and that it was very dangerous to *jump* to any conclusion at this juncture, thus suggesting to register the FIR only on the basis of the statement given by the injured.

Simultaneously, at work could be the local media. The pattern of behaviour of the local media in such cases is almost set and predictable. In the event of a communal riot or bomb blast, Brahminist media persons who normally are in a majority and hence dominate the local press, surround police officers and ask them such questions as would indirectly suggest which line the police should take if they wish to have a favourable reporting in the media and what would happen if they take a different line, even if it is correct. As the local police officers know that their seniors, the government and the public, form their opinion on the basis of whatever is reported in the media, they choose to toe the line suggested by the Brahminist press reporters. At the same time, senior Brahminist journalists get themselves busy contacting and convincing the CM, the Home Minister and other senior leaders, as to what action the government should take. This pattern of the media's behaviour *vis-à-vis* local administration and the government has been so common in the country that it could not be any different in the Nanded blast case.

The cumulative effect of the well-orchestrated moves and efforts of the Brahminist forces at different levels resulted in the Brahminists having their way and in getting the FIR registered on the basis of the theory of fire crackers.

However, it proved to be a temporary victory for the Brahminists, as given the intensity of the blast, the material found at the site of the explosion and the background of the persons killed and injured, it did not take long even for a layman to infer that it was a bomb blast. Ultimately, the Inspector General of Police, Nanded Range, had to admit the fact and set the record straight. He told media persons that some splinters were found on the bodies of the deceased and a live pipe bomb was also found at the explosion site and that the fire-crackers story was a deliberate fabrication by the injured to mislead the police.

Further investigation revealed that the deceased and injured persons were active workers of RSS and Bajrang Dal. They had been well-trained in making and handling bombs of different types and had been targeting mosques by camouflaging their operations to appear like those by Muslim outfits. Laxman Rajkondwar, in whose house the explosion took place, was a well-known RSS man. Moreover, the diaries, important documents, maps of some Muslim religious places and the mobile telephone numbers seized by the police from the houses of the accused incriminated them further. On the basis of this evidence, 16 persons were arrested and their police custody remand taken; but surprisingly, all of them, one by one, were released on bail and some other suspects very easily obtained anticipatory bail.

For a month, the local police had been investigating the case to the best of their ability. But as they had lost their credibility in the eyes of the general public, especially of the minority community, by unquestioningly registering a case based on the theory of fire-cracker blast. Secondly, as the scope of the investigation appeared to be widening, the case was transferred to the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) of the Maharashtra Police, then headed by Addl. DGP KP Raghuvanshi, a trusted officer of the inner group of the IB, and hence, of the Brahminists. Therefore, they felt relieved as they knew that he was the

officer who would complete the technical formalities of the investigation and would stop where he ought to.

As a lot of evidence was already placed on record by way of articles found at the place of incident and by way of diaries, documents, maps, Muslim dresses, artificial beards, telephone numbers, mobile phones and other articles seized during the house-searches of the accused and suspects, the ATS could not ignore or discard this evidence and had to accept it as a *fait accompli*. Moreover, they had to conduct the narco-analysis test of the surviving accused and to record the statements of important witnesses disclosed in the investigation by the local police. Consequently, in a short span of time, a mountain of damning evidence against the whole network of Bajrang Dal and Sangh Parivar piled up before the ATS. This evidence was sufficient to unravel the wider terror network of the Sangh Parivar. But from the first chargesheet filed by the ATS on 24 August 2006, it was noticed that the investigation was restricted to the Nanded blast case and to the 2003-2004 blast cases of Parbhani, Purna and Jalna which had been incidentally and coincidentally detected during the Nanded investigation and that no efforts, whatsoever, had been made to expose the wider terror network of the RSS, VHP and the Bajrang Dal. This did not surprise those who know the Brahminists–IB nexus and servility of the ATS Chief Raghuvanshi to the IB.

The first chargesheet filed on 24 August 2006, named seven accused – Rahul Pande, Laxman Rajkondwar, Sanjay Choudhari, Ramdas Mulange, Dr. Umesh Deshpande, Himanshu Panse (deceased) and Naresh Rajkondwar (deceased). They were charged under sections 304 (culpable homicide), 286 (negligent conduct), 338 (grievous hurt), 201 (destroying evidence), 202 (withholding information on a crime), 203 (providing false information), 212 (harbouring an offender), 120 B (criminal conspiracy), 34 (common intent) and 109 (abetment) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), along with section 3 (causing an explosion likely to endanger life, person or property), 4 (attempting to cause or make or keep explosives likely to endanger life or damage property), 5 (making explosives under suspicious circumstances and 6 (abetment) of

the Explosives Substance Act, 1908; Sections 3, 25 and 35 (unlawful possession of Arms) of the Arms Act 1959, and Sections 18 (attempting to commit or abetting a terrorist act) and 23 (unauthorised possession of bomb, etc., with intent to aid a terrorist act) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act 1967 (as amended in 2004).

After conducting further investigation, the ATS filed a supplementary chargesheet on 11 November 2006, naming four more accused – Maruti Wagh, Yogesh D. Vidulkar, Gururaj Jairam Tuptewar and Milind Ektate. But this chargesheet also did not reflect the will of the ATS to go to the root of the matter.

Facts revealed in the investigation

From the two chargesheets filed by the ATS and the documents enclosed therewith, following facts seemed to have been disclosed in the investigation:

1) The accused persons, involved in assembling the bombs at Nanded, were also responsible for three earlier bomb blasts in neighbouring districts – at the Mohammadia Masjid in Parbhani (November 2003), at the Quadria Masjid in Jalna (August 2004) and at the Merajul-Uloom Madrassa/Masjid in Purna in Parbhani district (August 2004).
2) The target of the bombs, which blew up in their faces on 5-6 April 2006, was a mosque in Aurangabad. Himanshu Panse and Maruti Wagh had visited and taken a close look at the Aurangabad mosque and its surrounding area in May 2004.
3) Police raids on the houses and other establishments of the accused persons and subsequent search operations revealed that Himanshu Panse, Naresh Rajkondwar, Maruti Wagh, Yogesh Vidulkar (Deshpande), Gururaj Tuptewar, Rahul Pande, Sanjay Choudhari, Ramdas Mulange and Laxman Rajkondwar were/are hardcore activists of the RSS, VHP and the Bajrang Dal.
4) Indoctrination by these organisations made them propagate that innocent Hindus were being attacked by

"extremist Muslim organisations" day in and day out and hence Himanshu Panse and Rahul Pande started a gymnasium to mobilise the youth and draw them towards their version of Hinduism. Moreover, Himanshu Panse and Maruti Wagh started a branch of Sangh at Bajrang Nagar, Nanded.

5) They created an anti-Muslim atmosphere by organising seminars and making speeches aimed at emphasising how the Muslims committed "injustice" to Hindus and motivating *the Hindus* for doing "something" for Hinduism. To that end they used to celebrate almost all Hindu festivals and celebrations with fanfare.

6) In order that the aim of "revenge" was effectively fulfilled, accused Wagh, Panse, Choudhary and Vidurkar went to Akanksha Resort at the foot of the Fort Sinhgad near Pune in 2003 and received training in making three types of bombs, including pipe bombs, from a man named Mithun Chakraborty. After demonstrating to them how to explode these bombs, Mithun Chakraborty handed over explosives to Panse. Shortly after returning from this camp, they exploded bombs at Mohammadia Masjid in Parbhani.

7) Himanshu Panse also underwent training by the VHP and Bajrang Dal at Goa for two years.

8) Apart from the above training camps, the RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal conducted three more camps as is evident from the statement of one Santkumar Bhate, a resident of Pune and a retired Merchant Navy captain. He has disclosed the following facts in his statement recorded by the ATS on 20 April and 18 May 2006:

i. In March or April 2000, he received a call from the office of the Bajrang Dal situated behind the Saraswati Mandir School, Pune. Milind Parande, the head of Bajrang Dal's All India Physical Education wing, requested him to train his activists, due to arrive in Pune for a camp, in the use of short-sticks (gelatin sticks). Bhate admitted to having attended the camp and imparted training. Around 40-50 state-level activists participated in the camp and Himanshu Panse was their group leader.

ii. Milind Parande, then requested Bhate to also impart training at an upcoming national-level camp of activists at the Bhonsala Military School, Nagpur. Parande and three of his disciples carried 300 sticks with them for the camp. It was a 40-day camp organised by the RSS and Bajrang Dal in which 115 activists from all over the country participated. Bhate attended the camp and imparted training in the use of gelatin sticks to the activists for the major part of the camp. But, according to him, he was "disappointed" with the camp atmosphere as the organisers of the camp were "misleading" the participants. Moreover, two ex-servicemen and a former senior IB officer were also present at the camp to impart training.

iii. Bhate was also invited to a Bajrang Dal camp at Gadahinglaj in Kolhapur district. The head of that camp was one Shankar Vaidya.

9) The search operation at Panse's house unearthed items of disguise such as artificial beard, artificial moustaches, "Shervani" [Muslim long coat], etc., apparently to be used in order to assume the appearance of a Muslim.

10) From the above articles found in the house of Himanshu Panse and from the conversation on mobile phone no. 9822297494 of witness Atul Vinod Kamtikar, it was revealed that Wagh was to visit Aurangabad on 5 April 2006 for carrying out "some work" and hence a motorcycle was kept ready at Dhoot Motors of Sachin Suresh Kadam.

11) The contents of Ramdas Raznishi of Wagh and the map found in his pocket diary indicated that Himanshu Panse along with Maruti Wagh, Shrikar Sonawane and three

others inspected the Masjid in Aurangabad in May 2004.

12) Govind Nagacharya Puranik, a BSNL employee at Nanded, also played a key role in these nefarious activities. He was affiliated to RSS and had been attending RSS training camps since 2000. He financed and helped the accused persons and provided them with logistical support both before and after the Nanded incident. He, however, very easily obtained anticipatory bail.

13) Shrikar Shivsambha Sonwale, a Nanded resident, was a close friend of the accused persons. He knew that Himanshu Panse and Maruti Wagh had detonated a bomb in Parbhani mosque in November 2003, but he withheld this vital information from the police. Had he informed the police, the gang would have been apprehended and the explosions that followed at other places could have been prevented.

14) One of the accused, Sanjay Choudhari, has stated in his narco-analysis test that before the Parbhani blast of November 2003, Himanshu Panse had asked Sanjay Choudhari to go to Pune and meet an "important person." Accordingly, Sanjay went to Pune. The "important person" met him on his arrival at Pune station and himself drove him to Kshatriya Lodge. Sanjay checked into the lodge in his real name and stayed there for two-three days as per Himanshu's instructions. All the expenses were paid by Himanshu.

15) Sanjay has further stated that Himanshu often called up senior Bajrang Dal leader Balaji Pakhare and leaders of RSS in Mumbai and that Himanshu was receiving financial support for these activities from the Bajrang Dal and RSS of Mumbai and Pune.

16) Sanjay also told the police that the plan to blast the Aurangabad mosque was triggered by the Sankat Mochan temple blast of March 2006. Himanshu said that he would carry out his plan only after he received an order over the phone from a senior leader. Himanshu had a separate SIM card for receiving such orders.

17) After his arrest, Sanjay had received a call from the Bajrang Dal leader, Balaji Pakhare of Nanded. He told Sanjay not to worry and that he would get him released on bail at the earliest.

18) Another accused, Rahul Pandey, told the police during his narco-test that one Yogesh from Warad, one Mukesh from Varanasi and Govind Puranik from Nanded had been helping Himanshu in his "plan."

19) Rahul also disclosed that VHP leader Praveen Togadia had come to their place to give a speech and that Himanshu had made all the arrangements for Togadia's visit.

20) He also said that Himanshu had gone to Goa with Yogi in the month of December for sight-seeing.

Before KP Raghuvanshi and his team realised, they were face to face with tonnes of damning evidence and scores of vital clues against terror outfits like RSS, VHP and Bajrang Dal. But, for obvious reasons, the evidence was not utilised properly and the leads were not taken to their logical ends, as is evident from the following facts:

1. No enquiry was made into the track record of the Bhonsala Military School of Nagpur where the national-level terror training camp of RSS-Bajrang Dal was held in 2001 and about the details of 115 activists who attended the camp there. The school is still functioning normally to this day.
2. No enquiry was made about the ownership and management of the Akanksha Resort of Pune where a training camp was held in 2003 and about its affiliation to any of the terror outfits and about the names of the trainers and trainees.

3. The identity of "Mithun Chakravorty," who not only imparted training to the accused in making and handling bombs at the Akanksha Resort but also handed over explosives to them, was not disclosed. From the way attempts were being made to hold back his real identity, it can be presumed that he is an extremely important person.
4. Milind Parande, the head of Bajrang Dal's All India Physical Education wing, who organised the first known camp of activists in Pune in the year 2000 and who also attended the Nagpur camp in 2001 along with 300 gelatin sticks, was not made an accused in the case.
5. No enquiry was made about three disciples of Milind Parande who attended the Nagpur camp. Likewise, there was no probe into the names of 40-50 activists who attended the terror camp organised by Parande in the year 2000.
6. No serious attempt was made to identify the two ex-servicemen who were present at Nagpur camp for imparting training to Bajrang Dal activists (later, the ATS headed by Hemant Karkare arrested them in the Malegaon case). Had they been arrested in this case, further blasts could have been averted.
7. A former senior IB officer who also participated in the Nagpur training camp was not got identified. On the other hand, attempts were made to hide his identity as jealously as that of "Mithun Chakraworty." Apparently, the ATS could not touch him without getting a nod from the IB which the latter would never give.
8. No enquiry was made into the training camp at Gadahinglaj, district Kolhapur and who organised it. Who financed it? What were the names of the trainers and participants? What sort of training was imparted to them? and so on and so forth.

9. No enquiry was made into the track record of Shankar Vaidya, who was the camp head at Gadahinglaj.
10. The main conspirator, Himanshu Panse, is said to have undergone a two-year rigorous training in Goa. But a detailed enquiry such as the exact location of the training camp, its organisers, the names of the trainers and of the trainees, etc., did not seem to have been made.
11. The call records of mobile phone no. 9822297494 of witness Atul Kamtikar, used by the accused did not seem to have been obtained to get to know the names of the persons contacted by the accused before and after the incident.
12. Atul Vinod Kamtikar, who seems to know the plan of the accused, was not made an accused.
13. Govind Nagacharya Puranik, who has admitted having attended RSS camps since 2000 and who helped the accused financially and provided them with logistic support, has been let off the hook.
14. Shrikar Shivsambha Sonwale, who was one of the persons accompanying Himanshu Panse, the leader of the group, to inspect the target mosque in Aurangabad and who was also aware of the Parbhani mosque blast of November 2003, was also not made an accused.
15. No enquiry seemed to have been made into the "important person" of Pune who received one of the accused, Sanjay Choudhari, at the railway station and about the Kshatriya Lodge, where the latter was accommodated before the Parbhani blast.
16. The leader of the group, Himanshu Panse, used to receive instructions from Bajrang Dal leader of Nanded, Balaji Pakhare. The latter seemed to have phoned Sanjay Choudhari *while he was in police custody*. But Balaji Pakhare has not been made an accused.

17. It is also not known what enquiry was made with the likes of "Yogesh" from Warad and "Mukesh" from Varanasi who, according to one of the accused, Rahul Pande, had helped Himanshu Panse in carrying out his plans.
18. VHP leader, Praveen Togadia, was found to be indoctrinating the group of terrorists. But it is not known whether Togadia was interrogated in this regard and whether an attempt was made even to seize the CDs of his speeches.
19. No attempts seemed to have been made to identify the "Yogi" with whom Himanshu Panse had gone to Goa for sight-seeing. This fact assumes extreme importance in view of the fact that Panse had undergone rigorous training in Goa for two years.
20. No enquiry seemed to have been made in respect of the calls made from and received by the mobile phone of deceased Naresh Rajkondwar.
21. And most important, it is not known whether the special SIM card on which Himanshu Panse used to receive important messages, like the orders to carry out the blasts from his superiors, was seized and, if so, whether its call details were obtained and further enquiry made in respect of the frequently-made and received calls. (The issues of Bhonsala Military School, Akanksha Resort, Mithun Chakravorty and the former senior IB officers have been dealt in more detail in the chapter concerning the post-Mumbai attack investigation of the Malegaon blast case.)

Apart from the above acts of serious and glaring omission, the ATS under Raghuvanshi committed even a more serious act of commission when it wrote to the Addl. Chief Secretary (Home) of Maharashtra seeking sanction for prosecution only in respect of seven persons, out of 21

arrested by it, for prosecuting all of whom it had earlier sought permission from the Collector, Nanded, only three weeks ago, *i.e.*, on 29 July, 2006. Later, 11 of them were discharged u/s 169 Cr. P.C. saying that there was no sufficient evidence against them. This was really surprising as only three weeks ago the ATS had sent a report to the Collector and sought his permission to send the chargesheet as required under the Arms Act and the Explosive Substance Act, and claimed to have sufficient evidence against them. The turn-around by the ATS could not be under political pressure as has been generally perceived, because all the discharged accused persons belonged to Sangh Parivar which was the mother organisation of BJP, the main party opposed to the ruling coalition in the state as well as at the Centre at the time. The only logical inference that can be drawn is that the accused were hardcore Brahminists and hence the Brahminist IB pressurised Raghuvanshi to discharge them.

This action on the part of Raghuvanshi proved to be the proverbial last straw on the camel's back. As there was already a hue and cry from secularists and Muslim organisations against the biased attitude of the police and the ATS, the government had no option but to transfer the case to the CBI. This was a cause for serious concern for the Brahminists as well as for the IB as they apprehended that the CBI, having not been known for its caste or communal bias, could probe deep into the matter and expose the whole conspiracy. But the IB was not an organisation to give up so easily. Though as a system the CBI has not been infected by ideological infiltration, there have definitely been stray cases of individual infiltration. It appears from the later developments, that the IB, by using its clout in the PMO and its oft-repeated and deceptive terms like "secret operation," "counter-insurgency operation," "international relations," etc., got the team of their choice from the CBI selected for the investigation.

The IB's selection of the CBI team proved to be more than justified, as the CBI team exceeded even the expectations of the IB and surprised everybody, including the IB and the Brahminists. It went to the extent of further diluting the case by the following acts of omission and commission:

1) The CBI did not investigate the case as a wider terror con-

spiracy involving the nefarious network of Bajrang Dal activists supported by the Sangh Parivar. It did not even club together the Nanded, Parbhani, Jalna and Purna blast cases, even though it had already transpired that they were committed by the same terror group. Instead, it treated the Nanded incident as an isolated case, and while filing the chargesheet deleted section 120B (conspiracy) of the IPC and the sections of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, which had been earlier applied by the ATS.

2) CBI, consciously avoided any mention of RSS-Bajrang Dal-VHP connections with the accused involved in the case.
3) The name of Laxman Rajkondwar, in whose house the Nanded explosion took place and from where many incriminating articles were seized, was deleted from the list of the accused, even though he had been indicted in the earlier chargesheet.
4) No enquiry was made about the Bhonsala Military School or the Akanksha Resort or other places where Bajrang Dal activists were trained in the use of arms and explosives.
5) No enquiry was made as to whether such training camps had also been held elsewhere in the country as a part of a wider conspiracy.
6) Like the ATS, CBI also seemed to have deliberately avoided making a thorough enquiry about "Mithun Chakravorty," the former army officer, and a former senior IB officer, who trained the Bajrang Dal activists in the use of firearms and explosives.
7) Even Rakesh Dhawade, who was the main facilitator of the Akanksha Resort training camp and who was later arrested by the ATS headed by Hemant Karkare in the 2008 Malegaon blast case, was not allowed to be arrested by the CBI, probably because of the apprehension that he would disclose the identity of "Mithun Chakravorty." Moreover, after his arrest by the ATS when he told the Jalna Police that two professors of Pune, *viz.*, Dr. Sharad Kunte and

Prof. Deo, had participated in the terror training camp, no further enquiry was made by the CBI in respect of the duo. In this regard, Krishna Kumar on www.indiatoday.in (3 January 2009) remarks, "The CBI's slack investigation into Nanded blast is getting exposed with every new development in the Malegaon bombing. Despite recent disclosure of Malegapn-accused Rakesh Dhawade, the CBI has not pursued the case of two teachers of chemistry in Pune. Dhawade told Jalna Police how two Pune college teachers (Kunte and Deo) gave training in bomb-making to Hindutva terror suspects. But CBI has been dragging its feet."

One should, however, understand that the above-mentioned acts of omission and commission on the part of the CBI were definitely not under political pressure, as both the governments, *i.e.*, in the state and at the Centre, were headed by the Congress Party and they were not going to be benefitted by favouring the accused who belonged to Sangh Parivar, the mother organisation of BJP, the main opposition party. The only logical conclusion is that the CBI team, hand-picked by the IB, acted under the instructions of the IB and its Brahminist masters.

However, there was one officer who was not to be brow-beaten by the IB and taken in by their gimmicks. He was the ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare, who had succeeded KP Raghuvanshi in January 2008, and who had been investigating the Malegaon blast case. He suspected that there were a lot of loopholes in the Nanded blast case of 2006 and noticed that the CBI had not taken seriously many important clues such as the confessional statements of the accused, the scull cap, beard, etc., found in the houses of the accused and the calls made from the mobile phones of Naresh Rajkandwar and Himanshu Panse. Hence, he sent his team to CBI headquarters, Delhi on 25 November 2008 to dig into the records of the Nanded case. He also appeared bent upon tracking down "Mithun Chakravorty" and the former senior IB officer who imparted training to the terror group. But, before he could accomplish his task, he was unfortunately killed in the Mumbai attack of 26/11.

V

Malegaon Bomb Blast 2008
(Pre-Mumbai attack investigation)

The first true and honest investigation of the case Hemant Karkare showed the way

On 29 September 2008, a bomb explosion took place in the crowded Bhiku Chowk of Malegaon, killing six persons and injuring more than 100. But as usual, even before the flames of the blast were doused and its echoes died down, fingers started pointing towards SIMI, "Indian Mujahideen" and other so-called terrorist outfits. Muslims of Malegaon were scared as they were apprehensive that the police would promptly swing into action and start picking up Muslim boys without any evidence as they did earlier in the Malegaon blast of 2006 case and even in cases of blasts elsewhere in the country, during the last few years. Therefore, when the Dy. C.M. and the Home Minister of Maharashtra, R.R. Patil, and other leaders visited the town in the wake of the blast, people of Malegaon, including women and children, came on the streets in thousands and gave vent to their ire by mobbing the leaders, heckling them and shouting slogans against the government and the police.

But neither the perpetrators of the blast, nor their handlers, nor the agitating Muslims of Malegaon noted the marked change in the situation. They did not know that this time, unlike in previous blast cases, the investigation was not going to be done by the commands of the Brahminists in the IB and on the basis of readymade evidence furnished by them and nothing was going to be concealed or suppressed as, this time the investigation team, the Maharashtra ATS, was headed by an honest, God-fearing and thoroughly professional officer, called Hemant Karkare, who was not and could not be a puppet of the IB, nor could he be brow-beaten by any authority or scared by any threat or

influenced by communal or any other consideration.

As a professional sleuth, Karkare knew that investigating a sensational case was like knitting a spider's net, wherein the spider denotes the investigation agency, the well-spun fine strands the pieces of evidence, the well-knit net a chargesheet and an insect caught in it an accused. As he knew his job well, he set out with confidence and conviction. Undeterred and unwavered by the outside cacophony, like a thorough professional he started his investigation from where it ought to have been started, the scene of the blast, which he knew formed the nucleus of the spider's net. The blast was found to be caused by an improvised explosive device (IED) fitted on a LML Freedom motorcycle bearing no. MH-15-4572. But the perpetrators were not fools to have maintained the original number and original parts of the vehicle intact. They had cannabalised some of its parts from other vehicles, had changed its number plate and even the chassis and engine numbers to mislead the investigators. But with the help of the dealer's record and of forensic experts the police could reach one Sadhvi Pragyasingh Chandrapratapsingh Thakur (38), who originally belonged to Madhya Pradesh, but was presently living in Surat (Gujarat). It transpired in the enquiry that she was an active member of the ABVP a decade ago and was also the national executive secretary of Durga Vahini, Vishwa Hindu Parishad's women's wing. The two-wheeler used in the blast belonged to her, but for the sake of record it was shown to have been sold. Investigation revealed that one Manoj Sharma *alias* Joshi, an RSS member, who had sold Pragyasingh's bike was involved in a double-murder case in February 2003 at Mhow, M.P. He was subsequently shot dead by his rivals. He was "very close" to the Sadhvi, as reported by the Mumbai edition of *The Times of India* (29 October 2008).

A preliminary enquiry with Prgayasinh Thakur led the police to two of her associates namely Shamlal Sahu and Shivnarayan Kalang Sarasingh, both belonging to M.P. Out of them Sahu was a BJP member. They had helped the Sadhvi in executing the plan. All three were arrested by the police on 23 October 2008, their police custody remand taken, and were subjected to thorough interrogation. Each and every

piece of information elicited from them and from other sources during the course of investigation was meticulously followed by the ATS under Hemant Karkare to its logical end, and gradually the whole plot started unfolding itself.

A mere perusal of some of the newspaper reports, during the period of the investigation, would reveal how professionally, systematically and impartially Hemant Karkare was proceeding with the investigation. It was an absolutely honest, straight and transparent investigation. There were no pulls or pushes or twists or turns or frequent change of tracks. Based as it was on true and factual pieces of evidence, it had a linear smooth sailing, one revelation leading to another and so on, and finally unearthing a diabolical anti-national terror plot.

The story of this investigation in narrative form has appeared in many magazines and periodicals. I am reproducing below gists of reports in respect of the case published in important newspapers in logical sequence so that readers can experience the thrill of the investigation as it progresses:

1) Following the information, Ramesh Upadhyaya, a retired army major, was picked up from Pune. He once headed the RSS's Mumbai unit of the Ex-Servicemans' Cell. He is suspected to have supplied RDX (*Pune Mirror*, 28 November 2008).
2) One Sameer Kulkarni, originally belonging to Maharashtra, was picked up from Bhopal for allegedly supplying chemicals for preparing bombs (*The Times of India*, Pune, 29 October 2008).
3) Nasik-based Bhonsala Military School's former commander, Major Prabhakar Kulkarni, came under police scanner for allegedly training Malegaon blast accused in the use of RDX on the school premises in 2001 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 1 November 2008).
4) Retired Colonel Shailesh Raikar, the administrator of Bhonsala Military School, Nasik, was interrogated for allegedly attending a meeting of the accused involved in the case 15 days prior to the Malegaon blast (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 2 November 2008).

5) The ATS arrested Ajay Rahirkar and Rakesh Dhawade, from Pune – Rahirkar for handling the financial affairs of the group and Rakesh Dhawade, an arms expert for procuring weapons (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 November 2008).
6) One Chintamani Mhatre was arrested from Dombivali for collecting weapons (*The Times of India*, Pune, 4 November 2008).
7) The ATS said that arms expert Rakesh Dhawade was involved in Parbhani and Nanded blasts (*Sakal*, Pune, 11 November 2008). (Dhawade was later arrested in Parbhani and Jalna blast cases, but not in the Nanded case.)
8) Sadhvi Pragyasingh Thakur was subjected to a brain mapping test which showed that she was telling the truth. She was earlier subjected to a narco-analysis test (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 2 November 2008).
9) Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, a serving army officer, was arrested on 4 November 2008, for terror conspiracy in the Malegaon blast case. He had come on the ATS radar because of some SMSs sent by him to his Abhinav Bharat colleague, retired major Ramesh Upadhyaya (*The Times of India*, Pune, 7 November 2008).
10) Purohit was the co-founder of Abhinav Bharat, a right-wing Hindu organisation. He admitted that he was the "mastermind" of the plot and had provided RDX for the explosion. The ATS suspected that he also trained the youth in the use of explosives (*The Times of India*, Pune, 7 November 2008).
11) The ATS was convinced about Purohit's links with Col. (retd.) S.S. Raikar, the commandant of Nasik's Bhonsala Military School. Police suspected that Raikar helped procure arms for Abhinav Bharat.
12) Initially, VHP leader Praveen Togadia was not happy with Lt. Col. Purohit's activities as he feared that his organisation (Abhinav Bharat) would split Hindutva forces. He met Purohit in a Mumbai hotel in April 2008 and tried to dissuade him but Purohit did not agree to fold up Abhinav Bharat (*The Times of India*, Pune, 9 November 2008).

13) Lt. Col. Purohit's laptop, suspected to contain the names of 58 youths who had undergone arms training at Pune in 2003, as disclosed in Nanded blast case, in addition to vital information about the conspiracy, went missing from his Panchmadhi (M.P.) house (*Sakal*, Pune, 8 and 9 November 2008 and *The Times of India*, Pune, 9 November 2008).
14) Lt. Col. Purohit's narco-analysis test was conducted in the Forensic Science Laboratory in Bangalore on 9 November 2008 (*The Times of India*, Pune, 11 November 2008).
15) One Sudhakar Chaturvedi of U.P., arrested by Mumbai's Matunga Police station for possessing a factory-made revolver and a fake Indian army ID card, was found to be the national coordinator of Abhinav Bharat. He admitted in the narco-test to have participated in the Malegaon blast (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 12 November 2008).
16) The Commandant of Bhonsala Military School at Nasik, Col. (retd.) S.S. Raikar told investigators that a meeting of Abhinav Bharat had taken place on the Nasik campus of the school on September 15, *i.e.*, two weeks before the blast (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 13 November 2008).
17) The laptop of Lt. Col. Purohit was finally traced. The ATS officers believed that it contained vital information about Malegaon conspiracy, a list of the persons who attended the training camp at Pune and also a list of members of Abhinav Bharat (*Pudhari*, Pune, 14 November 2008).
18) "In the course of investigation, certain information was received about the involvement of the Malegaon blast accused in the Nanded, Ajmer and Samjhauta Express blasts," an I.P.S. officer said (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 November 2008).
19) In his narco-analysis test, Lt. Col. Purohit is said to have given sensational information that he supplied explosives for Ajmer and Malegaon blasts at the instance of Mahant Dayanand Pandey (*Sakal*, Pune and *Pudhari*, Pune, both of 15 November 2008).

20) Lt. Col. Purohit's role was suspected in Samjhauta Express blast. Haryana Police were expected to visit Pune to question Purohit and Sadhvi Pragyasingh. They were to pick up investigation from Indore, where the trail last went cold. The bombs used in Samjhauta Express blasts were suspected to have been assembled in Indore (*Sakal*, Pune, 13 and 14 November 2008; *The Indian Express*, Pune, 14 November 2008).

21) During his narco-test, Purohit told officers, "Praveen Togadia was responsible for the Samjhauta Express blasts. He asked me to find out from Dr. Dev, how much RDX was remaining after the blast" (*Pune Mirror*, 19 November 2008).

22) The Mahant of "Jammu Sharda Peeth," Swami Dayanand Pandey was arrested by the ATS in Kanpur, for his alleged role in Malegaon blast (*Sakal*, Pune, 13 November 2008).

23) At a meeting of Purohit, Pandey and Pragyasingh, held in Bhopal on 12 April 2008, Dayanand Pandey had asked Purohit to supply RDX for the blast. Meetings were also held at Faridabad and Pune (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 November 2008).

24) The ATS Chief Hemant Karkare said, Pandey along with other accused had participated in meetings at Bhonsala Military School, Deoladi Camp (Nasik), Indore, and Jammu & Kashmir, and that he was a part of a larger conspiracy (*Pune Mirror*, 15 November 2008).

25) The investigators feel that Pandey had been in touch with Lt. Col. Purohit who was stationed at 42 Rashtriya Rifles in Kashmir and hence the RDX used in Malegaon blast could have been sourced from Kashmir (*Pune Mirror*, 15 November 2008).

26) The government prosecutor told the Nasik court that the RDX used in Samjhauta Express blast was supplied by Lt. Col. Purohit and that he had procured it while he was posted in Deolali camp, Nasik (*Sakal*, Pune and *The Times of India*, Pune, both of 16 November 2008).

27) The ATS retracted its claim of use of RDX in Samjhauta Express blast under pressure, as the IB alerted the central government about the government prosecutor's statement in the court saying that the Centre had already blamed Pakistan's ISI for the Samjhauta terror strike, on the basis of the Bureau's finding. Moreover, a senior IB official observed, "Forensic examination of the blast site and two unexploded bombs had conclusively proved that RDX was not used, but the ATS was leveling allegation to the contrary" (*The Times of India*, Pune, 18 November 2008).

28) However, on the same day, S.P. (Railways), Bharti Arora in whose jurisdiction Samjhauta Express blast had taken place, clarified that "RDX was used in the blast and the Forensic Science test laboratory has confirmed it" (*Sakal Times*, Pune, 18 November 2008).

29) The CBI director said that a link had already been established between the Malegaon blast and the one in Nanded two years ago (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 14 November 2008).

30) Bombs in Samjhauta Express, Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) and Ajmer Sharif dargah had identical timing devices in a suitcase lock (*The Indian Express*, 18 November 2008).

31) Purohit also said that Swami Asimanand of Dangs had informed him that Sunil Joshi, the man who had sold Sadhvi Pragyasingh's motorcycle, was also involved in Ajmer Sharif bombing of 11 October 2007 (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 24 November 2008).

32) Purohit claimed to have met Pragya on 5 October 2008 to tell her that "our people" had carried out the killings in Orissa, burnt down two churches and also carried out the Malegaon blast (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 24 November 2008).

33) Malegaon blast accused booked under MCOCA (*The Times of India*, Pune, 21 November 2008).

34) MCOCA Court, Nasik, refused custody of Malegaon blast accused (*The Times of India*, Pune, 25 November 2008).

35) Police said that Rakesh Dhawade and another accused raised Rs. 10 lakhs for Malegaon blast and the police were gathering details of hawala transactions of Rs. 20 lakh (*The Times of India*, Pune, 14 November 2008).

36) Purohit told CBI officers that he had given Dhawade Rs. 3.2 lakh two months before [the Malegaon blast] to buy four weapons (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 24 November 2008).

37) It has also been disclosed that Ajay Rahirkar had given Lt. Col. Purohit a large amount of money. He had also given Rs. 2.5 lakh to a builder of Nasik. A large amount of money is suspected to have been transacted through hawala in which Purohit played a key role (*Pudhari*, Pune, 16 November 2008).

38) The ATS scrutinised several bank accounts in Gujarat to get to know the origin of funds used for executing the blast. The ATS believed that the blasts were funded from Gujarat (*Pune Mirror*, 18 November 2008).

39) The ATS is of the opinion that Purohit used Pandey's high profile contacts to get logistic support (*Pune Mirror*, 18 November 2008).

40) The ATS is probing the alleged role of several Pune industrialists, who donated funds to the Hindu outfit Abhinav Bharat; the ATS officials said that Shyam Apte, a Pune resident, used to approach these industrialists for donations (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 26 November 2008).

41) Two historians from Pune were under the ATS scanner (*The Times of India*, Pune, 8 November 2008). The name of one of them was known to be Ninad Bedekar (*Pudhari*, Solapur, 27 February 2009).

42) The statement made to the police by Pune resident Sanat Kumar Bhate in 2006, after Nanded blast, has brought into focus the possibility that retired officers of the IB may have links with radical Hindu outfits.

43) It has been disclosed that Pragyasingh had close connections with Shabri Dham Ashram Mahant and VHP leader of Dangs (Gujarat), Asimanand Swami. Pragyasingh and Purohit used to have frequent telephonic conversations with him. Immediately after the Malegaon blast he is said to have had conversation with Pragyasingh. Swami was using the SIM card of his driver Sunil Dahade for such conversations. Police arrested Dahade and one more person from the Ashram, after which the Swami absconded (*Sakal*, Pune, 8 November 2008, *Sakal*, Pune, 9 November 2008, *Pudhari*, Pune, 10 and 11 November 2008).

44) The sources in the ATS said that they were investigating the role of three VHP leaders from Gujarat for their alleged links with arrested accused Sameer Kulkarni, a founder member of Abhinav Bharat (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 9 November 2008).

45) The role of BJP MP of Gorakhpur (U.P.), Yogi Adityanath and BJP MLA, Das Agarwal, is suspected in the conspiracy (*Sakal*, Pune, 13 November 2008).

46) Lt. Col. Purohit told the CBI that VHP General Secretary, Pravin Togadia, was involved in the formation and funding of Abhinav Bharat.

- Purohit first met Togadia in February 2006, in Nasik at the residence of local VHP unit head Vinayak.
- In December that year he met Togadia in Mumbai and apprised him of the Mumbai blast concept.
- In March-April 2007, Togadia told Purohit about the names of donors of the trust.
- In August-September 2007, Togadia gave him Rs. 2 lakh, which was later passed on to Abhinav Bharat's Samir Kulkarni (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 24 November 2008).

47) Purohit also told the CBI that Dhawade claimed to have trained the RSS cadre who died in the Nanded blast (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 24 November 2008).

48) The ATS informed the court that there has been direct or indirect involvement of two high profile but non-political leaders who owed allegiance to a pro-Hindu organisation (*Sakal*,

Pune, 11 November 2008; *The Times of India*, Pune, 12 November 2008).

49) A Delhi doctor of "international repute" was learnt to have visited Dayanand Pandey on January 26 at Faridabad where the Malegaon plot was allegedly hatched (*Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 23 November 2008).

50) In the coming days, the ATS is likely to question three more persons from Pune, *viz.*, Himani Savarkar, Col. (retd.) Jayant Chitale and former BJP corporator, Milind Ekbote. Besides, a top army officer and a prominent historian are also under consideration (*Sunday Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 23 November 2008).

51) The ATS has been concentrating on 54 persons who participated in the training camp at Bhonsala Military School at Nagpur in 2001. ATS seriously suspected that some of them were involved in the two Malegaon blasts and the Nanded blast (*Sakal*, Pune, 10 November 2008).

52) The ATS suspected that Bajrang Dal activists who were trained in Nagpur, attended another training camp in Sinhgad, near Pune, in 2003. Some of the trainers are suspected to be common. Lt. Col. Purohit was suspected to have been present at the Sinhgad camp and Rakesh Dhawade is suspected to have played a key role in organising the camp (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 13 November 2008). It was revealed in Nanded blast investigation that Bajrang Dal organised three terror camps in year 2000 at Pune, in 2001 at Nagpur and in 2003 at Sinhgad near Pune.

53) The CBI has decided to reinvestigate the Nanded blast case of 2006, as the Malegaon blast investigation indicated that the CBI in its investigation had not taken into consideration many important clues.

54) ATS team visited the CBI headquarters in Delhi on 25 November 2008 to dig into records of the Nanded blast of 2006 as it has now learnt of Pragyasingh's involvement in those blasts too (*Sakal Times*, Pune, 26 November 2008).

55) It also visited army headquarters to get to know the background of Lt. Col. Purohit and his links during his stint as a Military Intelligence officer (*Sakal Times*, Pune, 26 November 2008).

56) Investigators suspect that Malegaon blast accused may have had access to army's explosive depot at Khadki (Pune) and that Lt. Col. Purohit was planting the explosives pilfered from there on alleged terrorists from across the border in order to win accolades from his superiors (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).

57) The police informed the MCOCA court on 26 November 2008 about the recovery of Mahant Dayanand Pandey's laptop containing clippings of video and audio recordings of the deliberations of various meetings the Mahant held with Sadhvi Pragya, Lt. Col. Purohit and others. The government pleader told the court that Pandey, Purohit and Pragya were seen to be speaking about the RDX, chemical bombs and their use (*Maha Mumbai* [Maharashtra Times], Mumbai, 27 November 2008).

As the investigation was taking a very interesting and decisive turn, I had been very eagerly reading the daily newspapers. But out of the above-mentioned news items, whenever I read the ones concerning the sensational parts of the investigation, as given below, a chill would go down my spine:

i) VHP leader Praveen Togadia's connections (sr. nos. 11, 21 and 46).

ii) Revelation of sensational information in Purohit's narco-analysis test (sr. nos. 14, 19 and 21).

iii) Mahant Dayanand Pandey's arrest (sr. no. 22).

iv) Recovery of the laptops of Purohit and Dayanand Pandey containing explosive information (sr. nos. 17 and 57).

v) Suspected involvement of the accused in Nanded, Malegaon 2006, Ajmer Dargah and Samjhauta Express

blasts (sr. nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 26 and 30).

vi) Invocation of MCOCA against the Malegaon accused (sr. no. 33).

vii) The links of former IB officers with radical Hindu outfits and their participation in the terrorists' training camps (sr. no. 42).

viii) The links of the leaders of VHP and other Hindu organisations with the accused (sr. nos. 43, 44, 45, 46, 48 and 49).

ix) Suspected involvement of two historians from Pune in the case (sr. nos. 41 and 50).

x) Impending interrogation of hardcore Brahminists like Himani Savarkar, Col. (retd.) Chitale and former BJP corporator Milind Ekbote (sr. no. 50).

xi) Visit of ATS team to CBI and army headquarters at Delhi in connection with Nanded blast case and the CBI's decision to reinvestigate the case (sr. nos. 54 and 55).

xii) Prying into the sources of funds of the terror organisation, (sr. nos. 35 to 40).

While reading the above news items, I felt that Hemant Karkare, in his enthusiasm to do an honest and true investigation, had been unwittingly entering into a danger zone where even the bravest of brave officers and the strongest of strong politicians feared to tread. I shuddered at the thought of what would happen next and eagerly waited for the next day's newspapers. Then came the Mumbai terror attack and all investigation was suddenly interrupted.

VI

Who Killed Karkare?

Mumbai Terror Attack is a reality But its CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane episode is shrouded in mystery

There have been numerous theories doing the round as to who planned and executed the Mumbai attack of 26/11. I do not wish to enter into the discussion as to whether it was done by LeT alone, or by LeT-ISI combine or by the LeT supported logistically by the underworld don Dawood Ibraihm or whether it was the handi-work of Taliban and/or Al-Qaida or whether it was a Zionist-Mossad operation or a Zionist-Brahminist operation or a CIA-Mossad operation like in Beirut and Lebanon or whether it was engineered by CIA alone by helping radical Islamic groups in Pakistan or whether it was a Zionist-WASP (White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant force which virtually rules America) conspiracy or whether it was a simple contractual-mercenery operation funded either by Taliban or by America or by the corporations in Israel, and so on. Whoever has planned and executed it, the fact remains that the Taj-Oberoi Trident part of the Mumbai attack was a reality, with the terrorists having Pakistan connections. Nobody can have any doubt about that part of the attack. But the same cannot be said of the CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane episode of the attack as it is shrouded in a thick mystery. I shall analyse only *that* part of the attack mainly on the basis of newspaper reports. Admittedly, all newspaper reports cannot be called 100 percent correct. But, at the same time, they cannot be dismissed as totally false. Such reports, especially those published in reputed newspapers and periodicals, if read between the lines, and tested on the touchstones of common sense and sound logic, definitely lead us to some inferences which cannot be brushed aside with a flippant hand.

Following are some news reports concerning the CST-CAMA Hospital part of the attack and their logical analysis.

Part I

The Brahminist elements in the IB and in the Naval Intelligence Directorate deliberately blocked the hot intelligence given by the U.S. and the RAW

A careful reading of the reports concerning the serious intelligence lapses in respect of the Mumbai terror attack, published in the following newspapers clearly indicate that the IB, which normally passes on even a vague and unspecific information to the authorities concerned, *intentionally blocked a very specific and hot intelligence* and did not pass it on to the Mumbai Police and to the Western Naval Command which it concerned, and also intentionally did not monitor the suspected mobile phone numbers of the terrorists or, if monitored, did not act on the information till a particular time.

These newspapers are:

1) *The Times of India*, Pune	1 December 2008
2) *The Indian Express*, Pune	3 December 2008
3) *The Times of India*, Pune	3 December 2008
4) Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune	3 December 2008
5) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai	11 December 2008
6) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai	15 December 2008
7) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai	24 December 2008
8) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai	26 December 2008
9) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai	10 January 2009

The important points in the news reports published in the above-mentioned newspapers are given in Annexure "A".

A) Analytical summary of the reports published in above newspapers

1) On 18 November 2008, the U.S. alerted RAW that an LeT ship was trying to infiltrate into Indian waters. It also provided



A sketch of the area which witnessed major terror incidents and Hemant Karkare's murder

specific details like latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of the vessel. The coordinates were 30-34 which put the ship 20 to 30 nautical miles south of Karachi, but well within the Air Defence Interrogation Zone (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 15 and 26 December 2008).

2) This input was passed on to the IB by the RAW on 19 November, for dissemination to the respective agencies (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 26 December 2008).
3) The Joint Director IB, Prabhakar Alok, forwarded the input to the Naval Headquarters (through the Principal Director Naval Intelligence) and to the Coast Guard on 20 November, *but, surprisingly, not to Mumbai Police or Maharashtra government whom it concerned most* (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 15 and 26 December 2008).
4) The Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, never passed on the intelligence to the sword-arm of the Navy, *i.e.*, the Western Naval Command under which Mumbai came and for which it is really meant (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 15 and 26 December 2008).
5) The Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, did not even seem to have apprised the Naval Chief of this absolutely vital information, as is apparent from the fact that while reacting to the Mumbai incident, he [the Naval Chief] referred only to inputs given by the IB and RAW on 12th and 18th November respectively, and said that they were not actionable inputs. He further clarified that "India is going to be attacked by terrorists couldn't be called actionable." Obviously, he was not aware of the very specific and actionable inputs received by his Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, on 20 November (*The Indian Express*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 3 December 2008).
6) The Coast Guard, however, launched a search for the suspected LeT vessel on 21 November, but it could not locate the ship at the coordinates provided by the U.S. intelligence. Therefore, the Coast Guard officers contacted the Jt. Director IB, Prabhakar Alok, and requested him to provide further intelligence. Alok promised to revert, *but never did* (*Hindustan Times*, 11 December 2008, *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 15 and 26 December 2008).
7) Moreover, a highly placed source [most probably the RAW, through the Cabinet Secretariat] through a "secret" note, had furnished to the IB a list of 35 mobile phone numbers being used by the LeT and had requested to keep them under surveillance. This note was received by the IB on 21 November, *i.e., five days before the attack*. But surprisingly, the IB did not monitor these numbers. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 35 numbers contained in the "secret" note were the cell numbers that the terrorists used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan (*Hindustan Times*, 10 January 2009).
8) It was only after the terrorists struck at their targets in Mumbai and after Anti-Terrorist Squad chief Hemant Karkare and two other officers had been shot dead that the IB swung into action. Calls were made to Kolkata from where 32 of the 35 SIM cards were said to have been purchased, Mumbai Police were alerted and the process of recording of conversation began (*Hindustan Times*, 10 January 2009).

B) Billion Rupee Questions

1) Why didn't the IB pass on the absolutely specific and actionable vital piece of intelligence to Mumbai Police and Maharashtra government to whom it mattered most, especially in view of the fact that it had alerted them on less specific information as many as five times between March 2007 and November 2008? (*The Times of India*, Pune, 3 December 2008).
2) Why didn't the Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, forward the IB's very vital information to the Western Command to which it pertained and also to the top brass of the Navy? (*The Indian Express*, Pune and *Sakal*, Pune, both of 3 December 2008). Did the Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, himself

or somebody down the line, intentionally block it? Or did they do so at somebody else's instance?

3) Why didn't the IB, known for keeping several telephones under surveillance even on the basis of unconfirmed information or slightest suspicion, monitor the 35 mobile phones, the numbers of which had been received by them from an authentic source, at least five days *before* the attack? Why did they wait till the terrorists reached their targets and killed ATS Chief Karkare and some other officers? (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 10 January 2009). Or, was it that they monitored these number but used the information received for some dubious purpose?
4) How was it that the IB, which normally keeps a very close watch on Mumbai, did not notice that the Mumbai Police had withdrawn the coastal patrolling from the sensitive coastal sector, since 40 days *before* the attack? (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 24 December 2008). And if it did, why didn't it insist that the coastal patrolling be not only resumed but also intensified forthwith when it had a very specific intelligence of possible terror attack via sea?

C) Logical Conclusion

Apparently, the main culprits responsible for this extremely serious bungling are:

i) The Jt. Director, IB (Prabhakar Alok) who intentionally did not pass on the absolutely specific and actionable information to the Mumbai Police, to whom it concerned most;
ii) The Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, or somebody down the line, who blocked the information and did not pass it on to the Western Command and the senior Naval officers; and
iii) A senior officer in the IB who did not keep surveillance on the 35 mobile phone numbers furnished by the RAW, till the time the CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane carnage had taken place.

An in-depth and impartial probe into the matter would definitely establish that they had a link with Brahminist fanatics, who had been planning to establish a "Hindu (read Brahminist) Rashtra" in the country and that the omissions on their part were, definitely not out of negligence or oversight, but were deliberate acts aimed at bailing out the enemies of the Constitution and conspirators of "Hindu Rashtra" who had been unveiled and about to be exposed by the ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare.

The above logic is further confirmed by the wilful refusal on the part of the IB and the RAW to furnish information to the two-member Pradhan panel set up by the Maharashtra government to probe into the matter, as to what intelligence they had received and what they passed on to the state government.

According to a report published in *The Indian Express* (31 May 2009), Mr. V. Balchandran, a former RAW officer and the second member of the panel, is said to have sent an email to his former colleague, Chennai-based security expert, B. Raman, to clarify the doubts raised by the latter about the *bona fides* of the panel report. *The Indian Express* report said that in the said email Mr. Balchnadran had written, *"On the intelligence side also, we had to go by the source reports available with the state police, as the IB and RAW did not pass on any intelligence report to us which they might have had with them or had (or had not) passed on to the state police."*

The RAW had done its part of the job, but it must have been prevailed upon by the Brahminists in the IB, by using their clout with the PMO, not to furnish any information to the panel.

Part II
16 CCTVs at the CST were tampered with

A) *DNA*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008:
Security cameras installed at the station captured images of the two terrorists which were later identified as Azam Ameer Kasab and Abu Dera Ismail Khan.

B) *The Times of India*, Pune, 28 November 2008:

The close circuit television cameras (CCTVs) installed after the 7/11 train blasts captured the entire shootout. Railway and other officials now have clear footage of the incident for their investigations.

C) *The Indian Express*, Pune, 12 December 2008:

1) It has now emerged that the attack at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus (CST) could well have been captured better, providing better clues to investigators, if only the 16 CCTV cameras installed at various spots inside the mainline section of the heritage railway station had not failed to record the proceeding. While the two terrorists started the firing spree at CST on the night of November 26, killing at least 56 people at the station, the cameras proved useless.
2) The 16 cameras in this section (the long distance train platform) were not recording at that time while those elsewhere in the station were functioning perfectly, leading to suspicion that it was not a technical snag.
3) The station has 38 CCTV cameras installed, of which 16 are on the main-line (long distance train platform) and 22 are on the suburban line.

D) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 28 December 2008:

1) While 16 cameras in the mainline part of the station failed to record the terror attack, two others installed for surveillance on passengers coming from the two entry gates to the suburban section were turned towards the concourse hall instead.
2) "These cameras were installed to keep vigil on the people coming and going through the door-frame metal detectors at two gates. They could also record some portion of the passage between the main-line and suburban section. However, they were turned in such a way that they could not record the activities outside the suburban section...", informed a police official.

Conclusion

Initial reports, *i.e.*, those published during the first two days of the incident suggest that the CCTVs installed at the CST had *captured the entire shootout and the images of the terrorists* and that the clear footage of the incident were available with the railway and other officials. But about 15 days after the incident, reports started trickling in that the 16 CCTV cameras installed in the main-line section of the CST, *i.e.*, the area where the shootout took place, were not functioning on the day of the incident and hence failed to record the event.

These conflicting reports lead us to two different theories. Either, it did not strike to the planners at the planning stage that the CCTV cameras had been installed at the place where perpetrators were planning to wreak havoc in the garb of terrorists and then to vanish and substitute somebody else as "terrorists." But when they realised that the whole incident had been recorded and its clear images had been available with Railway and other officials, the IB must have seized them from the officials concerned by advancing their usual argument that it was a part of a "top secret operation" and having bearing not only on the "internal security" but also on "international relations" of the country and must have told the officials concerned very strictly to keep it as a closely guarded secret and to declare that the 16 cameras were not working.

The other theory could be that as a part of the planning itself, the CCTV cameras covering the main-line section of the station where the shootout was to take place and the CCTVs at the entrance gate of the suburban section, through which the perpetrators were to pass and exit had been tampered with or disturbed. In either case, the dishonest and mala fide intention of the planners and conspirators was manifold. They did not want the shootout and the images of actual perpetrators to be made public. This was not an isolated incident, as such mischiefs have happened in the past also when Brahminists and IB were suspected to be involved. It may be recalled that in the case of Ahmedabad bomb blasts and Surat unexploded bombs, where the IB's role was suspected, the CCTVs at Talasari toll *naka*, through which the stolen vehicles used in those cases had passed, had been found to be tampered with.

Part III
The "terrorists" at CST used SIM cards which had Satara connections

A) *Maharashtra Times* (online news), 15 December 2008:

1) The report that a SIM card belonging to a person from Satara district was used in Mumbai terror attack has created quite a flutter. In this connection the ATS has taken a person from village Kumbharwadi in Wai Taluka to Mumbai and has made enquiry with him. Moreover, a woman from Satara has also been involved in the SIM card matter.
2) In the brush the two terrorists had with the railway police at the CST on November 26, a mobile phone of one of them had fallen down. When police seized it and made further enquiry it was disclosed that *the terrorists had made contacts through this mobile phone* and that its SIM card belonged to a person from Satara district. The ATS team from Mumbai detained one Ashok Gore in whose name the SIM card stood, from Kumbharwadi in Wai Taluka and took him to Mumbai. He told the police during interrogation that he had lost the mobile phone in Ratnagiri, but did not register a complaint. Though the police have released him after verification, a watch is being kept on him as the mystery of the SIM card still remains to be solved.
3) One more SIM card of BSNL found at the CST belongs to a woman from Satara. She told during the enquiry that her son was using the SIM card. The ATS made enquiry with her son also. It is not yet clear whether the BSNL SIM card was used by the terrorists.

B) *Pudhari*, Pune, 19 December 2008:

1) It is realiably learnt that I.G. ATS, Dilip Shrirao, interrogated an influential person in Satara [in connection with the two SIM cards found with the terrorists].
2) The news that the mobile phones found with the terrorists of Mumbai attack, contained SIM cards belonging to two persons of Satara district (Maharashtra) has caused a lot of stir in the district. The ATS is said to have made inquires with a youth from Wai Taluka and a woman from Satara town, in whose name the SIM cards stood.
3) ATS officers are learnt to have inquired with some other persons in Satara town and district. It has also been disclosed that *the ATS had interrogated a well-known person of Satara town.*

C) *The Times of India*, Pune, 10 December 2008:

Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan didn't find time during the CST operation to call LeT leaders who were monitoring the operation from Pakistan [whereas the terrorists who had a brush with the police at the CST were found to have made contacts through the mobile phone having Satara connection, as is evident from *Maharashtra Times* online news quoted above].

Logical Conclusion

The two terrorists who wreaked havoc at the CST were not Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan, but were different persons possessing SIM cards obtained from Satara and probably having Maharashtra connection. These two mobile phones have not been shown in the chargesheet in the list of mobile phones seized by the police, apparently because the Crime Branch Mumbai and the IB had the apprehension that the fact of their having dished out a concocted story and misguided the whole nation would be exposed if the recovery of these two mobile phones was brought on record and thoroughly inquired into.

Part IV

Out of the 284 calls received by the terrorists from their handlers in Pakistan by using VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol Technology), not a single call was received by Kasab and Ismail Khan

A) *Sunday Times of India*, Pune, 12 January 2009 (quoting the Crime Branch, Mumbai and IB sources):

i) "During the 58 hours that the siege lasted, the gunmen received a total of 284 calls. Of these 41 calls were between the gunmen at the Taj and handlers in Pakistan.

ii) "The terrorists at the Oberoi and Trident hotels received 62 calls, while the gunmen at Nariman House received 181 calls."

B) Chargesheet

Moreover, these call details have also been mentioned in the chargesheet filed by the Crime Branch in the court.

Conclusion

Not a single call was received by Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan, who allegedly wreaked havoc at the CST and killed Karkare and others, thus reaffirming the suspicion that these two were not among the group of terrorists who came from Pakistan in a trawler and landed at Cuffe Parade.

Part V

The Terrorists spoke fluent Marathi

A) *Maharashtra Times*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008:

1) The terrorists who entered the CAMA Hospital shot dead two watchmen working there and then turned to a third employee who was standing nearby and was not in uniform, and asked him in fluent Marathi "Are you working here?" The employee touched the terrorists' feet and said "I do not work here, my wife has been admitted here as she suffered a heart attack." They again inquired threateningly, "Are you telling the truth?" The person replied, "I am telling the truth, I swear by my mother." Then they spared him.

2) The employee gave this information to the officers of the CAMA Hospital and the health department.

3) These terrorists are said to have killed Addl. Commissioner of Police, Ashok Kamate, ATS Chief Hemant Karkare and Vijay Salaskar.

B) *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 29 November 2008:

1) *"Tujha ithe kay abey?"* (What are you doing here?) was the question put forth to a staff employee of Cama Hospital by a terrorist on Wednesday night. The staffer, who had a gun pointed to his head, got a new lease of life as he bluffed, "I have visited the hospital as one of my relatives is admitted here," he said in Marathi.

2) Replying to a question about terrorists conversing in Marathi, the state spokesperson Bhushan Gagrani (a senior IAS officer) said, "The staffer who spoke to the terrorist confirmed the incident and told us that he communicated with one of the terrorists in Marathi on Wednesday night."

3) The state has informed the police about this and "they (police) are investigating the matter," he added.

C) *Hindustan Times*, 5 December 2008:

1) Chandrakant Tikhe is an unlikely hero. This pot-bellied man in his fifties works at Cama and Allbless Hospital as a generator operator. Tikhe was in front of the hospital building with other staff members and relatives of patients when he heard gunfire.

2) As the noise grew closer, Tikhe and others rushed into the hospital building. More than a score of people rushed towards the terrace for cover. Tikhe followed them. But as he reached the terrace, he found himself face-to-face with

Kasab and Khan.

3) With their guns trained on Tikhe, the terrorists asked him what he was doing there. "I told them, I am a hospital staffer on the night shift and that it was my duty to ensure that all doors were locked."
4) Kasab and Khan then wanted to know whether Tikhe was a Hindu or a Muslim? "I replied '*Saab, mai Hindu hoon*' (Sir, I am a Hindu)," said Tikhe. The terrorists then ordered him to lead them out of the building. Tikhe led the way downstairs while the two followed, keeping well back.
5) For half-way down the stairs, Tikhe ran into a posse of policemen led by Sadanand Datey... In the cross-fire, Tikhe was injured by an exploding grenade.
6) The terrorists escaped from the hospital and fled towards Girgaum Chawpatty, where Khan was killed in an encounter with the police and Kasab was captured.

Conclusion

The so-called terrorists, creating havoc in CST-CAMA Hospital area were not foreigners, but were Marathi-speaking persons and were not anti-Hindu.

Part VI
Out of 46 persons killed at CST, 22 were Muslims

A) *The Times of India*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008:

Akmal (Ajmal), an illiterate daily-wager from Faridabad (Pakistan), has told the police that he and his fellow *jihadis* were brainwashed into joining the *fidayeen* mission with the rather uncomplicated brief to kill as many as possible while trying to avoid hurting Muslims.

B) *The Times of India*, Pune, 29 November 2008:

1) While publishing the sensational disclosure made by Ajmal Kasab, the only *jihadi* caught alive by the Mumbai Police, *The Times of India* reported that "they were mandated to kill discriminately, particularly white foreign tourists and to spare Muslims."
2) In the same issue, *The Times of India* reported that one Abbas Ansari, his wife and four others of his family were killed at CST, while they were on way home for Id.

C) Marathi daily *Loksatta*, Pune, 8 December 2008:

1) 40 per cent of those killed at the CST Station, Mumbai were Muslims.

D) *The Times of India*, Pune, 3 December 2008:

"The two gunmen, who spread terror, at the terminal station last Wednesday, ended up killing 22 helpless Muslims with their indiscriminate firing, the total number of people, including passengers and Railway Police force personnel, they killed at CST was 58."

Later, it was disclosed that 52 and not 58 persons were killed in the CST incident and that out of them six were either police or other employees, thus putting the figure of the civilians killed in the CST incident to 46; 22 (48 percent) out of them were Muslims, most of whom having Muslim appearance like men having beard or donning skull caps and woman wearing "burqas".

Conclusion

The two terrorists at the CST, cannot be *jihadis* who were mandated to kill people while sparing Muslims.

Part VII
Karkare led to the trap

On 7 December 2008, NDTV India, IBN7 and Aaj Tak TV channels telecast only a part of the police wireless communication of a continuous 10 to 15 minutes duration, which had taken place mainly among the

Control Room, the Commissioner of Police, the Jt. Commissioner of Police (Crime) and the DCP Zone I in the early hours of the Mumbai terror attack on 26 November 2008. The communication appeared to be of the period some time between 10.45 pm and 12 pm, *i.e.*, from receiving the information of Addl. CP Central Region (Sadanand Date) getting injured at CAMA Hospital to the "encounter" at the Girgaum Chowpatty so far as the CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack is concerned. (The transcript of the communication pertaining only to *that* part of the attack is given in Annexure B of this book.)

It appears from the conversation of senior officers on wireless that both the CP and the Jt. CP (Crime), who had been directing the whole operation, were not aware of Hemant Karkare's movements. The Jt. CP appeared to know only that he was at CST, but not his subsequent movements. Under these circumstances it is pertinent to know under whose instructions Karkare was acting.

Nitin Mathane, the wireless operator of Hemant Karkare, told the Special Court hearing the 26/11 case, that he had left with Karkare, and his five-member escort team from his [Karkare's] Dadar residence around 10.00 pm. On reaching the decided spot near the Haj House at CST, Karkare met senior officers Vasant Koregaonkar, Sanjay Mohite and KP Raghuvanshi who informed him that the terrorists had opened fire at CST and they had now left from the foot overbridge. [But as discussed in Part XI (C), the duo never crossed over the foot overbridge]. Mathane further recalled that Karkare immediately put on his bullet-proof jacket and helmet and walked towards the rear gate of CAMA Hospital [which was in the lane to which the foot overbridge led]. The team was joined by Kamate and Salaskar even as the firing continued [in CAMA Hospital] (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 16 July 2009).

The above incident raises some questions:

1) Who were the officers who decided to meet near Haj House?

2) Why did KP Raghuvanshi tell Karkare that the two terrorists had crossed over the foot overbridge, when that was not the case? And more importantly why he himself did not go?

3) If the CP and the Jt. CP (Crime) did not know Karkare's movements, who was giving him the locations of the terrorists and directing him to various places like the lane near The Times of India building, CAMA Hospital, SB1 office and finally to Rangabhavan Lane. Apparently, he was not getting instructions on wireless, otherwise the CP and the Jt. CP (Crime) would have known his movements. Then how was he getting instructions? On mobile phone? If so, from whom?

Part VIII
Ajmal Kasab was arrested in Kathmandu (Nepal) before 2006 by Indian agencies

A) *The Times of India*, Pune, 16 December 2008:

1) A lawyer C.M. Farooque has claimed that the surviving Mumbai attack accused, Ajmal Kasab, was arrested in Kathmandu in 2006 by Indian agencies with the help of Nepalese forces, *The News* reported from Rawalpindi.
2) "C.M. Farooque, an advocate said the Nepalese forces arrested almost 200 people including Ajmal Kasab, before 2006 and his application in this regard was lying pending in the Nepalese Supreme Court in which Nepalese forces and Indian High Commission were made respondents," said the report.
3) The advocate said he wrote letters to the Pakistani and Indian governments and addressed a press conference in Nepal on the issue.
4) *The News* report further said, "The people arrested from Nepal had gone there on legal visa for business but Indian agencies were in the habit of capturing Pakistanis from Nepal and afterwards implicating them in Mumbai-like incidents to malign Pakistan.

B) *Lokmat*, Kolhapur, 17 December 2008:

While speaking to a news agency, on this issue, a spokesperson of Nepal Home Ministry said that they did not have any information about the arrest of any such person and of handing him over to Indian agencies.

C) *Sakal*, Pune, 21 December 2008:

1) The Nepal Foreign Affairs Ministry clarified that the report of the arrest of Ajmal Kasab in Nepal is false and the report is an attempt by Pakistani media to malign the image of Nepal.
2) The Ministry's statement further said that the application made by the Pakistani advocate for the release of Kasab was dismissed.
3) The application was dismissed for not complying with the legal formalities properly.

Analysis of the reports

The Home Ministry of Nepal has not categorically denied the report of the arrest of Ajmal Kasab. It simply says that they do not have any information about it, but the Nepali Foreign Affairs Ministry's statement is self-contradictory and hence confusing. On the one hand, it denies the report of the arrest of Kasab but, on the other hand, it says that the application for the release of Kasab was dismissed, and that too, on technical grounds which means that the dismissal was not on merit.

Conclusion

There is reason to suspect that Ajmal Kasab was arrested by Nepalese forces and was handed over to the Indian intelligence agencies. Given the cordial relations between the then King of Nepal and the Brahminist forces in India, out to destroy the Indian Constitution and to establish the so-called "Hindu Rashtra," as transpired in the investigation done by the ATS headed by Hemant Karkare, the theory that the Nepalese forces arrested Kasab and handed him over to the Brahminist-dominated Indian intelligence agency sounds quite logical.

The theory that Ajmal Kasab was not among the group of terrorists which landed at Badhawar Park was further reinforced by the fact that one of the residents of that area (Anita Rajendra Uddaiya) had seen six people alighting from an air-boat and she later identified the dead bodies of all six of them in JJ Hospital (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 14 January 2009).

Anita Uddaiya has not been cited as a prosecution witness, but on the other hand she has been ptosecuted u/s 182 IPC, for allegedly misleading the investigators, probably because she stuck to the truth and refused to identify Ajmal Kasab as one of the persons in the group which alighted from the dinghy at Badhawar Park, Cuffe Parade.

Part IX
Much-publicised photograph of Ajmal Kasab

The first photograph of Ajmal Kasab, claimed to have been taken on the suburban section of the CST by *Mumbai Mirror* lensman Sebastian D'Souza appeared in *Mumbai Mirror* (27 November 2008), *i.e.*, the very next day, and thereafter it started appearing in almost every newspaper and on every TV channel. Presuming the claim of Sebastian D'Souza to be true, the following queries need to be answered before accepting his claim in its totality:

1) How come the same photograph, taken from the same angle and having the same background which appeared in Marathi daily *Pudhari*, Pune (28 November 2008) was attributed to CCTV footage? Moreover, the authenticity of this photograph has been seriously doubted by some experts on technical grounds. The *Rashtriya Sahara* in its special issue of 5 January 2009 said that the photograph appears fake as the angle is too narrow for a train station like CST, which would have wider angle and be shot from a higher position.
2) In its issue of 28 November 2008, *DNA*, Mumbai, published

that "security cameras installed at the station, captured images of the two terrorists who were later identified as Azam Ameer Kasab and Abu Dera Ismail Khan." Is it correct? If so, where are the footages?

3) The food stall manager at CST, Shashikumar Singh, who was an eyewitness to the mayhem at the CST, said "The terrorists were shouting but since their faces were covered with black cloth, their voices were muffled" (*Pune Mirror*, 28 November 2008).
4) Nobody has claimed the authorship of the photograph of Ajmal [or Azam] Kasab, published on page 5 of the 29 November 2008 issue of *The Times of India*, Pune. The photograph appears to have been taken from an angle of 30 to 40 degrees from the front. Is it possible, that under those circumstances the desperate terrorists would spare the person clicking the camera from such an angle, albeit with a zoom?
5) Another photograph of Kasab, taken almost from the front, but from a little height was published in the Marathi daily *Maharashtra Times* of the Times Group, on 27 November 2008, *i.e.*, only the next day of the attack. It was claimed to have been snapped by lensman Sriram Verneka of *The Times of India* Group. But on the very same day, *i.e.*, on 27 November 2008, the same photograph appeared in the Marathi daily *Lokmat*, Mumbai. How come such an exclusive photograph was published in the daily of a rival group?
6) The photograph of another terrorist (Ismail Khan) was published in the issue of 3 December 2008 of *Pune Mirror*, but the name of the photographer was not mentioned.
7) Most important, the video footages in respect of the terrorists who *actually* indulged in the shootout at the main-line section of the CST were not available as the 16 CCTV cameras covering that section of the station, were said to be not working, on the day of the incident, whereas the video-images of the terrorists who wreaked havoc at Taj, Oberoi and Nariman House and held the whole country to ransom for three days, were readily available as the CCTVs at those places were perfectly in order. However, the photographs of the two youths, purported to have been taken at the CST at the time of the actual incident, by some intrepid press photographers, the authenticity of which could easily be questioned by reason of their not having been supported by the CCTV footages and also by reason of their material contradictions as discussed in the preceding paras, were touted by the police as photographs of real terrorists and the photograph of one of the two, who was claimed to have been later caught alive in the encounter, was relayed throughout the world and was repeatedly published in newspapers and TV channels in the country as the face of terrorism. On the other hand, *the photographs of the remaining eight or whatever number of terrorists who wreaked havoc at Taj and other places and whose identity could not have been doubted as their images had been captured by the CCTV's while in action, were not published and were kept away from the public view.* What were the IB, the Crime Branch Mumbai and the government hiding? Were they up to *suppressio veri, suggestio falsi*? If so, for what?

Inference

As the terrorist was already in the custody of the IB, his photographs could have been taken either before or after the incident. It is more plausible that they were taken in the midnight, an hour or so after the incident, as by then the whole station had been vacated, and secondly, it was easy to convince the photographers that one of the terrorists had been caught alive and that in such an important case it was necessary to make some manipulations by taking his photographs and showing them as having been taken during the shootout in order to make the case strong. The photographers could have done it in good faith, not knowing the diabolical plan of the conspirators and the IB.

Part X

A woman witness forcibly taken to the U.S. for interrogation and recording her statement, but she did not budge

A) *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 14 January 2009:

1) Forty-seven-years old Anita Rajendra Uddaiya, one of the persons who saw the terrorists land on the shores of Mumbai on the evening of 26 November, mysteriously disappeared from her residence on Sunday morning.... Anita's daughter Seema Ketan Joshi lodged a missing complaint with police, who then launched a massive search.
2) Around 8.30 pm on the night of the terror attack, Anita had been sitting on an empty boat, near her house at Mahatma Phule Nagar, Badhwar Park in Cuffe Parade, when she saw six people alighting from an air boat. When she asked them why they had come through such an unusual route, they threatened her.
3) A fortnight ago, the Crime Branch had taken Anita to J.J. Hospital to see whether she could identify the bodies of the dead terrorists kept there. She identified six of them as the people she had seen on the day of the attack.

B) *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 15 January 2009:

1) Anita Rajendra Uddaiya, who has been reportedly missing since Sunday, could be in U.S.A., claimed her daughter Seema Ketan Joshi on Tuesday.
2) Seema told this newspaper that her mother had been in talks with some American investigation officers for good three weeks before her disappearance. She even claimed that Anita was being offered $10,000 (approx. Rs. 500,000) for her cooperation.
3) The American investigation officers supposedly were very impressed with Uddaiya's identification skills. "The description of six of the people she saw having alighted off the dinghies was so accurate that it bowled them over," said Seema.
4) Uddiaya had also met officers from the Mumbai Crime Branch.
5) Seema says that for the last 15 days, Uddaiya had been undergoing a battery of medical tests. "Then one day, last week, she came and said, 'I am ready to go to America, pack my bags.' I packed her bags myself.... Then on Sunday morning she got up at 6.30 and went to the toilet (or pretended to go to the toilet.) My neighbours saw a large jeep parked outside the toilet. The officials came and whisked her away."

C) *The Indian Express*, Pune ,17 January 2009:

1) Anita Uddaiya, the potential witness to the arrival of 26/11 terrorists, created a flutter on Thursday by attributing her disappearance to a supposed trip to the U.S. for a court appearance – a claim that was immediately rubbished by the Mumbai Police.
2) She said she had been escorted to the international airport by four men and flown to the U.S. for a court appearance and back. She claimed she had spoken of Satara only to keep the U.S. trip confidential.
3) The Mumbai Police challenged this claim by citing an immigration check. Udaiyya does not have a passport and never went out of the country, they said.
4) Udaiyya claims to know nothing about the men, their credentials or the agency they represented, but stressed that they had drawn up all the necessary papers required to take her to the U.S.

"These four men, three foreigners and an Indian, as translator, wanted to record my statement. They claimed to be investigation officials from the U.S. and kept asking if I would be willing to repeat my statement in front of officers there," she said.

5) "They called me up at 5 pm on Saturday and asked me to be ready by night.... all night we waited for the men to come, but they didn't till the next morning. They made me get into a car and did not even let me get back indoors to inform my family," she said.
6) "I thought it would be a journey of a few hours, but it took over 18-20 hours."
7) "I was taken to a court, given a black garb and a hood to wear, and then my statement was recorded before a judge. I was then taken to a hotel-room and later flown back. They gave me Rs. 500 for (taxi) fare," she said.

D) *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 17 January 2009:

1) Uddaiyya mysteriously disappeared on Sunday morning, leading her daughter to file a missing person complaint, only to reappear in the early hours of Wednesday, equally mysteriously.
2) She said, "I didn't disappear. I had informed my husband. There were some foreigners, who had been in touch with me from November 27. They heard my story. They met me at least thrice before telling that they would like to take me abroad for a day. I wanted to help them, so I said O.K."
3) On 27 November, her account of how she saw six men walk up from the beach, burdened with heavy carry-alls, and how she tried to chat with them, was aired on India TV. Soon after, the above-mentioned three white men came to meet her. They were accompanied by an Indian man, the interpreter, whom she calls "Sudhakar."
4) She had also given her statement to the Crime Branch, says Uddaiya.
5) In preparation for her trip she was taken to a hospital for medical tests.
6) On Sunday morning she got a call asking her to step out of her home without carrying anything, "pretending to go to the loo." Some distance away a big van was waiting to pick her up. On way she was allowed to meet her husband who was admitted to St. George's Hospital.
7) "Then we went to Andheri airport where I was given a skirt, blouse and a scarf. Then we got into a plane, it was white and blue and had a star on the tail. It was not a big plane. In all, there would be 15 people." says she.
8) "When we landed, it was night. I was put through a security check and when we stepped out, it was cold. The streets were not crowded and I saw several tall buildings."
9) "The next morning," Uddaiya says, "she was taken to a building where there were 30 people who asked questions like what time did the terrorists land, what they looked like, what they wore, etc."
10) By the time she was taken back to the hotel, it was almost dusk.
11) "Unlike the time I left Mumbai, when there was no waiting involved, I was taken to a large room and we had to wait for hours. The aircraft in which I came back was a larger plane."
12) Uddaiya landed in Mumbai around 6 pm and was taken to a hotel. After dinner her escorts called for a taxi, gave her Rs. 500 and instructed him [the taxi driver] to drop her home.

E) *The Times of India*, Pune, 17 January 2009:

1) The city Crime Branch on Friday registered a non-cognisable offence against 26/11 terror attack witness, Anita Uddiaya, u/s 182 IPC for misleading the investigators.
2) Jt. C.P. (Crime) Rakesh Maria clarified that Anita is not a prime witness in 26/11 case as reported. "I don't understand why any agency will whisk her away to the U.S. without informing the Mumbai Police which is probing the 26/11 case?"

F) *Sakal*, Pune, 19 January 2009 (quoting PTI):

1) FBI clarified on Sunday that nobody was taken outside India in connection with the Mumbai terror attack enquiry.

2) The statement further said that a woman witness, Anita, who had seen the terrorists alleged that she had been taken to the U.S. for enquiry, but she even did not have a passport.

Analytical summary of the above newspaper reports

1) Anita Rajendra Uddaiya had clearly seen the six terrorists alighting from a dinghy and had a talk with them (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 14 and 17 January 2009).
2) After seeing her interview on India TV on 27 November, three foreigners [FBI officers] and an Indian approached her and questioned her (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India] and *The Indian Express*, Pune, both of 17 January 2009).
3) They interrogated her three times, were impressed by *her identification skills* and decided to take her to the U.S. for recording her statement to which she agreed. She was offered Rs. 5 lakh for the same (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 15 and 17 January 2009).
4) She was shown the dead bodies of terrorists at JJ Hospital by Crime Branch officers, *six of which she identified unequivocally* (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 14 January 2009).
5) Mumbai Crime Branch officers also recorded her statement (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 15 and 17 January 2009).
6) Her travel documents under fictitious name were prepared and she was taken to the U.S. on 11 January 2009, morning apparently by a private plane (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 15 January 2009 and 17 January 2009).
7) As the IB, which is also the immigration authority, the Mumbai Police and FBI were involved, there was no difficulty in preparing fake documents and there was no question of their being detected (logical inference).
8) In the U.S., her statement was recorded either by a judge or a senior police officer, with her face covered (*The Indian Express*, Pune and *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], both of 17 January 2009).
9) She was brought back to India on 13 January 2009 evening by a service plane (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 17 January 2009).
10) Apparently, she told the truth and did not yield to any pressure of the FBI or the Mumbai Crime Branch (logical inference).
11) *Consequently:*

i. The Crime Branch, Mumbai, registered an offence against her u/s 182 IPC, for "misguiding" the investigators (*The Times of India*, Pune, 17 January 2009).

ii. She was given only Rs. 500 for taxi fare and not Rs. 5 lakh ($10,000) as promised earlier (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 17 January 2009, *The Indian Express*, Pune, 17 January 2009).

iii. Out of their guilty-conscience, both the Crime Branch Mumbai and FBI denied that she was taken outside India for interrogation (*The Indian Express*, 17 January 2009, *Sakal*, Pune, 19 January 2009).

iv. Fearing that she would spill the beans in the court, the Crime Branch Mumbai declared that she was not a prime witness in 26/11 case (*The Times of India*, Pune, 17 January 2009).

The logical conclusions of the above analysis

1) Anita Rajendra Uddaiya had clearly seen six of the terrorists while alighting on the beach, and she unequivocally identified their dead bodies later; she gave true and factual statements both to the FBI and the Crime Branch, Mumbai; she did not yield to any pressure and did not give a statement as desired by the FBI or the Crime Branch Mumbai (*i.e.*, IB), as regards the number of terrorists or their descriptions. She apparently refused to identify some of the terrorists whom she had not seen, but whom the IB wanted her to identify or refused not to identify some of those whom she had seen landing near Badhwar Park, but whom the FBI did not want her to identify. Consequently, not only her name was dropped from the list of important witnesses but she was also prosecuted.

2) The claim made by the Crime Branch in the chargesheet that 10 terrorists reached Mumbai shore in the rubberised dinghy, out of whom two sailed towards Hotel Oberoi and eight landed at the Indian Coast off Bhai Bhandarkar Machimar Colony opposite Badhwar Park was not correct; only six conclusively identified by Anita Uddaiya, whose intelligence, honesty and identification skills could not be doubted, landed off Bhai Bhandarkar Colony near Badhwar Park.

Part XI
Holes galore in the Mumbai Crime Branch story

Apart from the very serious acts of wilful omission, commission and manipulation on the part of the intelligence and investigation agencies, and some goof-ups and slips on the part of the conspirators and perpetrators, as discussed in parts I to VIII above, there have been so many more holes in the story, concerning the CST-CAMA Hospital-Ranghabhavan Lane episode, dished out by the Crime Branch Mumbai, apparently at the instance of the IB, that it is very hard to digest.

If the reports, published in the newspapers during the first couple of days of the incident, *i.e.*, before an unofficial censorship was clamped on the media and before the IB and the Crime Branch Mumbai cooked up their story and dished it out to the media, were to be believed, they demolish the police story to pieces, as discussed below:

A) The timing of firing at CST-CAMA

Contrary to what the Crime Branch Police want the public to believe, the firing at CAMA Hospital started even before the firing at CST had stopped; the firing was going on at both the places simultaneously for some time and the firing at CAMA Hospital was continuing till much after the three officers and some policeman had been shot dead in Rangabhavan Lane and till even after the suspected terrorists had been killed in the so-called "encounter," as seen from the reports published in below-mentioned important newspapers.

1) The firing at CST started at 9.45 pm, the firing at CAMA Hospital started at 10.40 pm and the firing at CST resumed at 10.50 pm (*Mumbai Mirror*, 27 November 2008).
2) The firing at CST started at 9.55 pm and continued till 11 pm (*Sakal*, Pune, 28 November 2008).
3) The firing at CST started at 9.30 pm and ended at 11 pm; while the firing at CAMA Hospital started at 10.30 pm and ended at 3.30 am (*The Times of India*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008).
4) At 1.00 am, two terrorists reached the terrace of CAMA Hospital and started firing from there (*Lokmat*, Pune, 27 November 2008).
5) The superintendent of CAMA Hospital, Maheshgauri, while narrating the incident in the interview published in Marathi daily *Pudhari*, Pune (5 December 2008), stated that the firing at CAMA Hospital continued from 10.00 pm to 3 am.
6) As reported in *The Indian Express*, Pune (16 July 2009), Nitin Mathane, the wireless operator of Hemant Karkare, while deposing in the court fixed the exact time of the firing on Karkare and others at 10.55 pm, which, if believed, meant that *the incident took place even while the firing at the CST and CAMA Hospital was still continuing.*

B) The number of terrorists at CST

There were not two terrorists in CST-CAMA-Ragbhavan Lane sector, as the IB and Crime Branch Mumbai want us to believe. Rather, there were six terrorists as is evident from the following reports:

1) "According to an eyewitness account, some terrorists entered CST Station from the side of the reservation counter and started firing indiscriminately. Sounds of two explosions were also heard from outside the station....Police sources said that two groups of terrorists came in CST premises. One group entered the railway station and the other caused blast in front of Metro [Capitol?] cinema, near the station" (*Lokmat*, Pune,

27 November 2008).

2) "Two groups of terrorists entered the CST premises. One group took charge of the station while the other was causing blasts outside the station" (*Lokmat*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).

3) "Four men with automatic rifles entered the CST Station around 10 pm and two started firing indiscriminately, first towards the crowd outside and then inside the station. The other two were spotted rushing towards the Metro Cinema multiplex via the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation office and the Azad Maidan next door" (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).

4) "The workers at the CST Station did not understand what exactly happened when the four terrorists who entered in the CST started firing indiscriminately....One Hollin Gonsalves, an employee of Hinduja In-cablenet, said that he heard cracker-like sound as he was going towards platform no. 13. While he thought that nobody would burst crackers on the platform, he suddenly noticed several people falling down. Therefore, he started running towards GPO. But as he heard sounds of firing there too, he started running towards the Municipal Corporation where also he heard sounds of gunfire, so he ran towards JJ flyover side..." (*Loksatta*, Pune, 27 November 2008).

5) "The firing at CST Station started at night. As it was learnt that a large number of people had been killed there, Hemant Karkare rushed towards CST. At the same time it was learnt that some terrorists were coming from Azad Maidan side firing and lobbing grenades, and hence, Ashok Kamte also advanced towards CST via Azad Maidan... While Karkare, Kamte, Mohite and Salaskar were cautiously proceeding through that lane (The Times of India Lane), covering each other, two grenade blasts took place on the sixth floor of the building adjoining CAMA Hospital. Mohite ran in that direction. One person had died near CAMA Hospital in the terrorists' firing. [At about that time] As Karkare, Kamte and Salaskar saw from in front of the CAMA Hospital that firing had *also* started from Special Branch (S.B.) office side, they proceeded ahead. Just then ACP Pydhoni's Qualis [vehicle] came from behind them..." (*Lokmat*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008).

6) "The four terrorists, after indiscriminatly firing at the CST, started running through Badruddin Tayabji Lane near The Times of India building towards the Police Passport Office (S.B. office), and while running, two of them jumped over the rear compound wall of the CAMA Hospital" (Weekly *Ham Nawa*, 5 December 2008).

Summary of the above report

Four terrorists entered the CST premises from the GPO side; two of them entered the station and two went towards the Municipal Corporation building where they were joined by another group of two which came from Azad Maidan side. These two groups entered the Badruddin Tayabji Lane by the side of The Times of India building; one group went inside CAMA Hospital and the other moved towards S.B. office. [The two terrorists inside the CST Station were also supposed to join them, but they could not do so as they were trapped inside the station and had to exit from Masjid Bundar side is as clarified in part "C" below. The reporter of weekly *Ham Nava* apparently being unaware of the two, who came from Azad Maidan side, seemed to have presumed that all the four entering Badruddin Tayabji Lane were from the CST side.]

C) The exit of the terrorists from the CST

1) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai (27 November 2008) reported, "... The two holed up in the station, took refuge in an empty local train coach and were apparently cornered by the police"

2) Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune (28 November 2008) reported that the two terrorists [inside the CST] turned towards the sub-way, but the presence of police forced them to run in the opposite direction. They started running on the track between platforms No. 2 and 3 and exited from Masjid side.
3) According to the *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai (30 November 2008), "The duo crosses the sub-way entrance and runs towards JJ School of Arts. A cop posted near The Times of India building fires at them and the duo returns to the station.... The terrorists jump on the track of platform 3 between the gap of the train and end of the platform.... The terrorists then escape from platform 3 to the Masjid Bundar end and walk out of the premises."

The above reports contradict the police story that the duo crossed over the foot-bridge near The Times of India building and went towards CAMA Hospital.

Total number of terrorists in CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane Section

The facts mentioned in (a), (b) and (c) above, if juxtaposed with each other, would lead to a logical inference that there were not two, but six terrorists in the CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane section – two, who exited from Masjid Bundar side and two each in CAMA Hospital and near S.B. office – Rangbhavan Lane area where firing was going on at the same time.

D) The "Skoda" theory

Apart from many contradictions in the "Skoda" story, it defies all logic, as is evident from the following reports:

1) Whereas *Lokmat*, Mumbai (28 November 2009) reported that the terrorist pushed the husband and wife out of the vehicle (Skoda) and sped towards Girgaum Chowpatty, the Pune edition of *The Times of India* reported the next day (29 November 2008), quoting a senior police officer, that they pushed Sharan Arsa (the owner of the car) and his friend out of the car and drove towards Chowpatty while the chargesheet filed by the Crime Branch in the court mentions three occupants of the car (the driver and two others).
2) *The Times of India* (Pune, 29 November 2008), reported, "After the initial shock, Sharan Arsa (the owner of Skoda) quickly called up the police control room to inform about the incident and provided them with his car number."
3) As per the chargesheet filed by the Crime Branch, "As soon as the two terrorists abandoned the police Qualis vehicle, the seriously injured policemen Naik, Arun Jadhav, who was lying helpless in the rear portion of the vehicle, picked up the wireless set installed in the vehicle, and informed the Police Control Room about the incident. Based on this information, the Police Control Room *immediately* flashed an alert wireless message to all police vehicles and mobile vans of all police stations *giving details of the terrorists' movement in the hijacked vehicle.*"

But from the part of the conversation replayed by the NDTV India, IBN7 and Aaj Tak TV channels on 7 December 2008, it appears that neither the Control Room, nor the CP or even the Jt. CP (Crime) knew till the time the "encounter" at Girgaum Chowpatty took place, that Karkare, Kamate and Salaskar had been killed in the Rangabhavan Lane incident and that the terrorists had fled towards Girgaum Chowpatty in a hijacked vehicle. This, in other words, meant that either the Control Room had not received the information or, if received, had not flashed the same out.

However, from the reports published in some newspapers, the officers of the DB Marg police station and some other officers at the Girgaum Chowpatty seemed to know about the hijacked Skoda car and were eagerly waiting for

the same. As reported in *The Indian Express*, Mumbai (30 November 2008), the Senior Police Inspector, Nagappa Mali of the DB Marg police station, in whose jurisdiction the encounter took place, said, "As we had information about the colour and the make of the car, we signalled them to stop..."

In view of the above facts, the obvious question is: if the message about the hijacked Skoda car was not flashed by the Control Room and when the CP and Jt. CP (Crime), who were in-charge of the operation, were not aware of it, how was it that only the officers of DB Marg police station and some other officers at the Girgaum Chowpatty knew about it. *The only inference is that somebody gave this information to these officers on mobile phone.* If so, who was that "somebody"? Why didn't he give such a vital piece of information to the CP and other senior officers?

Moreover, on the face of it, the above story appears improbable, rather impossible. Those who are aware of the topography of south Mumbai would know that even during rush hours it takes hardly seven to eight minutes for any car to traverse the distance from Mittal Chambers to Girgaum Chowpatty. Therefore, by the time Sharan Arsa and ASI Arun Jadhav recovered from their shock, informed the Control Room, which in turn informed the police officers concerned, who organised themselves, reached Girgaum Chowpatty and put up the barricades, the terrorists would have reached the other end of the city.

Inference

The Skoda car was specially arranged to be produced at the Girgaum Chowpatty along with the "terrorists" from the IB's stock.

E) The number of terrorists killed in the Girgaum Chowpatty encounter

1) As per the reports published immediately after the encounter, *i.e.*, on 27 November 2008 both the terrorists had been killed.
   i) "Two of the suspected attackers were shot dead in an encounter near the popular and crowded Girgaum Chowpatty (*The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).
   ii) "Two of the attackers tried to escape by Marine Drive. The police stopped them near Girgaum Chowpatty, where in an encounter both the terrorists were killed (*Loksatta*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).
   iii) "The police succeeded in nabbing two terrorists near Tardeo and killing the two terrorists who were running away in Skoda car near Girgaum (*Lokmat*, Mumbai, 27 November 2008).

The Indian Express and *Loksatta* did not appear to have issued any clarification in respect of the above news item and have stuck to their guns. The *Lokmat*, however, apparently at the "request" of the Crime Branch Mumbai, tried to vindicate the police version by saying in its issue of 28 November 2008 that "one of the terrorists died on the spot and the other who had got a bullet injury in the leg, became unconscious. The police mistook both of them as dead, tied their hands and legs and dispatched them to the mortuary." But this clarification of the *Lokmat*, instead of negating its earlier report, only confirms it further, as nobody would believe that any police officer worth his salt would leave a dreaded terrorist half dead or would send his body to mortuary without pumping a couple of more bullets in his head or chest.

The clarification published in the *Lokmat* that one of the two terrorists was half dead and the police mistook him as "dead" was further disproved by the deposition of the concerned doctor in the court. The *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai (29 May 2009) reported, "Dr. Venkat Ramamurthy, the resident doctor at Nair Hospital who first examined

Kasab, told the court that Kasab was conscious, well-oriented and able to speak."

2) In the audio tape of the wireless communication of the Mumbai Police Control Room, played by the NDTV and some other TV channels on 7 December 2008, the Jt. CP (Crime) Mumbai was heard telling the CP, after getting the facts confirmed by his DCP, that *both* the terrorists had been killed.
3) Moreover, the fact of the killing of *both* the terrorists, under the extraordinary circumstances of the case appears quite logical and natural as against the Crime Branch and IB's theory of catching alive of one of them which appears absolutely incredible. It is impossible to believe that a group of 10-15 well armed police officers and men would not kill but only *catch* the "dreaded terrorist," who, they knew, had mercilessly killed more than 50 innocent people and some senior police officers, and who had also killed one of their fellow officers right in front of them. Though it is always desirable to nab a terrorist or two alive in order to elicit information from them, it was psychologically, practically and humanly impossible to do so in the extraordinary circumstances of this case.

Logically, it appears that *both* the terrorists had been killed either owing to lack of coordination among the officers or due to over-enthusiasm of some officers but the mistake was promptly rectified by showing one of them as having been killed *elsewhere* and substituting him by another "terrorist" from the "stock."

The mystery of keeping a terrorist alive

The reason why the planners scripted to keep one of the "terrorists" *alive* could be that they had not expected that the real terrorists would leave some trails behind, in which case it would have been difficult for them to connect the "terrorists" in the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan

section to LeT and Pakistan, and serious doubts would have been raised about the origin of the terrorists who killed Karkare. Therefore, to be on the safer side, they kept a "terrorist" alive so that they could prove whatever they wished to, by way of his "confessional statement," or "recoveries" from him, or by manipulating physical clues like finger prints or DNA samples and so on. But, fortunately for India, the real terrorists left many traces like the GPS devices and satellite phones on the trawler and also records of calls made using VOIP system thus connecting themselves to LeT and Pakistan; but, unfortunately for the IB, those gadgets could not conclusively connect Ajmal Kasab and Ismail Khan to the terror-groups. It is also noteworthy that not a single call was received by these two "terrorists" from the handlers of the attack whereas other six terrorists received as many as 284 calls. Consequently, the IB and the Crime Branch Mumbai had to resort to manipulative evidence like DNA samples and chance finger prints and to do many somersaults in order to create evidence against them, as is evident from the chargesheet filed in the court.

An alternative theory of Mumbai terror attack

If all the above parts I to IX, *i.e.*, right from the receiving of the specific intelligence by the IB on 19 November 2008 to the encounter at Girgaum Chowpatty in the night of 26/27 November 2008 are collated and arranged in a logical sequence, the alternative story would go like this:

1) Not ten but eight Pakistani terrorists came in a rubberised dinghy to Mumbai shores.
2) Out of them, six landed at Bhai Bhandarkar Machimar Colony near Badhwar Park, Cuffe Parade, and two sailed further towards Hotel Oberoi in the same dinghy.
3) The six who landed at Badhwar Park wreaked havoc at Hotel Taj Mahal, Café Leopold and Nariman House and the two who had gone towards Oberoi Hotel caused mayhem at Oberoi Hotel and Hotel Trident.
4) The terrorists who caused heartless bloodbath at CST,

CAMA Hospital and Rangabhavan Lane were not from among the terrorists who had come from Pakistan, but were local terrorists.

5) The CST-CAMA Hospital-Rangabhavan Lane operation was planned, scripted, directed, choreographed and executed jointly by the Brahminists involved in the nationwide terror plot and their well-wishers in the IB with the sole objective of eliminating Hemant Karkare who had unearthed the plot.

The following could be the logical sequence of events from planning to execution of the operation:

i) As the ATS Maharashtra, under Hemant Karkare, had exposed the Hindutva (Brahminist) terrorism inside out and as Karkare was only inches away from arresting some of the most important Brahminist leaders in the country, the RSS, the VHP, and other Brahminist forces and their all-time saviour, the IB, had been extremely worried. While the hardcore Brahminists in the IB had been thinking of many alternative "secret operations" for saving their masters, a God-sent opportunity came their way when a hot and absolutely specific intelligence arrived from the U.S. and the RAW about some terrorists setting sail in a launch from Pakistan to attack Mumbai.

ii) They, instead of alerting the Mumbai Police and the Western Naval Command about this specific input, only cautioned their masters in Maharashtra and asked them to be in a high state of readiness so as to be able to swing into action within minutes of getting a signal from them and to coincide their operation with the main terrorist attack.

iii) The Brahminists in Maharashtra selected six to eight youths, well-trained in their camps at Nagpur and Pune during the last few years.

iv) The youths were divided into groups of two each and they

were briefed by some hardcore Brahminist leaders as well as serving and retired Brahminist IB officers about the role of each group. They were also explained the plan of action on the map.

v) As per the plan, they were to be in readiness a couple of days prior to the anticipated date of the arrival of the terrorists.

vi) They were to be in such a high state of alert that no sooner than did they receive the first signal alerting that the terrorists had landed at the Mumbai shores, they should start from their respective places and take positions at pre-decided points in the vicinity of CST, CAMA Hospital and SB office.

vii) As soon as they received the second signal that the terrorists had reached their targets such as Taj, Oberoi, Nariman House, etc., they were to unleash their operation at the places assigned to them.

viii) They would receive the signals on specific mobile phones already provided to them. The mobile phones contained SIM cards specially obtained from Satara (Maharashtra). They were not to use any other mobile phone or SIM card for communication even amongst themselves.

ix) The firing was to be first started at the CST followed by firing at CAMA Hospital with a gap of about 10 to 15 minutes. CST team, after completion of its task, was to cross over to the lane by the side of The Times of India building and to act as a back-up to the other teams.

x) Arrangements had been made by the concerned IB officers to direct the ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare, towards CAMA Hospital as soon as he arrived at any of the sites of the incident.

xi) The group in the SB office-Rangabhavan Lane area was to attract attention by opening fire when the target officer came in the vicinity.

xii) The groups in SB office-Rangabhavan Lane area were to accomplish their "task" as soon as Hemant Karkare came

within their range.

xiii) After the signal about the successful accomplishment of the task was received, all the group members were to leave their areas immediately and return to their original places as fast as they could.

xiv) The IB with the help of the Mumbai Crime Branch were to produce two "terrorists" from its "stock" at the scene for being driven in a special vehicle (Skoda) for an "encounter," but one of them was to be kept alive.

Almost everything went as per the plan. But like any operation or war or project in the world, this operation also did not work out *ditto* as per the original plan. It, apparently, encountered many surprises and its operatives committed some blunders, as described below.

1) The group of two inside the CST, having been brainwashed for years with the hate-Muslim doctrine, could not control their ire against Muslims and *forgetting that they had donned the role of "Jihadi" Muslims*, killed a large number of skull-cap-clad and bearded Muslim men, veiled Muslim women and their children among others.

2) After wreaking havoc at the station, the duo failed to cross over towards CAMA Hospital, as planned, as the police near the subway and The Times of India building forced them to retreat and hence they had to exit from the Masjid Bundar side.

3) As the police at the Girgaum Chowpatty, either due to over-enthusiasm or due to lack of coordination, killed *both* the "terrorists" produced in the Skoda vehicle, thus leaving none to narrate the story, the IB had to make last minute arrangement for producing another terrorist from among their "stock."

Notwithstanding these unforeseen happenings, and some serious blunders on the part of the perpetrators, the conspirators were apparently successful in their main objective, *i.e.*, to kill Hemant Karkare.

From the facts mentioned above, it is abundantly clear that the operation at CST-CAMA-Rangbhavan Lane section had nothing to do with the main attack at Taj-Oberoi-Nariman House. Those were two distinct operations having nothing in common between them - neither the objectives, nor the terrorists, nor their outfits, nor their planners, nor their *modus operandi*, nor their targets. The only connecting factor between the two was the Brahminist elements ensconced in the IB who managed to synchronise the attack by the native Brahminist terrorists at CST-CAMA-Rangbhavan Lane section with the attack by the foreign terrorists on Taj, Oberoi, Nariman House section, which they knew in advance. Thus, the Brahminist-dominated IB very seriously compromised the security of the country in order to save the Brahminist organisations and their leaders from the ignomity of being stamped as "terrorists" which they really had been.

The story dished out to the public

However, in order to hoodwink the media, the general public and even the government, the IB, with the help of the Crime Branch Mumbai, manipulated evidence and tried to plug the gaping holes in its original plan caused by the unexpected police action near the CST sub-way, and near The Times of India building and at the Girgaum Chawpatty and also tried to patch up the damage done by the goof-ups committed by the over-enthusiastic terrorists at the CST. But the covers, used by them such as statements of so-called witnesses, call records of mobile phones, some "recoveries," etc., to hide the gaping holes and goof-ups, were so short and so tattered that as they tried to pull over these covers to conceal one unsavoury part, the other more obscene parts revealed themselves. Nevertheless, based on this made-up evidence, the IB and the Crime Branch cooked up a story and dished it out to the media and the public. No sane person could have believed this cock and bull story. But our media, which is controlled to a large extent by the Brahminist forces, lapped it up without raising any query. They published it without ascertaining its veracity or without questioning its credibility, even though some contradictory reports had been published earlier by some

of them. Those, from amongst the political class or intelligentsia, who tried to raise some questions were snubbed, by using the oft repeated terms of the IB like "national prestige," "national security," "foreign relations," "scourge of global terrorism" and so on. The gullible general public meekly accepted the theory, probably because in matters of "terrorism," they, especially Muslims, are too overawed to challenge the official version for the fear of being stamped "anti-national" or being targeted by the vindictive IB. Moreover, in the police story, the events at the CST-CAMA-Rangabahvan Lane were so intelligently and craftily entwined with the main attack, that the general public and even the gullible government, chose to remain quiet.

The guilty conscience of the Crime Branch Mumbai and the IB

Though the general public has, for some reason, remained quiet, the guilty conscience of the Crime Branch and the IB did not allow them to sit in peace and occasionally manifested itself in one way or the other. The frantic attempts by the Crime Branch to explain away the blasts in taxis at Vile Parle and Wadi Bunder, at about or immediately after the time of the attack, the registration of an offence by it under the Official Secrets Act against some TV channels and others and the anxiety of the IB to keep the Pradhan Panel report under wraps are examples of their utter sense of guilt, the details of which are given below:

I) The mystery of taxi blasts at Vile Parle and Wadi Bundar

The guilty conscience of the IB and the Crime Branch, Mumbai manifested itself in their miserable attempt to hide the facts about the bomb explosions in taxies near Vile Parle and Wadi Bundar as evident from the following facts.

1) The Marathi daily *Lokmat*, Mumbai (27 November 2008) and daily *Pudhari*, Pune (28 November 2008) reported that near the Vile Parle flyover, a powerful blast took place in taxi no. MH 01-BA-5179 in which three persons were killed on the spot.

2) Four days after the incident, Jt. C.P. (Crime) Mumbai, unnecessarily tried to explain away the taxi blasts. In a report published in the 1st December 2008 issue of *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India] captioned "Cops Explain taxi-mystery," the Jt. C.P. Rakesh Maria was reported as saying, "the two powerful blasts did not tie in with the terrorist operations....the terrorists planted bombs in the taxis in anticipation that those taximen (in which they had travelled to their targets) may leak their plans." The same report further said that the investigators were "trying to locate all taxies that the terrorists may have used."
3) According to a news report published in the *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai (19 April 2009), the police submitted a report to the court the previous day that one Laxminarayan Goel of Hyderabad was killed along with the taxi driver in the blast at Vile Parle while he was going to his sister-in-law's place in Kandivli, cancelling his earlier plan to go to Hyderabad after learning from his sister-in-law on mobile phone that terrorists had been on the rampage inside CST Station. In support of the claim the police reportedly produced the call details of the mobile phones of deceased Goel and his sister-in-law. The police report also said that the fact was confirmed by the senior superintendent of CST.
4) So far as the other blast is concerned, Marathi daily *Lokmat*, Pune reported on 27 November 2008, *i.e.*, on the very next day of the attack, that *three* persons were killed in a taxi blast on Dockyard Road (Wadi Bundar).

In view of the above conflicting reports, the mystery of the taxi blasts, instead of getting solved by the clarification of the Jt. CP (Crime) Mumbai, as published in the *Pune Mirror* (1 December 2008), has further deepened, and has raised many questions.

How many persons were killed in Vile Parle taxi blast? Three [including the driver] as reported in the press the very next day or two

(Goel and taxi driver) as claimed by the police five months later in the court? If three, what was the name of the third person? When the number of the Vile Parle taxi was known on the first day itself what were the Crime Branch trying to locate? How could the senior superintendent of CST confirm the death of a person killed in a taxi near Vile Parle, as claimed by the police? Were the call details of mobile phones sufficient to know what conversation took place between deceased Goel and his sister-in-law? What were the names of the persons killed in Wadi Bundar blast? The chargesheet mentions that in the Wadi Bundar taxi blast the taxi driver and two ladies were killed. If so, were the ladies got identified? Where were the bodies of the persons killed in these two taxi blasts taken?

The logical inference is that the two terrorists who wreaked havoc at the CST Station, and who on being cornered by the police, exited from the Masjid Bundar side, were killed in the Wadi Bundar blast while running away in a taxi with their remaining stock of explosives and the other two from the Rangabhavan Lane area or their "covering" party were killed in Vile Parle taxi blast in similar circumstances while running away after completing their task. It could also be that the terrorists belonged to the suicide squad of an outfit and they committed suicide by detonating the explosives to avoid identification as per the directions of their masters. There is a reason to suspect that the real names of the four persons (other than the taxi drivers) killed in the taxi blasts have been kept secret and the persons killed elsewhere were adjusted here, by taking into confidence the police officers of Vile Parle Police Station, and Byculla Police Station in whose jurisdiction the blasts took place, the officers of the CST railway police station, some railway officer, the doctors of the hospitals where the dead bodies had been taken and some others by telling them that for some "confidential" reason they were compelled to do so.

II) An offence under the Official Secrets Act

An offence was registered by the Crime Branch Mumbai on 2 March 2009, under sections 3, 5 and 7 of the Official Secrets Act against some TV channels for airing confidential wireless communication among the police officers that took place on the night of 26/11 and against unidentified persons for stealing the details of the conversation and the log book.

On 7 December 2008, NDTV India, IBN 7 and Aaj Tak TV channels, and TV9 on 26 February 2009, aired a part of the wireless communication where the Mumbai Police commissioner referred to as "King" was heard communicating with his officers and guiding them on various operations during the 26/11 attack. One could also clearly listen, in the recordings, the details of police movements and sequence of events.

Now the question is whether such a communication among police officers constitutes an offence under section 3 (spying), 5 (wrongful communication of information) and 7 (interfering with officers of the police or members of the Armed Forces) of the Official Secrets Act, especially when it was aired after the passage of a considerable period? And if so, how? These points have not been elaborated by the Crime Branch Mumbai in its FIR which is very vague and unspecific.

The anxiety of the IB and of the Crime Branch is not that some very secret information has been leaked that would help the enemy countries or the terrorist outfits or would hamper the investigations. Their main anxiety is that the story that they have formed and fed to the public through the media, in regard to the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the episode would prove to be wrong, as many true facts revealed in the wireless communication are contrary to what they have made the public, the media and even the government to believe and, consequently, the IB-Brahminist conspiracy would be exposed. In registering an offence under the Official Secrets Act, their only objective appears to be to sternly warn all those possessing the copies of the C.Ds of wireless communication, and of the wireless log-books, that if they dared use them again and tried to produce in the court as evidence, they would be prosecuted for these offences having punishment ranging from three to 14 years of imprisonment. The IB and the Crime Branch Mumbai, definitely do not intend to punish the TV channels and the police officers responsible for the disclosure of the so-called "confidential information" as they know, that trying to do so would mean getting

more exposed. Their purpose is limited only to ensuring that the wireless communication is not made public again.

III) The government's [read IB's] anxiety to keep the Pradhan Panel report under wraps
The selective leakage of the report is a red herring

What was it that sent the Maharashtra Government scurrying about frantically declaring in the State Assembly that the report of the two-member Pradhan Panel, set up by it to probe into the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, would not be made public and what made it hurriedly approach the Supreme Court to obtain a stay on the Bombay High Court's order directing the government to hand over a copy of the report to it [the High Court] in a sealed cover? Was it merely because of the points raised in the report such as the failure of the top brass of the Mumbai Police to perform as a team, the discontinuance of the coastal patrolling which was started after the Mumbai bomb blast of 1993, failure to take sufficient steps to beef up coastal patrolling despite receiving six earlier alerts issued by the central intelligence agencies about terrorist attacks by sea route, diverting to other duties five patrol boats deployed for this purpose under DCP (Port), non-submission of a report by the study group set up in the wake of the 2006 train blasts for three years, the Quick Reaction Team (QRT) having had no firing practice for a long time and no training in hostage-rescue operations, the Mumbai Police having no knowledge of the Jewish Centre at Nariman House, the failure of the "desk-officers" in processing the circulars received by the state government from the Central Home Ministry between February -July 2008 and not keeping higher officials informed about them, etc., as mentioned in the "exclusive" reports published in some leading English dailies during July-August, 2009? Or was there something more serious in the panel report which apparently has not been leaked and published yet?

Going by some earlier newspaper reports as given in Annexure A of this book, it is clear that on 19 November 2008, the IB had received

an absolutely specific information about the Mumbai attack by sea, but it failed to pass it on to the Mumbai Police whom it concerned most. This fact was further confirmed when the other member of the Pradhan Panel, V. Balchandran, who happened to be a former RAW officer, in a communication to one of his former colleagues lamented that the IB and RAW did not give any information to the panel about the intelligence received and disseminated by them (*The Indian Express*, 31 May 2009). In its report, the panel must have definitely pointed out this glaring omission on the part of the IB (RAW, however, having had played its role dutifully) and must have drawn some logical inferences by coupling this fact with the material contradiction between the police version and the facts revealed by undisputed pieces of evidence like the original CDs of the wireless communication among the officers on the night of the attack and the log-books of the Control Room of the relevant period, which, most probably, could have been made available to the panel and by some other equally credible pieces of evidence such as footages of TV channels, newspaper reports, statements of some eyewitnesses and so on. The panel, most probably, could also have pointed out that the extremely serious omission on the part of the IB was not an act of negligence but a deliberate and willful act.

It appears that to cover up the Himalayan blunder on the part of the IB in not sharing the absolutely specific information of the terror attack with the Mumbai Police, as pointed out by the panel, the adverse comments made by the panel on the desk-officer system in respect of the routine alert circulars were blown out of all proportion, thus trying to confuse the *specific intelligence* of the IB with the *routine* alert circulars of the Union Home Ministry and an impression was sought to be created that the "babus" in the state home ministry were responsible for the non-communication of the IB's intelligence. I would like to enlighten the readers on this issue. The intelligence reports of the IB are received only by the seniormost officers like the DGP or the CP or the SP in sealed covers marked "secret" or "top secret," addressed to the officer by name and in most of the cases the messages or the reports are in coded language. The officer concerned is supposed to personally

open it and decode the message himself or herself. No lower functionary or bureaucrat is involved in the process. Against this background, to say that the desk-officer system is responsible for the non-communication of the intelligence is to intentionally divert the attention of the public, the government and the media from the main issue of the IB's serious misconduct.

In the light of the above-mentioned facts, one is bound to suspect that the "leakage" of a part of the panel-report and its publication in leading newspapers is nothing but a red herring, apparently managed by the IB through the media-friendly Crime Branch Mumbai, because of its guilty conscience and only to mislead the public and the Government.

Perfect case for reinvestigation

All these factors put together make out a perfect case for reinvestigation.

VII

The Investigation of the Mumbai Attack case

IB & FBI *de-facto* investigators, Mumbai Crime Branch merely a puppet

IB and FBI having serious stakes

On the face of it, the Mumbai Crime Branch has investigated the Mumbai attack case of 26/11. But a between-the-line reading of the newspaper reports indicates that for all practical purposes, the investigation has been done jointly by the IB and the FBI with Mumbai Crime Branch acting merely as a puppet. As a matter of fact, both the IB and the FBI had serious stakes in the case. While the IB wanted to hide something in respect of the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack, the FBI did not want a part of the Taj-Oberoi-Nariman House story to be bared. By investigating the case jointly and by submitting the mutually agreed chargesheet, they ensured that the interests of both of them were protected.

The chargesheet and the evidence

The Mumbai Crime Branch, the *de jure* investigation agency of the case, filed the chargesheet on 25 February 2009. The 11,280-page chargesheet heavily relied on the evidence of mobile phones, satellite phones, GPS devices, email IDs used by the attackers and their handlers, VOIP devices, the confessional statement of Ajmal Kasab, his identification by witnesses, as well as DNA samples of some of the terrorists and, more importantly, "one of the chance finger prints lifted from the glass-door of the cabin of the vessel M.V. Kuber which matches Ajmal Kasab's fingerprints," a special mention of which has been made in the

press release handed out to the media.

As the investigation in relation to GPS devices, VOIP devices, satellite phones, email IDs and even some mobile phones has been done mainly by the FBI as seen from newspaper reports, the onus to prove the same in the court rests with it. As the technology, on which these devices and gadgets work, is still in an evolutionary stage, no finding in respect of them could be called final or conclusive in a court of law. Therefore, in order to convince the court about the credibility of the evidence, the FBI and the Crime Branch will be required to prove that these devices cannot be tampered with or the recordings thereon cannot be obliterated or fresh recordings cannot be manipulated, without their being detected. The court may do it *suo moto* by calling some experts in the field and examining them as defence witnesses, if it so desires.

So far as the evidence of DNA samples and the chance fingerprints is concerned, the same is doubtful on the face of it. Any experienced investigating officer of a moderate intelligence would tell how difficult it is to get any scientific clue for DNA test or a chance print in a fishing trawler or a small inflatable rubber boat, especially when it had been at sea for several hours after the terrorists abandoned it. Apparently, the creation of such evidence was an afterthought of the investigation agency, especially after important witnesses like Anita Uddaiya refused to identify Ajmal Kasab, and the much-hyped photographs billed as Kasab's photograph-in-action were seriously doubted by some experts and the foreign media.

As regard the evidence of Ajmal Kasab's identification parade and his confessional statements, the less said the better. Nothing could be more ridiculous than adducing and relying on such an evidence. Even in minor offences when accused persons are arrested, their faces are heavily covered even while being produced in the court, lest the identification parade, if held, would be marred. In this case, an accused whose photographs from all the angles have been shown to the whole world, for over six months, without a break, is being "identified" by witnesses. What could be more ridiculous than this? The same can be said of his

so-called confessional statement recorded while he was in the police custody. No court in the world would believe a confessional statement of a person declared as a "lone surviving terrorist" and recorded while in police custody for a long time. Even if custodial confessions have been made admissible in some draconian statutes, they are yet to stand the scrutiny of the highest court.

Ball in the court's court

Now, the ball is in the court of the court. The question is what would the court do or what the court ought to do. If it decides to go by whatever has been put up to it by the IB and FBI and conduct the proceedings as laid down in the Criminal Proceeding Code, its job is cut very short. So far as the only surviving "terrorist" Ajmal Kasab is concerned, the country's Brahminist forces have already pronounced their verdict in respect of him. They have not only pronounced the punishment but also decided the place where, and the mode in which, it would be executed. As for the rest of the accused, some of whom have been killed and some of whom are hiding outside the country, they are only of academic interest to the court and the society and hence may be ignored.

However, if the court, on the scrutiny of the case papers, comes to a *prima facie* conclusion that an alternative theory exists and hence decides to go beyond whatever has been put up by way of the chargesheet and the evidence, it has to start from the scratch and take the following measures:

1) As the Mumbai terror attack, 26/11, has two distinct parts, *viz.*, the Taj-Oberoi-Nariman House part and the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part, the two should be segregated completely, two separate offences should be got registered and investigated.
2) As the IB and the FBI have a vested interest in the case, they should be totally kept out of the picture; even the officers of Mumbai Crime Branch or some other officers who had been associated with earlier investigation or who are close to IB or prone to their pressure should not even

remotely be allowed to be associated with the fresh investigation.

3) A new team comprising very competent senior police officers with impeccable integrity, and absolute impartiality, both political and communal, be formed and directed to complete the investigations of the two cases within a stipulated period.
4) The investigating team should be told to immediately take into possession (*a*) the audio tapes/CDs of the police control room containing the wireless communication amongst the officers and the control room, especially of the first day of the attack; (*b*) the footages of the CCTVs installed at various places of attack; (*c*) the call records of the mobile phones of the senior officers involved in the counter-terror operation, especially of Hemant Karkare; (*d*) the video clippings of important TV news channels, especially of the first two days and (*e*) the press cuttings of important newspapers of 27 and 28 November 2008, when there was no unofficial censorship. The investigating officers may be cautioned to ensure that the tapes, CDs, footages and clippings are not doctored. This evidence will be particularly useful in the investigation of the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack.
5) There are at least three witnesses who have clearly seen and some have even talked to a couple of the terrorists in the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane section. They are, (*i*) an employee of CAMA Hospital with whom the terrorists spoke in fluent Marathi, (*ii*) Chandrakant Tikhe, a generator operator at CAMA Hospital, whom terrorists asked whether he was a Hindu or a Muslim, and (*iii*) Maruti Phad, the driver of Bhushan Gagrani, an IAS officer, who saw at least one of the terrorists who killed the three officers. The Crime Branch might have recorded their statement to suit the IB's theory by telling them that it was the question of the country's security and prestige. Their true and factual statements need to be recorded in an absolutely free environment.
6) Anita Rajendra Uddaiya, who lived near Badhwar Park in Cuffe Parade, had seen six terrorists alighting from an airboat at about 8.30 pm on the night of the attack. She had seen them clearly and even had spoken to them. She can be used to ascertain whether the "lone surviving terrorist" was one of them.
7) The police seized two mobile phones at the CST, through which the terrorists were said to have made contacts during operation. In the police investigation, the SIM cards used in those mobile phones were traced to Satara district. But no detailed enquiry seemed to have been made in this matter. The new investigation team, may be asked to obtain the call records of these mobile phones and through them to reach the real conspirators and perpetrators of the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane attack.

The ardent wish for reinvestigation of the case is definitely not to save an Ajmal Kasab from the gallows, but to free 99 percent of the gullible population of this country from the clutches and intellectual slavery of less than one percent Brahminists. The impartial and thorough reinvestigation would definitely disprove the much-touted theory of the IB aimed at maligning and discrediting Indian Muslims under the cover of "Pakistan," and at bailing out the Brahminist terrorists which was about to be exposed threadbare by Hemant Karkare.

Why they behaved as they did

In the whole episode, it is very interesting to know why every party involved behaved the way it did.

1) The IB

How dare the IB take such a great risk of ignoring an extremely

specific intelligence input received from the U.S. and the RAW and of not passing it on to Mumbai Police and of not ensuring that the same was passed on to the Western Naval Command?

Firstly, it was a do or die situation for the Brahminist forces in India as there was every likelihood of the nationwide terror conspiracy aimed at establishing the "Hindu [read Brahminist] Rashtra" being fully exposed by the ATS under the stewardship of Hemant Karkare and, consequently, the efforts of Brahminist forces to that end so meticulously and jealously persevered since 1893 getting washed away. Therefore, the IB, which is more Brahminist than the Brahminists, took this huge risk.

And, secondly, the Brahminists in the IB were confident that even after such a Himalayan blunder, they would get away with impunity and would be able to tackle the government by giving some plausible explanation such as "error of judgement," or "tactical move," or "covert operation," or using patent terms like "national security" and "international relations," which they had been doing for decades.

2) The government and political leaders

One wonders how our governments, political leaders and the statesmen of whatever hue and colour, so easily gulp the IB's made-up stories laced with blatant lies. Either they are so naïve as not to understand the nexus between the Brahminsit forces and the IB and their game plans, or they are also party to the fabrication of evidence and cooking up false stories. In either case, it is a matter of grave concern, as, if they are so gullible as to be taken in by any gimmick or jugglery, then any foreign power could take them for a ride and if the latter is the case, the future of the secular fabric of India is very bleak.

3) The Crime Branch, Mumbai

Why were the Crime Branch officers doing all the somersaults, turnabouts and histrionics to manipulate evidence in order to justify the story of the IB, which they knew was not true?

The whole world has watched and listened to what happened during the three days of Mumbai attack and a lot of evidence has already been created at many places such as the audio recording of all the wireless conversation among the officers at the police control rooms, visual recording by CCTV cameras at some places of attack and video recording and photographs by the electronic and print media. Therefore, when the police story was trotted out, even a layman could make out that while something was being hidden, something else was being forcibly pushed down the people's throat.

If this was the case of a common man, the experts in the Crime Branch, even if unaware of the communal connection of the IB and their game plan, must definitely have been wondering as to what all this exercise was and why the investigation was being done upside down. The senior officers of the Crime Branch are sufficiently experienced, reasonably secular and intelligent enough not to be taken in by the IB's usual rhetoric like "covert operation," "counter insurgency operations," or "decisions at the highest level" and so on. Then, the question remains, why the professionally sound, sufficiently experienced and high-profile officers of Mumbai Crime Branch became so subservient to the IB as to create some new evidence, delete or destroy or manipulate some, or tamper with something else at their instance? The reason could be one of the two:

First, senior officers of the Crime Branch knew that the IB, given its powers, influence and reach, could make or mar one's career. Therefore, those having high ambitions must have been keeping the IB in good humour by obeying their orders to the dot, so that at the crucial moment it could throw its weight in favour of those officers. The second possibility could be that the IB might have blackmailed senior Crime Branch officers by using their unsavoury past record and forced them to do the investigation as per its dictates. In either case, this does not augur well for the police, the society and the nation.

4) The media

How was it that the Indian media, known for its investigative, inquisitive, proactive and incisive journalism, suddenly became so passive after

the Mumbai attack and lapped up without questioning whatever was fed to it by the police?

Those who have observed and studied the evolution of the Indian media during the last fifty years would not have been surprised by this attitude of the media as they knew how carefully and meticulously it has been nurtured and groomed by the Sangh Parivar; how the Brahminist elements have infiltrated the media during the last 50 years and how they have gradually captured a sizeable part of it. Therefore, when the Brahminist elements in the media realised that raising any hue and cry about the gaping holes in the investigation, and doubting the authenticity of the police version would mean undermining the Brahminists' interests and exposing their game plans, they behaved like disciplined soldiers and obeyed the orders of the police officers without hesitation.

No doubt after the police version was handed out to the media, some of the non-Brahminist journals and news channels did cry foul; but their cries were drowned in the din of jingoistic shouts of "down with terrorism."

Over-enthusiasm of FBI in the investigation of Mumbai terror attack

The over-enthusiasm of the FBI and the Indian investigators' over-dependence on them is apparent from the following facts:

1. FBI was the first foreign investigation agency to arrive in India after the Mumbai attack (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 1 December 2008 and *Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 2 December 2008).
2. The dossier handed over to Pakistan by India appears to have been prepared mainly on the basis of inputs provided by the FBI (*The Times of India*, Pune, 9 December 2008).
3. Fahim Ansari, one of the suspects arrested by the U.P. Police, complained to the court that a lady officer of FBI harassed him sexually and the court ordered an enquiry into the complaint (*Sakal*, Pune, 10 February 2009).
4. Fahim Ansari's advocate raised a legal point as to how a foreign agency was allowed to investigate a case when there is no such provision in the Indian law (*Sakal*, Pune, 10 February 2009).
5. The Mumbai Crime Branch decided to match voices in calls made by the 10 terrorists during the attack with the data-base supposedly available with the FBI (*Pune Mirror* [The Times of India], 12 February 2009).
6. A three-member team of the Mumbai Crime Branch flew to the U.S. in the first week of February 2009, with the equipment recovered from the fishing trawler Kuber. The technical experts of the FBI examined the Global Positioning System (GPS) equipment and satellite phones used by the attackers to retrieve information which the terrorists might have deleted (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 16 February 2009).
7. FBI handed over all the crucial evidence linking the perpetrators of Mumbai terror attack to Pakistan, to the team of Mumbai Police in Washington (*The Times of India*, Pune, 20 February 2009).
8. A three-member team of Mumbai Crime Branch which returned from the U.S. on 20 February 2009, said that the FBI had linked 26/11 to Pakistan on the basis of VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) calls and the GPS (Global Positioning System) used by the terrorists (*The Times of India*, Pune, 21 February 2009).
9. The U.S. sent FBI chief, Robert Mueller, in the first week of March 2009 to tie up the entire exercise in which FBI investigators would play a key role in testifying the evidence gathered in Mumbai (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 22 February 2009).
10. FBI interrogated Fahim Ansari, in connection with 26/11 Mumbai attack, by confronting him with the lone surviving terrorist Ajmal Kasab. They, along with the IB officer, interrogated Fahim and LeT "terrorist" Sabauddin (*Pudhari*, Pune, 23 February 2009).
11. The FBI Director, Robert Mueller, called on Union Home

Minister P. Chidambaram, IB chief Rajiv Mathur and National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and had extensive discussion on the Mumbai attack as well as the threat from terrorist groups in the Subcontinent (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 4 March 2009).

From the above reports it can be seen how dependent our investigation agencies had been on the FBI and how much interest the FBI had been taking in the case. Thus, the investigation, for all practical purposes, had been done by the FBI and the IB, with the Crime Branch Mumbai acting as poster boys. FBI's gross interference in the investigation and our extreme reliance on them is dangerous to the sovereignty of the country.

Before we rely too much on FBI in matters of terror, we must understand the social racial and administrative structure within America and their intricate relationship. So far as terrorism is concerned the important factors in America are:

i) Christians
ii) Jews
iii) Zionists
iv) Muslims
v) CIA
vi) FBI

And their counterparts in India are:

i) *Other* Hindus, a gullible lot
ii) Brahmins
iii) Brahminists
iv) Muslims
v) IB and RAW
vi) CBI

When the American factors are compared with those in India, Christians correspond to *Other* Hindus, Jews to Brahmins, Zionists to Brahminists, Muslims to Muslims and so on.

Though CIA is the premier intelligence agency in America, it could not be fully controlled by Zionists in spite of their best efforts over the years, as Brahminists could not fully control RAW and CBI in India. However, the Zionists in America and the Brahminists in India have been successful in fully controlling FBI and IB respectively. In fact, it was because of the internal rivalry between the CIA and the FBI that the specific information about the 26/11 Mumbai attack was passed on to RAW by the CIA.

Moreover, the American concept of nationalism is quite different from the Indian concept, partly because of its late establishment as a nation, and partly because it is a conglomeration of different cultures and nationalities. The nationalist fervour in America is not as strong as in India. In America, whichever community or group takes initiative and follows it with persevence takes control. The Zionists have been in the forefront in all fields because of their oneupmanship and perseverance. They have been able to control the American economy and security agencies like FBI almost completely. Though they have not been able to fully take over politics, administration and intelligence agencies like CIA, they have been so powerful even in these fields as to influence their policies and decisions to a great extent. As the Zionists have the agenda of controlling the world, we must be careful before surrendering our liberty even on limited issues, like investigation, to organisations like FBI. Otherwise, there is a danger of losing our sovereignty in the long-run. In this context, it will not be out of place to mention a news item published in *The Indian Express*, Pune (11 November 2008) under the caption "Secret order allows U.S. to hunt Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Syria; Donald Rumsfeld signed order on President George W. Bush's direction in 2004." Quoting a senior U.S. official, the news report further said, "The secret order gave the military new authority to attack Al Qaeda *anywhere in the world*." The dangerous implications of this blanket order need not be over-emphasised. In this case, or in any other case, in India, if the FBI comes to the conclusion that Al-Qaeda was involved, the U.S. is free to intervene and attack under the pretext of finishing Al-Qaeda, as nobody could challenge the claim of the U.S. and nobody could rein it in, in such an eventuality.

The issue of the role of insiders

During the fortnight following the Mumbai attack, the general public were fed with so much of information, by way of news reports, articles and discussions in newspapers, periodicals and TV channels, that they were almost convinced that the terror attack was a handiwork of LeT, plotted and planned in Pakistan, with or without the support of local or alien powers. But, as more and more information started trickling in, a part of the intelligentsia started suspecting the authenticity of the ATS-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack, especially the killing of the ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare. Gradually a demand for a thorough and impartial enquiry into *that* particular part of the attack started coming from cross sections of the society:

- § Ex-servicemens' association of Mumbai demanded a thorough probe by a special investigation team under the supervision of the High Court into the suspicious death of Hemant Karkare and to bring to book the real culprits and the brain behind the conspiracy (*Lokmat*, Kolhapur, 17 December 2008).
- § The Union Minister for Minority Affairs and former Chief Minister of Maharashtra, A.R. Antulay, raised this issue and demanded an enquiry into Hemant Karkare's death, especially in view of the fact that he was the head of the ATS which had been investigating the sensitive Malegaon blast case and that many elements had been unhappy with his investigation (*Lokmat*, Kolhapur, 18 December 2008).
- § A public interest litigation was filed by an advocate in the Mumbai High Court. The petitioner contended that as ATS Chief, Hemant Karkare, had arrested workers of some Hinduist organisations, he was suspected to have been killed by Hinduist terrorists and hence a thorough and independent enquiry be made into his death. The High Court disposed of the petition directing that the investigation agency must investigate into the death of Hemant Karkare and the advocate representing the government made a statement that all the points raised by the petitioner would be inquired into by the investigating agency (*Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 19 December 2008).

However, when such doubts were being raised about the involvement of a mysterious third party in the case and the demands were being made for a thorough and independent enquiry into the death of Hemant Karkare, the Brahminists in BJP and in other Brahminist organisations were highly perturbed. They opposed any such demand tooth and nail and condemned those making such demands. When Union Minister, A.R. Antulay, made such a demand, the MPs of BJP and Shiv Sena raised hue and cry for his resignation in both the houses of Parliament. In Maharashtra State Assembly, there was a pandemonium with BJP, Shiv Sena members calling Antulay an "agent of Pakistan" and asking for his blood. Some over-enthusiastic workers of BJP burnt his effigy in Mumbai. Even his own government and the Congress Party failed to support Antulay. On the other hand, he was snubbed by the party bosses and was forced to eat his words. This was not surprising as in such matters the Union Government and the ruling party are normally fed and misled by the Brahminist IB.

What was really surprising was the stand taken by the Brahminists in this case, which was diametrically opposite to the stand hitherto taken by them in terror matters. Till yesterday, whenever there was a so-called terror attack or a bomb blast, Brahminist leaders, without exception, had been falling over each other not only to merely suspect but to authoritatively declare that "insiders" (read Muslims) had been involved in the matter. But this time they had been outrightly dismissing the involvement of "insiders" and strongly opposing any demand for a thorough enquiry into the death of Hemant Karkare, because they knew that in this case, the "insiders" are different.

This controversy over the alleged role of "insiders" has incidentally brought out some bizarre revelations that the senior BJP and RSS leaders like LK Advani and Narendra Modi are not among the inner-most core of the organisation. When the hardcore Brahminist leaders in the country, the section of the media controlled by them, the Brahminist IB and at its instance and advice, the investigation agencies,

the government, both at the Centre and in the states, had been, in chorus declaring that there were "no insiders involved" and there was no question of a separate wide-ranging enquiry (other than the so-called investigation conducted by the Brahminist IB and the Zionist FBI) into the matter, the most powerful Hinduist leaders of BJP like LK Advani and Narendra Modi, were speaking in different voices. The Marathi daily *Sakal*, Pune (31 January 2009) reported that NDA prime ministerial candidate LK Advani had demanded that the case of Mumbai attack be enquired into by appointing a commission. He said that the "investigation done so far had revealed that the government had received advance information about the attack, yet it failed to stop it." The Chief Minister of Gujarat, Narendra Modi, also raised this issue when he said in the National Executive Committee meeting of the BJP held in Nagpur, that "In the Mumbai terror attack, the involvement of some Indians was suspected" (*Pudhari*, Kolhapur, 11 February 2009). Thereafter, LK Advani reiterated his demand which was reported as follows by *The Indian Express*, Pune (18 February 2009): "Echoing the remarks of Gujarat C.M. Narendra Modi, BJP's prime ministerial candidate, LK Advani, today said that "local angle" to the Mumbai 26/11 attack "could not be ruled out" and demanded a wide-ranging enquiry that covered this aspect of the controversy as well." On 5 June 2009, Advani again repeated his demand in the Lok Sabha for a judicial enquiry into the whole matter by appointing a commission, but the government turned down his request (*Sakal*, Pune, 6 June 2009).

The stand taken by these two seniormost leaders of the BJP and RSS contradicting the stand taken by their party and their mother organisation, only points to the fact that they are not among the inner-most core of the RSS and were not privy to the plot of CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack. Had they been so, they would not have raised this issue and had not demanded a "wide-ranging" enquiry into the matter fearing that such an enquiry would expose the Brahminists-IB conspiracy of the fake CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane attack coinciding with the real Taj-Oberoi attack. This controversy, thus, leads to the logical conclusion that in the Brahminists' reckoning, being

a staunch Hinduist (read anti-Muslim) does not necessarily mean being an inner-core Brahminist.

In the recent past also, there have been some developments indicating the dual policy of Brahminists *vis-à-vis* non-Brahminists in their own party/organisation.

Some developments in the recent past have indicated that the hard-core Brahminists in RSS and BJP have been giving a short shrift to LK Advani and Narendra Modi. Developments like the half-hearted projection of LK Advani as prime ministerial candidate of BJP, the attempt on the part of RSS to defeat Narendra Modi and his close associates in 2007 Gujarat election for Modi allegedly having become too big for his boots, the Ahmedabad bomb blasts and the recovery of unexploded bombs in Surat, the cities boasted by Modi to be the most secure places in India, and an attempt by the IB to protect the American national Ken Haywood suspected to be involved therein, the anti-Narendra Modi SMS campaign undertaken by the RSS and VHP following the demolition of some unauthorised temples in Gujarat, have given rise to the suspicion that LK Advani and Narendra Modi did not constitute the innermost circle of the RSS, contrary to the public perception. The controversy over the "local angle" in the Mumbai attack has confirmed this fact.

But these developments should not surprise those who know the Brahminists inside out and also know their real concept of *The Hindu*ism. Their agenda is to establish the Brahminism of the bygone era in the name of Hinduism as has been amply proved in the investigation of the Malegaon blast case of 2008. The main accused, Lt. Col. Purohit, has made no bones about it, when in a meeting of the conspirators of the "Hindu Rashtra" held on 26 January 2008, the transcript of which has been enclosed with the chargesheet of the case, he says "...if anyone opposed their Hindu *Aryavart* government, he would be excommunicated and killed." Obviously the Advanis and Modis do not fit in the definition of the "Hindu Aryavart" as contemplated by Purohit. Even Shiv Sena chief Balasaheb Thakrey does not fit in that category, as is evident from the following facts:

When the reports about the involvement of Lt. Col. Purohit and his group of Brahminist terrorists in Malegaon blast and other cases were flashed in the media, the Shiv Sena chief Balasaheb Thackrey was so much enamoured of the "valour" of Purohit and his group that he did not think twice before declaring them "patriots" and "nationalists." There were also reports that Shiv Sena was contemplating to give ticket to Lt. Col. Purohit for the ensuing Lok Sabha election. But Balasaheb Thackrey probably did not know then in what estimation he was held by the Brahminists of Abhinav Bharat. It came to light only when the transcript of one of the meetings of Lt. Col. Purohit and his terror group, which had been enclosed along with the second chargesheet filed by the ATS in the Malegaon blast case on 23 April 2009, was published in the press.

The Times of India in its Pune edition of 24 April 2009, reported under the caption "Col. Purohit badmouthed Shiv Sena" as follows:

"A supplementary chargesheet filed by the ATS of Mumbai Police in the 2008 Malegaon blasts case on Thursday [23 April 2009] shows that Col. Prasad Purohit and other members of the right wing group Abhinav Bharat thought very poorly of the Shiv Sena as a Hindu organisation.

The chargesheet contains transcripts of phone conversations between the 11 accused where they say that several mainstream Hindu organisations had grown too weak over the years.

Shiv-Sena and its leader Bal Thackrey are hand in glove with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim', reads a portion of the transcripts. This conversation took place between Purohit, Dayanand Pandey and retired major Ramesh Upadhyay. 'Shiv-Sena party is in close partnership with gangsters and is involved in extortion. They are betrayers of Hindus', Purohit and an unidentified person discuss."

A similar report appeared in the Delhi edition of the *Hindustan Times* (24 April 2009). It further added that one of the persons present in the meeting remarked, "Shiv Sena Chief Bal Thakeray was a danger to the Hindu community." The moral of the story is that all common Hindus, however highly placed, should understand that what is being billed as "Hinduism" by Brahminists is not Hinduism but Brahminism in the garb of Hinduism.

VIII

Malegaon blast case of 2008

(Post-Mumbai attack investigation)

Undoing of Hemant Karkare's Investigation
The *protégé* of the main conspirator heading the investigation team
Many serious omissions and commissions

To use the metaphor of the spider's net again, the process of net knitting, started by Hemant Karkare had itself generated potentialities for further extention of the net, much beyond the Malegaon case. How wide to extend the net and how many insects to entrap therein would depend on the integrity and impartiality of the investigating officer. The IB however, for obvious reasons, did not want the net to be widened beyond a certain limit. Therefore, they had already selected an officer, or so it seemed, as within hours of the tragic death of the ATS Chief Hemant Karkare in the terror attack, and while his mortal remains were still waiting to be consigned to flames, the Government of Maharashtra, in an unusual hurry, apparently on the insistence of the IB, *temporarily* appointed the Addl. D.G.P. (Railways), the most controversial former chief of the ATS, KP Raghuvanshi, as the head of the ATS (*Lokmat*, Mumbai, 28 November 2008).

What was such a hurry for the government to make this appointment? Was it a Constitutional post, which, if not filled in time, would result in Constitutional breakdown? If the government's argument was that they did not want any let-up in the investigation of the Malegaon blast case which had reached a very crucial stage, they should have at least made inquiries about the relationship between him and the main accused in the Malegaon case, Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, before making his appointment. The following facts would reveal their cordial relationship:

i) In 2005 (*i.e.*, when KP Raghuvanshi was the chief of the ATS), Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit and Lt. Col (retd.) Shailesh Raikar (the administrator of Bhonsala Military School, Nasik) were invited by the ATS as chief guests to speak in a seminar on how to gather intelligence on radical groups. Both Purohit and Raikar were at the time posted with the military intelligence (*DNA*, Mumbai (online news), 12 November 2008). When asked about it, the then Addl. D.G.P. (Railways) who was the ATS chief at the time [KP Raghuvanshi] admitted the fact and said "... but I am not able to recall the details" (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 12 November 2008).

ii) The ATS had shared information with the military intelligence after a huge cache of arms was seized in Aurangabad in May 2006. Purohit was part of the army team which was assisting the ATS in the arms haul case for at least four days. The ATS had seized 43 kg. of RDX, 16 AK-47 assault rifles, 3,200 rounds of ammunition and 50 hand grenades on the Nasik-Aurangabad highway (*DNA*, Mumbai, online news, 12 November 2008).

iii) "I am really thankful for the interaction you organised for our officers. My officers have been immensely benefitted by this interaction and hope that in future also we continue to benefit from the experience, knowledge and expertise of army officers like you and Major (then) Purohit." The then Spl. IGP ATS, KP Raghuvanshi, wrote this on 5 September 2006 to Lt. Col. Raikar of Southern Command, a copy of which was marked to Purohit. Both of them were in Military Intelligence at the time (*Sakal Times*, Pune, 26 November 2008).

The above reports, especially the letter by KP Raghuvanshi, written only about three weeks before the Malegaon blast, clearly indicate how much respect KP Raghuvanshi had for Lt. Col. Purohit and Lt. Col. (retd.) Shailesh Raikar, respectively, the confirmed and suspected conspirators of the 2008 Malegaon blast case, and how dependent he had been on them for the investigation of terror-related cases. They were as good as "gurus" to him. Against this background, how would one expect Raghuvanshi to grill the main conspirator, Lt. Col. Purohit rigorously or probe deep into the nationwide conspiracy and to expose the Brahminist terrorism?

The question that has been constantly nagging me is this: what were the government's compulsions in appointing, albeit "temporarily," a highly controversial officer like KP Raghuvanshi who had friendly relations with at least one of the main conspirators of the case, as the head of the ATS, in such a haste, when they could have asked the officer next in seniority in the ATS to hold the charge? To those who know the intricacies of the case, the answer is quite simple. The IB could not afford to take any chance at this juncture. They wanted to post a thoroughly "tested" officer to head the team investigating the Malegaon case. KP Raghuvanshi had already proved his sychophancy and staunch Brahminism in the investigation of Nanded blast case of 2006 by sparing important Brahminist leaders and Brahminist institutions and in Malegaon blast case of 2006, by going to the extent of reversing the process of correct investigation by the local police and arresting the victims as "accused." The IB wanted to post him as fast as they could to pre-empt any discussion on the issue of the posting of the ATS Chief. Therefore, when the rest of the world was busy watching the scenes of the brutal Mumbai attack on the TV screens, mourning the deaths of scores of innocent people and discussing hows, whys and whos of the killing of Hemant Karkare, the IB was engaged, either directly or through PMO, in convincing the state government about the importance of filling in the post of the ATS chief promptly and about the suitability of Raghuvanshi for the post. And the gullible state government, as usual, fell prey to the gimmicks of the Brahminist IB and issued the order by signing on the dotted line.

Though the IB had annointed their darling KP Raghuvanshi in a shameless hurry, in order to undo a lot of things done by Karkare, the

task ahead was not easy. Apparently, Raghuvanshi's mandate was to file the chargesheet as early as possible and that too, by restricting the investigation to Malegaon blast case alone, by not going astray and by not probing deep into the matters revealed in the earlier part of the investigation. But this was easier said than done, as Raghuvanshi's predecessor late Hemant Karkare, had not left anything to chance. The most important pieces of evidence such as the sensational contents of the laptops of Lt. Col. Purohit and Mahant Dayanand Pandey had been disclosed to the court and, thus, were known to the general public through the press. Moreover, some very important statements had already been recorded before the magistrate and their contents were also known to many.

Raghuvanshi was in great dilemma. While he could not alter or tamper with the evidence already on record, or could not manipulate or produce new evidence, he had to accomplish the task assigned to him by his mentors. It was, thus, left to his ingenuity, craftiness, jugglery and semantics to draft the chargesheet in such a way as to meet both the ends. But, he could not jump to the chargesheet without going through the formality of completing the investigation. Therefore, he put up a semblance of doing some further investigation and in order to fit the case in the IB's theory, he very clumsily and haphazardly manipulated some evidence and ridiculously tried to hush up or nullify certain facts having been revealed in the investigation, as is evident from the newspaper reports published in *Sakal Times* (5 December 2008); *The Indian Express*, Pune (24 December 2008); *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai (24 December 2008); *Pune Mirror*, 31 December 2008; *Indiatoday.in*, 3 January 2009; *Pune Mirror*, 9 January 2009 and *Sunday Times of India* (18 January 2009).

What the ATS under Raghuvanshi did in the post-Mumbai attack investigation of the case is summarised below:

1) Grounds were prepared to make a small fry like Rakesh Dhawade a scapegoat, and to bestow upon him the title of the "main facilitator."
2) A psychological atmosphere was created to the effect that the real identity of a person by an assumed name "Mithun Chakravarty," who trained the Nanded, Malegaon and other blast-accused would never be known, thereby once again confirming the presumption that he was a very important person.
3) The case of two chemistry professors of Pune, Dr. Sharad Kunte and Dr. Deo was intentionally avoided to be pursued, even though Rakesh Dhawade informed Jalna Police in November 2008 that they had given training to right-wing terror suspects in preparing pipe bombs. Dr. Kunte was the Executive President of the VHP till a few years ago. At present, he is the chief of the intellectual wing of the RSS in Western Maharashtra.
4) By recording the confessional statement of Mahant Dayanand Pandey *only in respect of Malegaon blast case*, further enquiry into his involvement in other important blast cases and in the main terror conspiracy to wage war against the State, was virtually pre-empted.
5) A ridiculous attempt was made by the ATS to delete the name of VHP leader Praveen Togadia from the terror plot by arguing that the "Togadia" mentioned by Lt. Col. Purohit in his narco-analysis test was "another" person by that name hailing from Aurangabad though the police could not locate him (!).
6) An attempt was also made to give a clean chit to VHP and RSS.
7) The only positive contribution by Raghuvanshi's ATS was the arrest of one of the bomb-planters, Praveen Mutalik of Karnataka, whose name had been disclosed by Hemant Karkare at the initial stage of the investigation.

After thus *completing* the investigation, the Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) Maharashtra filed its 4528-page chargesheet of the Malegaon blast case 2008, in the MCOCA Court Nasik on 20 January 2009, against eleven arrested accused and three absconding persons. The persons charged

were 1) Sadhvi Pragyasingh Thakur *alias* Sadhvi Purnachetanand Giri, 2) Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit, 3) Sudhakar Dwivedi *alias* Dayanand Pandey *alias* Swami Amrutanand *alias* Shankaracharya Sharda Sarvagya Peeth, 4) Rakesh Dattatraya Dhawade, 5) Sameer Sharad Kulkarni, 6) Sudhakar Omkarnath Chaturvedi, 7) Shivnarayan Gopalsingh Kalansagar, 8) Shyam Bhavarlal Sahu, 9) Ramesh Upadhyay 10) Ajay Eknath Rahirkar and 11) Jagdish Chintaman Mhatre, and three absconding persons, *viz.*, 1) Ramchandra Gopalsingh Kalsangra, 2) Sandeep Vishwas Dange and 3) Praveen Mutalik.

In the chargesheet, the sections of law applied against the accused were, sections 302, 307, 326, 324, 427, 153A, 153A(a)(b) and 120B of the IPC, sections 3,4,5 and 25 of the Arms Act; sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Explosive Substance Act; sections 15, 16, 17, 18, 20 and 23 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act 2004 and sections 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii), 3(2), 3(4) and 3(5) of the MCOCA.

Apparently, there were several serious shortcomings in the chargesheet, the most significant being the omission of sections of the IPC, concerning "waging war against the government as established by law in India." This omission is very surprising, especially in view of the fact that the chargesheet itself contains evidence to the effect that the accused in this case had no faith in the Indian Constitution and they intended to create a separate state. *Pune Mirror* of 22 January 2009 quoting the contents of the chargesheet reported as follows:

"The bulky 4000-plus page chargesheet gives a detailed view of the role played by suspended army man Lt. Col. Purohit, Sadhvi Pragyasingh Tahkur, Rakesh Dhawade, etc., and their intention to create a separate Constitution and a separate national flag....

"The transcripts retrieved from Pandey's laptop also speak of the groups' plan to seek help from the then monarch of Nepal, King Gyanendra. In his conversation with other accused, Purohit has explained in detail how he held meetings with King Gyanendra and how the deposed monarch had accepted a proposal to train Purohit's men. In a recorded conversation, Purohit also claims that he had asked the King to procure AK-47s from the Czech Republic, for which he was ready to pay.

"Prasad Purohit in 2007 floated Abhinav Bharat with an intention to propagate a separate Hindu Rashtra with its own Constitution having aims and objectives as "Bharat Swarajya, Surajya and Suraksha" in the Preamble, says the chargesheet. It further says that Purohit wanted to adopt a "National Flag," *i.e.*, solo-themed saffron flag, having golden ancient torch in the middle.

"Excerpts from the transcripts of the conversation that the police claim was retrieved from Swami Dayanand Pandey's laptop:

Purohit: "I have contacted Israel. One of our captains has been to Israel.... very positive response from their side. They have asked us to show something on the ground.

"Our website had not been launched yet. We just gave them on paper....they asked us to wait and watch for six months.

"We have asked for four things, continuous and uninterrupted supply of equipment and training; second thing, allow us to start our office with saffron flag in Tel Aviv; number three, political asylum; number four, support our cause in UN that Hindu nation is born.

"They have accepted two things. They don't want to fly our national flag in Tel Aviv saying they don't want to spoil their relations with India. Also they are saying that they cannot support us on international forum for two years.

"Let me also tell you, we had a meeting with King Gyanendra on June 24, 2006 and then in 2007.... the King had accepted the proposal.... 20 people from my side will be trained there as officers and 200 as soldiers every six months. I will get 40 officers and 400 soldiers every year. I requested the Monarch that his being an independent nation, may ask for AK-47 from Czechoslovakia and I will pay the money and arrange for ammunition. The King has accepted.

"Purohit again talks of a meeting in which relatives of King Gyanendra participated."

Again, in its issue of 23 January 2009, the *Pune Mirror* reported, quoting the evidence in the chargesheet:

"At one of the meetings, Pandey expressed that there was no space for democracy in their Hindu Rashtra and there should be a King ruling over it.

"During the meeting, Pandey argued that they would approach the world body (UNO) to help them carve out an independent Hindu Rashtra out of India.

"Shankaracharya (Pandey) also spoke about a government in exile.

"Purohit talked of political excommunication of those who would oppose and this excommunication would be in the form of elimination.... He said the organisation had prepared a list of 75 people who would be eliminated.... In that meeting (held on 26 January 2008), Purohit said that if anyone opposed their Hindu *Aryavart* Government, he would be excommunicated and killed.

"He says that the 70-odd (or 75) people that they wish to eliminate for furtherance of their cause should be ostensibly eliminated as a part of a political movement, otherwise it would be considered as a mere criminal act."

If this is not a war against the State, then what is it? And if the above-mentioned evidence furnished with the chargesheet does not attract the relevant sections of the IPC concerning the offences against the State, what would?

The relevant sections of law in the Indian Penal Code pertaining to offences against the State are as follows:

Section 121: Waging or attempting to wage war or abetting waging of war against the Government of India.

Section 121A: Conspiracy to commit offences punishable by section 121.

Section 122: Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of India.

Section 123: Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war.

Section 124A: Sedition.

The evidence, adduced by the ATS along with the chargesheet by way of the transcription of the detailed discussions among the conspirators in various meetings, retrieved from Swami Dayanand Pandey's laptop, fulfills almost all the ingredients of the above-mentioned sections as it clearly indicates that the accused showed utter contempt for the Constitution of India and for the present form of democratic and secular government and conspired to form a theocratic state with a separate Constitution and separate flag by collecting arms, by imparting arms training to their followers, by seeking help of alien countries, and by planning to eliminate those opposed to their plan. *Therefore, all the above-mentioned five sections of the IPC squarely fit in this case. Not applying these sections is a very serious omission. It is difficult to believe that a very senior IPS officer would commit such a serious lapse out of ignorance or because of incompetence.* This is clearly a deliberate act aimed at indirectly aiding and abetting the crime syndicate by hiding their conspiracy to overthrow the present government established by law and create a separate Brahminical state in the name of "Hindu Rashtra" and, hence, it calls for stringent departmental and criminal action against the chief of the ATS.

There have been many more omissions in the chargesheet as detailed below:

Abhinav Bharat: it is an outfit named after an organisation founded by VD Savarkar in 1893. Himani Savarkar, the daughter-in-law of VD Savarkar's brother, is its national president and Retd. Maj. Upadhaya is the working president. Most of the accused in this case are members of this organisation. There is sufficient evidence to the effect that Col. Raikar, Shyam Apte, Dayanand Pandey and Col. Purohit collected funds for the organisation and used it for nefarious and anti-national activities; that some of its members procured weapons and explosives and that meetings of the organisation took place at various places like Bhopal, Indore, Pune, Nasik, Deolali and Jammu for planning and executing bomb explosions and other nefarious activities with a view to causing communal disturbances in the country and destabilising the constitutionally-established government. But surprisingly, the ATS did not

probe deep into the affairs of this right-wing anti-national organisation, did not arrest all its members as conspirators and did not go deep into its financial dealings.

Bhonsala Military School: This school was started by Dr BS Munje, one of the founders of the RSS, at Nasik in 1937 and later its branch was opened at Nagpur. This introduction is enough to know the ideology of the institute. The school authorities allowed Bajrang Dal to use the school premises for holding a camp of its cadre in which, among other things, training in bomb-making and use of firearms and explosives was imparted. Some of the trainers and trainees of that camp are accused in this case as well as in some other blast cases. Moreover, the administrator of the school, Col. Shailesh Raikar, had close links with the main accused (Lt. Col. Purohit) and had helped him in procuring arms. He also attended a meeting of Abhinav Bharat at Nasik office on 15 September, *i.e.*, about two weeks before the Malegaon blast, in which the conspiracy was hatched. But still, neither the office-bearers of the institute were made accused, nor the school was recommended to be derecognised by the government. One can only imagine what would have happened if an Urdu-medium school or a madrasah had allowed its ground to be used only for lathi-drill by some Muslim boys. Not only the school would have been locked, but the office-bearers and the staff of the institute and two layers of their near and dear ones would have been languishing in jails.

Akanksha Resort: This is a place near Pune where a training camp was organised in 2003 wherein RSS and Bajrang Dal militants were trained in making bombs and exploding them. A man identified as "Mithun Chakravarty" was the main expert, who trained the militants into preparing various kinds of bombs, IEDs and their use. He not only imparted training, but handed over large quantity of explosives to the trainees after the camp was over. These facts have been revealed not only in this case, but also in Nanded, Parbhani, Purna and Jalna cases. But the owners and managers of the resort have not been made accused, nor has the licence of the resort been cancelled.

"Mithun Chakravarty": This name first surfaced in the investigation of the Nanded bomb blast of 2006. Later it was disclosed in this case and also in other blast cases of 2003-2004 of Marathwada region. But so far, supposedly most efficient and professional sleuths of the ATS have not been able to even identify him, leave alone arrest him. The way they have been releasing information in respect of him indicates that they have been intentionally hiding his identity and do not want to arrest him. Otherwise, it was not at all difficult for powerful organisations like IB and the ATS to identify "Mithun Chakravorty" and to arrest him even if he was hiding in the heaven. A simple *first degree* method of interrogation of Rakesh Dhawade, of Lt. Col. Purohit, and of recently discovered conspirators like Dr. Sharad Kunte and Prof. Deo, all of whom were present at the camp as trainers, and of the owner, manager and employees of Akanksha Resort, would have led the investigators to "Mithun Chakravorty." But apparently, the IB, and at its instance the ATS for some mysterious reasons, did not want to disclose his identity and have been taking all possible precautions to keep it a closely guarded secret. The simple logical inference is that he is a very important Brahminist leader or a very senior officer of the IB, either serving or retired. If that is so, he will never be identified and arrested at least by the present investigating agency which is at the beck and call of the IB and the Brahminist forces.

IB officers: The most bizarre and disturbing fact revealed in the investigation of this case and of the earlier Nanded case is the dubious role of the retired and serving officers of the army and of the IB. But, while some army officers were arrested and after taking their police custody remand a lot of information was elicited from them, absolutely nothing has been heard about the IB officers.

It appears from the reports published in newspapers that the ATS has been trying to use the cover of army officers to protect the IB officers by taking advantage of the fact that some army officers, who were not directly involved in the conspiracy, had been spared the penal action either by citing them as witnesses or recommending action against them under the Army Service Rules.

The ATS has been trying to put the former IB officer, and the army officers who have been spared penal action, in the same basket in order to take advantage of the public sympathy that the army generally enjoys and thus, to save the former IB officer. But the two cases are quite different. While the army officers who have been spared were not directly involved in the conspiracy, the senior former IB officer was not only directly connected with the terror group but had also imparted training to their cadre. Whereas the army immediately handed over their officers like Lt. Col. Purohit, who were directly involved in the conspiracy, to the investigation agency, the IB has not been allowing the ATS to touch the former IB officer. The adverse comparison between the army and the IB does not end here. The army is a force which is thoroughly professional, patriotic to the core, secular in the true sense of the term and has been miles away from politics and communalism. It has given a full account of its professionalism, integrity and efficiency during the last six decades. This is a force which every Indian is proud of. Therefore, if unfortunately some of its officers are involved in a terror act, it can be taken as a one-off case and an aberration, and its integrity or secular credentials cannot be doubted on that account.

The case of the IB is quite different. Unlike army, there has been a large-scale ideological infiltration in the IB as delineated in this book with illustrations. It is a Brahminist force and hence, over the decades, has been indirectly helping the Brahminist elements to spread their poisonous tentacles through the length and breadth of the country with a view to undermining its secular fabric and establishing Brahminist hegemony over the Indian society. It has been aiding and abetting the Brahminist terrorism since long, *i.e.*, since Mahatma Gandhi's assassination. It has all along been working to protect the interests of the Brahminists and to further their cause as is evident from the dubious role played by it in many blast cases.

Even the conspiracy of the terror group involved in this case, to overthrow the constitutionally-established government and to form a separate "Hindu [read Brahminist] Rashtra" was in the know of the IB, as is evident from the statement of Col. Bappaditya Dhar (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 23 January 2009). From his statement it appears that the meeting of Abhinav Bharat, held in Indore, was covered by the IB. If that was so, why didn't it alert the government about the organisation and its diabolical plan, why didn't it advise the government to ban the organisation; and why didn't it try to avert the bomb blasts which have taken place during the last 3-4 years claiming hundreds of innocent lives? Or was it that it was also a party to the conspiracy? The dishonest intention of the IB is also evident from the fact that for the last three years it has not allowed the investigation agency to disclose the name of the former IB officer who imparted training to the militants of right-wing outfits in the use of firearms and explosives. Why is the IB trying to protect such an anti-national officer? The people of this country have a right to know the name of this officer and also the names of the retired and serving IB officers who are linked to the outfits which are ideologically opposed to the Constitution of India and have been training their cadres in making bombs, in generating terror and in spreading communal virus for attaining their ultimate objective of establishing Hindu (Brahminist) Rashtra.

Many suspects spared

In the course of investigation, names of many persons, including those of some high-profile political and religious leaders, emerged as suspects. But there is no mention of their names in the chargesheet, either as accused or as witnesses, even though there was sufficient evidence against some of them. It is also not known what enquiry was made in respect of the rest of the suspects and with what effect. Some of the names are as follows:

1) Himani Savarkar: She is the National President of Abhinav Bharat. There is an evidence on record that the organisation received funds from various sources and used the money for purchasing arms and explosives. In many of its meetings the issue of overthrowing the government and forming a separate Hindu (read Brahminist) Rashtra was discussed. Himani Savarkar was present in some of these meetings (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 23 January 2009). According to the ATS's

own finding, she was also present in the meeting in which Malegaon conspiracy was hatched. She is also on record on video as saying that she subscribed to the bomb *vs.* bomb theory. In spite of such overwhelming evidence, she has not been made an accused.

2) VHP leader Ashimanand Swami: He is the head of the Shabri Dham Ashram of Dangs (Gujarat). He had been constantly in touch with Lt. Col. Purohit and Sadhvi Pragyasingh. After their arrest, and after the arrest of two of the ashram employees, he absconded. This conduct speaks of his guilty conscience. But the ATS did not seem to have made all-out effort to arrest him.

3) VHP leader Praveen Togadia: Lt. Col. Purohit has mentioned his name in his narco-analysis test. There is a mention of his name in the telephonic conversation between Lt. Col. Purohit and Maj. (retd.) Upadhyaya. There is an evidence to the effect that he met Purohit in a Mumbai hotel. His name had also appeared in the Nanded blast case of 2006 as a person who instigated youths against Muslims. According to an article published in the *Outlook* magazine (22 December 2008), there was a news item in Delhi newspapers of 25 November 2008, *i.e.*, one day before the Mumbai attack, that the ATS was investigating the possible role of Togadia in the Malegaon case. But after the Mumbai terror attack, his name suddenly disappeared from the list of suspects. On the other hand, there was a miserable attempt on the part of the ATS to give him a clean chit as seen from the news item, captioned "Purohit's narco test sends the ATS on wild goose chase" in the *Pune Mirror* (9 January 2009) which suggested that the name "Togadia" mentioned by Lt. Col. Purohit was not Dr Praveen Togadia, but some other person from Aurangabad. However, the police was yet to trace that person. The argument is as foolish as saying that if in some political discussion a name 'Advani' appeared, one should not jump to the conclusion that he is the BJP's prime ministerial candidate, LK Advani, he could be a small-time trader "Advani" from some Sindhi colony like Ulhasnagar near Mumbai.

4) Three "VHP leaders" from Gujarat who had alleged links with accused Sameer Kulkarni, a founder-member of Abhinav Bharat.

5) A top Delhi-based leader of VHP who frequently visited Pune since 2003 and was in touch with Dr. Sharad Kunte, whose name has appeared as one of the organisers of the terrorists camp at Akanksha Resort near Pune.

6) Dr. Sharad Kunte and
7) Prof. Deo: Rakesh Dhawade, during his interrogation by the Jalna Police in November 2008, disclosed that these persons also imparted training in handling explosives in Akanksha Resort camp. But their names do not find place in the chargesheet. It is also not known whether enquiry was made with the duo, and if so what transpired therein.

8) Shamrao Apte: He collected funds on behalf of Abhinav Bharat from Pune industrialists. But he has been left untouched.

9) Two "well-known historians" from Pune: There were news reports that the role of two "well-known historians" of Pune was suspected in the Malegaon blast case and that they were under the ATS scanner. The name of one of them was later disclosed as Ninad Bedekar (Marathi daily *Pudhari*, Solapur, 27 February 2009). But after the Mumbai terror attack and murder of Karkare, their reference suddenly disappeared.

10) Milind Ekbote, former BJP Corporator, Pune and
11) Jayant Chitale, Retd. Col.: *Sunday Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, of 23 November 2008 (*i.e.*, only three days before the Mumbai terror attack), reported that in the coming days the ATS was likely to question these two persons, among others. But after the Mumbai terror attack, the investigation has gone cold. The investigation agency ought to disclose in what connection the names of these influential persons surfaced in

the investigation; what enquiry was made with them; and what transpired in the enquiry.

The above information is based on newspaper reports and it may only be a glimpse of the overall picture. There may be more politicians, religious leaders and even industrialists and traders involved either directly or indirectly in the wider conspiracy. People of this country are curious to know, and they have the right to know, who these conspirators are, and what action has been taken or is proposed to be taken against them.

Wider network ignored

How wide was the terror network of the crime syndicate can be gauged from the following facts:

i) The ultimate aim of the group of conspirators was to establish a separate Hindu Rashtra with its own Constitution (chargesheet of the ATS).

ii) The terror ring held meetings at various places like Faridabad, Kolkata, Bhopal, Jabalpur, Indore, Nasik, Pune, etc.

iii) Rakesh Dhawade, one of the accused, was involved in Parbhani and Jalna blasts of 2003/2004.

iv) During his narco-analysis test conducted on 9 November 2008, Lt. Col. Purohit admitted his role in the Samjhauta Express blast.

v) During his interrogation, Purohit admitted his role in Ajmer Sharif and Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) blasts.

vi) Certain information was received about the involvement of Malegaon blast accused in the Nanded, Ajmer and Samjhauta Express blasts (*The Times of India*, Pune, 12 November 2008).

vii) Mahant Dayanand Pandey said, "Mecca Masjid blast was the job of our men" (*Sunday Indian Express*, Pune, 25 January 2009).

viii) Sadhvi Pragyasingh and Ajay Rahirkar have stated in their statements that Purohit "masterminded" blasts in Orissa, Karnataka and Ajmer Sharif (*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 24 January 2009).

ix) The Rajasthan Police established the link of Ajmer blast to Abhinav Bharat (*The Times of India*, Pune, 13 April 2009).

x) Some of the 54 youths, who participated in the training camp at Nagpur in 2001, were suspected to be involved in the two Malegaon blasts and the Nanded blast (*Sakal*, Pune, 10 November 2008).

xi) The Nanded blast investigations have revealed that the Bajrang Dal had held training camps in Pune in 2000 and 2003.

Even a student of criminal law or a trainee police officer would tell that the events starting from Bajrang Dal's first terror training camp at Pune in 2000, up to the Malegaon bomb blast carried out by Abhinav Bharat form a nationwide terror conspiracy and hence need to be investigated as such. Hemant Karkare was doing exactly this. But his "temporary" successor (KP Raghuvanshi) treated Malegaon blast case of 2008 as a *single* entity, investigated it as such, made it, as he called while speaking to *Communal Combat* magazine, a "water-tight case," and filed the chargesheet accordingly. However, in order to pre-empt any criticism on this count, the ATS included the Parbhani mosque blast case of 2003 and Jalna case of 2004 in the chargesheet.

Apparently, a small fry like Rakesh Dhawade, a gullible ordinary man, has been made a scapegoat by elevating him to the position of the head of the crime syndicate and the "main facilitator," thus leaving out the giant Brahminist conspirators like "Mithun Chakravorty" (a senior former IB officer), Himani Savarkar, Dr. Sharad Kunte, Prof. Deo, the owner of Akanksha Resort, the two top historians of Pune, and many other religious and political leaders.

Though, on the face of it, the post-Mumbai attack investigation of the case was done and its chargesheet filed by the ATS, the *de facto*

investigators were the Brahminists in the IB. That the ATS Chief Raghuvanshi had all along been dictated and controlled by the radical right-wing forces and the IB is apparent from some of the uncalled for remarks made by him at the time of filing of the chargesheet. He reportedly said "two of the 11 accused used to frequent Nepal and were in close contact with the Maoists there" and "investigation did not establish any link between the accused and Israel" (*Hindustan Times*, Delhi, 21 January 2009). Both these statements were contrary to the facts mentioned in the documents enclosed with the chargesheet as evidence, which showed that the accused had *two* meetings with the King of Nepal and Lt. Col. Purohit had visited Israel in this connection and had received some assurances from Israeli Government (*Pune Mirror*, 22 January 2009). There is, however, no reference in the chargesheet to their contact with Nepal's Maoists, as claimed by Raghuvanshi.

Moreover, the reason given by the ATS in the chargesheet for not covering the Ajmer, Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) and Samjhauta Express blasts in the investigation is, to say the least, ridiculous. It says, "Swami Ashimanand has been absconding. If caught, fresh details about the plot might be revealed along with possible links to the Ajmer, Mecca Masjid and Samjhauta Express blasts." This argument would fool nobody, as by now, it has become common knowledge as to who did not want these cases to be investigated in depth and why? If any of these cases were taken to its logical end, it would have exposed the nationwide Brahminist plot, which the IB did not want, and hence it has been putting spokes in the thorough investigation of these cases. How the IB scuttled the investigation of the Samjhauta Express blast case, when it had been almost cracked during investigations, has been explained in the chapter dealing with that case. However, in order to refresh the memory of the readers, I am reproducing below its relevant part, at the cost of repetition:

Government pleader Ajay Misar, while requesting for the extension of the remand of Lt. Col. Purohit told the Nasik court that he had supplied the RDX that went into making the bomb planted in the Samjhauta Express (*The Times of India*, Pune, 16 November 2008). This

statement was obviously based on the narco-analysis test of Lt. Col. Purohit conducted on 9 November 2008. Thereafter, *The Times of India*, Pune reported in its issue of 18 November 2008, "Soon after Misar made the sensational charge in Nasik, the IB, which is keeping a close tab on the probe alerted the Centre about the implication of Misar's statement. When the train blast took place, the Centre had blamed Pakistan's ISI for the terror strike *on the basis of Bureau's (IB's) finding*." It was, thus, clear that the IB did not want the ATS to proceed further in the Samjhauta Express blast case, as it did not want to prove its earlier baseless theory wrong.

The IB has all along taken care to ensure, even at the cost of national security, that the Brahminist elements engaged in nefarious activities are not exposed. This anxiety on its part explains the brazen hurry with which KP Raghuvanshi, a tested sychophant and a hardcore Brahminist, was hurriedly appointed as Karkare's successor even before the blood of Karkare's bullet wounds had congealed.

The mandate that might have been given to Raghuvanshi by the IB and its radical right-wing bosses is easily discernible from a careful analysis of the chargesheet. The mandate could be,

i) To restrict the scope of the investigation and make it as limited as possible and to avoid investigation in other blast cases.
ii) Not to investigate even the interconnected blast cases as a single terror plot and not to probe deep into them.
iii) Wherever possible, to undo the "damages" done by Hemant Karkare.
iv) To keep the important Brahminist institutions and Brahminist leaders out of the loop.
v) Not to apply sections of law pertaining to "war against the State."

Late Hemant Karkare could never have agreed to that.

Raghuvanshi's appointment confirmed

The Times of India, Pune, reported in its issue of 12 June 2009 that the post of the chief of the ATS Maharashtra was elevated to the rank of

Addl. Director General of Police and that KP Raghuvanshi was appointed to the post following strictures by the High Court. This development did not surprise me as it was in perfect sync with my analysis. It should also not surprise those who know the Brahminist-IB nexus, the slavish sycophancy of Raghuvanshi to the IB and the significance of the Malegaon blast case to the Brahminists, which is a do-or-die situation for them.

The reason given in the report for posting Raghuvanshi so urgently and also the reason given for keeping the post vacant for over six months are both false. It is a fact that the High Court passed strictures for not filling the post of the ATS chief for a long time, but it had given a time of four weeks to comply with its direction. But before the ink of the court's order dried or before the copy of the order was received, the government not only filled the post, but even elevated it. And, secondly, the reason given for not doing it for so long was that all those officers being considered for the post declined to accept it. In any state, there are at least 60 percent of the posts which the police officers are generally not willing to accept. Do governments keep them vacant? Since when the Maharashtra Government has started the practice of asking the consent of the officers before appointing them to any post?

The truth is that the Brahminists in the IB wanted Raghuvanshi, and Raghuvanshi *alone*, to be posted as the ATS chief, and that too, for some unknown reason, very urgently. And the government could not post Raghuvanshi as the ATS chief as he had been stamped as anti-Muslim ever since the investigation of the Mumbai train blast case, especially after the highly-prejudiced investigation of the Malegaon case of 2006. But at the same time, it could not say "no" to the superpower IB. The only way to silent the critics was to obtain a court order, and that is what the government did, apparently with the active connivance of the IB. Everything was ready; the government was only waiting for the court's order. Contrary to expectation, the court order was not very specific, but it didn't deter the government, which promptly issued the readymade order posting Raghuvanshi as the ATS chief and touted it as consequent to High Court's stricture. If a detailed enquiry was made into the PIL, in connection with which the High Court passed the order, it would be traced to the IB or to some staunch Brahminist, regardless of the petitioner on record.

The episode has again reaffirmed the hypothesis that it is not the CMs or HMs of the states or Chidambarams or Manmohan Singhs, or Rahul Gandhis or Sonia Gandhis, who have been calling the shots in important and vital matters in India; it is the Brahminists serving in the IB or retired from the IB, who have been really doing so.

Now what will happen to the case? As the main accused in Malegaon case (Lt. Col. Purohit) has imparted training to the officers of the ATS, including Raghuvanshi, in detecting and handling of explosives and in investigating terror related cases, the new appointment would mean a *protégé* investigating a case in which his mentor is the main accused, and concerning the matter the investigation of which he has learnt from the mentor. Nobody should be surprised at the turn of the events and the outcome of the case.

MCOCA not for Purohit & Co.

The Times of India, Pune, reported in its issue of 1 August 2009, under the caption "MCOCA charges against Malegaon accused dropped," that "The Anti-Terrorist Squad (ATS) of the Maharashtra Police suffered a major setback in the Malegaon blast case on Friday (31 July 2009) when a special court in Mumbai dropped all charges under the Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime (MCOCA) against 11 suspects, including former armyman Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit and Sadhvi Pragyasingh Thakur." The report further said, "One of the primary reasons why Judge YD Shinde held that the harsh law was not applicable to the case was the *prosecution's failure* to show that the accused were members of a single organised crime syndicate."

The audacity of the suspected conspirators

The confirmation of KP Raghuvanshi as the ATS Chief and the dropping of the MCOCA charges against the Malegaon-accused seemed to have emboldened some of the suspects in the Malegaon blast case of 2008.

As reported in "Today" (*Sakal*, Pune) on 5 August 2009, Shivani Savarkar and Milind Ekbote, who had been under the scanner of the ATS as suspects in the nationwide terror conspiracy when Hemant Karkare was the head of the ATS, along with some other Brahminist leaders of Pune, felicitated the advocate representing the accused in the Malegaon case for getting the MCOCA provisions dropped and criticised the government for having applied MCOCA "only to prove its secular credentials and thus to please the Muslims." They had the audacity to make the allegation that Hindus had been intentionally implicated in the Malegaon blast case, even though the blasts had been caused by so-called "Jihadis". Their audacity manifests their confidence that they have "digested" Karkare's murder.

What will happen to Malegaon case next?

1) Whatever was done by Hemant Karkare will be subtly nullified.
2) The plea of Lt. Col. Purohit that whatever he did was a part of "anti-terror operation" will be accepted and he would be given a clean chit, at least, in serious charges. (He has already taken this stand as reported in *The Indian Express*, Pune (22 January 2009) in a news item captioned "Purohit cover story: Malegaon plot was MI anti-terror operation").
3) The work of Abhinav Bharat will restart with renewed vigour and the bomb blasts, *which have almost completely stopped since Lt. Col. Purohit and Co's arrest*, would start again and with them would start the anti-Muslim blame game. As a result, "Hindu [Brahminist] Rashtra" would appear not too distant a dream.

We have to wake up and take corrective measures urgently or perish as a secular and enlightened polity. However, before considering the measures to be taken to correct the situation, it is imperative to understand the dubious roles of the Maharashtrian Brahmins and of the IB in the murky communal history starting way back in 1893.

IX

Dubious role of Maharashtrian Brahminists

Ever since 1818, when the British annexed the territory of the Brahminist Peshwas of Pune, which the latter had acquired by ditching the descendants of Chhatrapati Shivaji and had become its *de facto* rulers, the Brahminists have been hankering for the repeat of the Peshwa experiment in India. How deep-rooted has been their craving for power; how they believe that it is they who should always wield the real power even in the present democratic dispensation, whether or not they have adequate political representation, and how much they aspire to hold on to this position, can be best illustrated by the following anecdote narrated by Smita Gupta, an eminent columnist.

She says, writing in *Outlook* magazine (30 March 2009), "A fellow Brahmin once lamented to late VN Gadgil that the community's hold over political power was declining. Gadgil, an LSE-educated barrister, who was a three-time MP, Union minister and Congress spokesperson, just smiled. "In Maharashtra", he told his interlocutor, "we solved that problem three centuries ago; the Brahmins (Peshwas) allowed Marathas to rule, while they wielded the real power."

If this is the outlook of one of a supposedly most progressive Brahmin, the views of the hardcore Brahminists can only be imagined.

A careful analysis of the major developments, having communal or casteist overtones which have taken place in India during the last about 115 years, as given below, would bring out an invisible thread passing through them – right from the first of the series of pre-planned communal riots of 1893 to the mysterious CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the Mumbai terror attack of November 2008, and this invisible thread is nothing but the Brahminist forces in Maharashtra.

1) The first pre-planned Hindu-Muslim riot was caused by Maharashtrian Brahminists of Pune in 1893 in order to divert the attention of common Hindus from the reformist movement of Mahatma Jyotirao Phule and others, which was sweeping the region in the last half of the 19th century.
2) Brahminist organisations like Hindu Mahasabha and RSS, which have been mainly responsible for injecting the anti-Muslim virus into the society and fomenting communal riots as part of their long-term strategy, were founded in Maharashtra.
3) The founder of Hindu Mahasabha was VD Savarkar, a Maharashtrian Brahminist and its headquarters was Pune in Maharashtra.
4) The founder and first chief of the RSS was Dr. Hegdewar, a Maharashtrian Brahminist, and the headquarters of the RSS was Nagpur, in erstwhile Central India (now in Maharashtra). Dr. Hegdewar's two immediate successors, Golwalkar "Guruji" and Balasaheb Deoras, were also Maharashtrian Brahminists. The present RSS chief, Mohan Bhagwat, is also from Maharashtra. Thus, barring only two chiefs (*Sarsanchalaks*), Rajendra Sinhji and K Sudarshan, all were Maharashtrian Brahminists. Moreover, according to a recent report in the *Hindu*, even today 57 percent of its important office-bearers and ideologues are Brahminists from Maharashtra.
5) The conspiracy to assassinate Mahatma Gandhi was hatched in Maharashtra and it is a well-known fact that almost all the conspirators, including the main accused Nathuram Godse, were Maharashtrian Brahminists.
6) Even after his death, the Mahatma was not spared by them. About 50 years after his assassination, as if to celebrate the golden jubilee of this shameful act, Brahminists of Maharashtra wrote a play entitled "Mi Nathuram Godse Bolto" (I am Nathuram Godse speaking) in which the assassin of the Mahatma has been portrayed as a hero who takes

pride in his dastardly act of killing this frail, old and defenceless apostle of peace, purportedly out of patriotic fervour for the latter's allegedly assenting to the partition of the country and for allegedly forcing the government to pay Rs. 55 crore to Pakistan out of the shared account of united India.

In the theatre, where the play was staged, the first row was mostly occupied by staunch Brahminists who clapped loudly at the heroic deliveries of the dialogues by their "hero" and the rest of the audience followed suit – a typical scene representing the Indian society, wherein 99 percent of the people follow less than one per cent of the Brahminists without understanding the subtleties of the matter.

There has been no protest worth the name against the said play in Maharashtra, except a few banners here and there that were put up by some reformist and secular organisations, which read, "Bapu, ham sharminda hain; Apke katil abhi jinda hain" (Bapu, we are ashamed that your murderers are still alive). However, a staunch follower of Gandhiji from Gujarat, Chunibhai Vaidya, wrote a booklet "Suraj Same Dhul" in Gujarati in which he knocked to pieces the claims of the playwright. According to Chunibhai, there had been six recorded incidents of attempts on the Mahatma's life since 1934 by the Brahminists. But at the time of the four earlier incidents there was no talk of the partition of the country and hence no question of India giving Rs 55 crore to Pakistan; and that, out of the six attempts, four were made in Maharashtra, in three of which Nathuram Godse was involved while in two incidents reactionary forces of Maharashtra were involved.

7) Most of the important communal riots during the last decade of the 19th century and in the beginning of the 20th century, which set the tone for an unending series of communal riots in the country leading to the demolition of Babri Masjid and the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, were engineered by

the Maharashtrian Brahminists by instigating common Hindus in religious festivals and processions.

8) Out of 48 incidents connected with the terrorism of Brahminist organisations as detailed in Chapter II of this book, as many as 35 pertain to Maharashtra. Though in some of the cases, common Hindu youths appear to be involved, a detailed enquiry into them would reveal that the Brahminists have been their masterminds.

9) The conspiracy to destabilise the constitutionally-established democratic republic and to form a Hindu [read Brahminist] Rashtra, which has been recently unearthed in the investigation of Malegaon blast case, was hatched in Maharashtra and most of the accused persons, including the main conspirator, Lt. Col. Purohit, were Maharashtrian Brahminists.

10) The terror outfit Abhinav Bharat, which is the fountain of inspiration of the above-mentioned anti-national conspiracy, has its origin in Maharashtra, and its national president, Himani Savarkar, a staunch Brahminist and daughter-in-law of VD Savarkar's brother, hails from Maharashtra.

11) The Ahmedabad bomb blast and Surat unexploded bombs case of July 2008 had Maharashtra connection, as the emails received by some TV channels minutes before the blasts were traced to New Mumbai, the vehicles used for the blasts were stolen from New Mumbai and passed through Talasari toll *naka* in Thane district of Maharashtra, presumably by tampering the CCTV cameras installed at the toll *naka* and some of the unexploded bombs were found to be wrapped in Marathi newspapers. But, apparently, the Brahminists in Maharashtra managed to give the investigation a totally different twist with the help of their brethren in the IB.

12) The SIM cards found with the terrorists involved in Delhi's Batla House encounter were traced to Aurangabad district of Maharashtra. The SIM cards were also found to have been used by the terrorists to contact somebody in Aurangabad.

However, only a superficial enquiry has been made into the matter and no action has been taken against the real masterminds. If probed deep and taken to its logical end, it would expose a Brahminist connection.

13) In the Kanpur (U.P.) explosion of August 2008, Maharashtra connections have been disclosed. In this case, two Bajrang Dal activists (Rajiv Mishra and Bhupinder Singh) had died while making explosive devices. The investigation revealed that they had plans for massive explosions in the minority-dominated Ferozabad, and that they had frequently called up on two mobile phones in Mumbai since two months before the blast. But the police have not yet been able to identify the persons concerned, apparently under the pressure of the Brahminist-dominated IB.

14) During the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, the mobile phones used by the terrorists who wreaked havoc at the CST Station have been traced to Satara district of Maharashtra. In whosoevers' names the SIM cards may stand, an in-depth investigation would lead the trail to Brahminist organisations and their leaders. But this matter has been frozen by the IB and Crime Branch Mumbai, for obvious reasons.

The incidents mentioned above, which are only illustrative and not exhaustive, point to the fact that it is the Brahminists in Maharashtra who have been calling the shots so far as communal activities in India are concerned.

Maharashtra, the Hindutva (Brahminist) laboratory

After the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, the media started calling Gujarat a "Hindutva [read Brahminist] laboratory". But it was a misnomer for Gujarat, which could well have been called a testing ground, but not the laboratory. The real Hindutva laboratory has been Maharashtra since 1893. The research subject of Maharashtrian Brahminists has been "How to maintain Brahmin supremacy over the society and how to

subjugate other Hindus by making them fight with the Muslims, leaving Brahmins unscathed." They have been carrying out research in this laboratory and experimenting in other states, the most successful of the experiments being the Babri Mosque demolition and the Gujarat massacre, in both of which all other communities suffered, while Brahmins remained totally unaffected.

In this connection, it may be recalled that seven years before the Gujarat pogrom, *i.e.*, during the 1995 assembly election, Shiv Sena leader Manohar Joshi, who had been systematically planted by the Brahminists in Shiv Sena in late 1960s, and who later became the Chief Minister of Maharashtra bypassing other senior leaders, had promised to turn Maharashtra into India's first "Hindu State." On this issue, an election petition was filed in the Bombay High Court which struck down Joshi's election on the ground that he had violated the constitutional commitment to secularism by seeking votes on the basis of his promise to establish a "Hindu Rashtra." The Supreme Court, however, overturned the High Court decision in 1996, saying, "In our opinion, a mere statement that the first "Hindu State" will be established in Maharashtra is, by itself, not an appeal for votes on the ground of his religion but the expression, at best, of such a hope."

In *The Times of India*, Delhi (24 February 2009), legal commentator, Manoj Mitta, observed, "The Supreme Court's 1996 clean chit to Hindutva is politically most corrosive. It has been cited by the Sangh Parivar over the years to rationalise a range of illiberal activities.... It may be high time for a political consensus on legally burying the 1996 judgement on Hindutva."

Only the future will tell how seriously the political parties of the country take Mitta's advice. But the point I am driving at is that it were the Brahminists of Maharashtra who have been in the forefront of communal activities and have converted Maharashtra into the real laboratory of Hindutva.

If, in spite of such a communally volatile atmosphere, a Gujarat-type situation has not developed in Maharashtra, the credit goes to the reformist movement in the state, albeit weak and disorganised, to the long tradition of saints and sufis and also to the Police of Maharashtra, which, with all its shortcomings, has been highly sensitive to communal issues.

No political leader of Maharashtra dares take on Brahminists

Ironically, there is not a single prominent political leader in Maharashtra who could look straight into the eyes of the Brahminists and take them head-on unlike a few leaders in some other states who openly confront them. The political leaders of Maharashtra, however big or powerful, are too scared of the Brahminists as the former have a lot of skeletons in their cupboards and they apprehend their exposure in the event of rubbing the Brahminists on the wrong side, given the latters' clout in the media. The second and third rankers among politicians do not dare hurt Brahminists for the fear of being blackedout by the media, which would be detrimental to their political career. The result of this is that the Brahminists' nefarious activities in the state have continued unabated.

X

The Chargesheet against the IB

The serious acts of omission and commission on the part of the IB since Independence and even since before Independence are summarised as follows:

1) Keeping the government in the dark about the communal activities of the RSS

Apparently, the IB kept the government in the dark, all along, about the nefarious communal activities of the Brahminist organisations like the RSS. Otherwise, it would not have been possible for the RSS to carry out its hate-Muslim campaign unhindered through its 45,000 branches called *shakhas* throughout India for over sixty years.

2) Projecting RSS as a nationalist and social organisation

On the other hand, it projected RSS as a nationalist, social and cultural organisation as is seen from the between-the-lines reading of the various reports sent by it to the central and state governments and to the police and, thus, it allowed the RSS to flourish and spread its poisonous tentacles through the length and breadth of India.

3) Different policy for leftist and secular organisations

The IB adopted a totally different policy in respect of leftist, secular and Muslim organisations. It fed the government with false and exaggerated information in respect of these parties and organisations and curbed even their positive and constructive activities, with a view to allowing the Brahminist organisations to continue with

their communal and casteist agenda unhindered.

4) Conniving at the Mahatma's assassination

The IB connived at the assassination of the Father of the Nation by wilfully omitting to take action against the conspirators, though it knew that at least five attempts had already been made on his life since 1934, and the involvement of a Brahminist group of Pune and of the main culprit Nathuram Godse had been established in some of the earlier attempts.

5) Not curbing communal riots

The fact that the communal riots, deliberately engineered by the Brahminists for their selfish motives, spread throughout the country and continued with increasing intensity for over 60 years after Independence, speak volumes about the dubious role of the premier intelligence agency of the country. Had the IB played a correct and honest role, communal riots would never have spread as they did, and communal harmony would have been maintained in the country.

6) Wilfully maligning Muslim community – planting RDX on Muslim boys

It was reported in the Delhi edition of *The Times of India* (13 September, 2007) that the CBI found in its investigation that the IB operatives colluded with the Delhi Police Special Cell sleuths to plant RDX on two Muslim youths, Mohammad Moarif Qamar and Irshad Ali to brand them as "terrorists." This was apparently to prejudice common populace against Muslims and divert their attention from the Brahminists' activities.

7) Justifying extrajudicial killings called 'encounters'

Hindustan Times, Mumbai (5 May 2007), published the contents of a letter written by the then IB Chief, VG Vaidya, to the then DGP Gujarat, KPS Gill, on 30 December 1991. It spoke of several police

officers revealing to members of the western media how they had killed men without legal sanction. In this connection, the IB chief, Vaidya, in his letter advised Gill that "Their [police officers'] professional compulsions in executive action should not get reflected in their public utterances." What he apparently meant was that there was no objection to illegal killings *per se;* what is objectionable was their disclosure of the same to the media.

8) Spreading rumours in the name of intelligence to demonise Muslims

Under the pretext of "intelligence," the IB intentionally spreads rumours of anticipated "attacks" by Muslim terrorist outfits on VVIPs, vital installations and religious places, with a view to create an anti-Muslim atmosphere in the country which is in keeping with the Brahminist agenda of gaining control over the society by making common Hindus and Muslims fight amongst themselves.

9) Intentionally ignoring terrorist activities of Brahminist organisations

On the other hand, while the real Brahmanist terrorists had been training their cadres in the use of arms and explosives all over the country and had been collecting money, arms, ammunition and explosives, the IB turned a Nelson's eye towards these activities and gave them a free hand.

10) Keeping government in dark about Abhinav Bharat and its anti-national activities

The IB was aware of the formation of the radical right-wing Brahminist organisation Abhinav Bharat and its diabolical anti-national activities as disclosed in the statement given by Col. Bappaditya Dhar to the ATS in Malegaon blast investigation (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 23 January 2009). But it did not alert the government and did not attempt to get it banned. On the other hand, there are reasons to suspect that it connived at its activities.

11) Uncalled for interference in bomb blast investigations with ulterior motives

The IB arbitrarily and unnecessarily interfered in the investigation of bomb-blast cases in order to put the investigation on wrong track with the objective of saving the Brahminist terrorists and of demonising Muslims. In some cases, it changed the complexion of the cases altogether by manipulating evidence; in some cases it intentionally scuttled the investigation where the local police had almost detected the same, while in some other cases it did not allow the vital clues, found by the investigation agencies, to be taken to their logical end, in all of which, as was found later, Brahminist terrorists had been involved.

12) Not allowing highly suspicious so-called terror incidents to be probed

By using its clout with the government, the IB did not allow serious incidents like the attack on Parliament, the attack on RSS headquarters at Nagpur and the Ahmedabad blasts, etc. to be investigated thoroughly and honestly even though the IB's dubious role in those cases was seriously suspected and the demand for their in-depth probe was being vociferously made.

Parliament attack: There are at least three well-researched reports/books on the Parliament attack case: i) *13th December – A reader: The strange case of the attack on the Indian Parliament*, by a group of lawyers, academics, journalists and writers, with an introduction by Arundhati Roy, ii) *December 13th: Terror over Democracy* by Nirmalangshu Mukherji and iii) an exhaustive report by the People's Union for Democratic Rights, which have exposed the falsity of the government's and IB's claims and have brought out the real facts behind the attack.

The terror attack on RSS headquarters at Nagpur: The terrorist attack on RSS headquarters at Nagpur was handled so shoddily

by the IB that it made a mockery of itself. At least five senior police officers of Nagpur knew one week before the "attack" that some terrorists had been kept in Badvani (M.P.) and that the IB had been planning some "operation" in or near Nagpur. And after the "attack," even school children, who did not know what IB was, started telling that it was the "IB's operation." To get to the truth of the case, some secular organisations set up a fact-finding committee headed by the retired High Court judge, B.G. Kolse-Patil. The Committee in its report picked many holes in the police story and demanded a judicial enquiry.

Ahmadabad blast: The Ahmadabad-blast case has been discussed at length in Chapter III of this book wherein a logical inference has been drawn that it was the handiwork of the IB.

No judicial enquiry was ordered in any of the above-mentioned cases, in spite of strong and persistent demands by the secular and human rights organisations.

13) Scuttling the investigation of Samjhauta Express blast

The IB twice scuttled the investigation of the Samjhauta Express blast – once when the Haryana Police was on the verge of cracking it and the second time when the ATS Maharashtra, headed by Hemant Karkare, had completely cracked it – under the pretext of saving national prestige, but in reality, to save the Brahminists involved in the case.

14) Inviting Lt. Col. Purohit as lecturer at the ATS training

The IB knew the activities of Lt. Col. Purohit and his terror organisation Abhinav Bharat, as it had covered some of its meetings (*Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 23 January 2009). In spite of that, it did not object to his being invited as a guest lecturer to train the officers of the ATS Maharashtra in the detection and handling of explosives. Given the cordial relations between the IB and the then chief of the ATS, KP Raghuvanshi, there is a reason to suspect that

the IB itself may have suggested or rather insisted that Purohit be called for imparting training.

15) Not objecting to Lt. Col. Purohit investigating the explosives-haul case

The IB did not even object to Lt. Col. Purohit assisting the ATS Maharashtra in the investigation of a large haul of arms, ammunition and 43 kg of RDX in Aurangabad. It could be that Lt. Col. Purohit himself was involved in the case, as it was he alone who could have access to such a large quantity of RDX, as has been disclosed in the investigation of Malegaon blasts. Against this background, Purohit guiding the ATS in the investigation amounted to an accused investigating his own case. Obviously, the IB did not wish the case to be investigated on the correct lines.

16) Allowing American national Haywood to leave the country

The American national, Ken Haywood, from whose computer the emails on the eve of Ahmedabad blasts had been sent, could not have left the country, especially when a look-out notice had been issued against him, without the active connivance of the immigration authority, which, in the case of India, is the IB.

17) Appointing a highly controversial officer in place of Karkare in shameless hurry

Within hours of the tragic death of the ATS, chief Hemant Karkare the Maharashtra Government appointed the highly controversial former chief of the ATS, KP Raghuvanshi, known for his anti-Muslim and pro-Brahminist disposition as the ATS chief "temporarily." As was expected, it confirmed his appointment after six months. Considering the excessive interest the IB had been taking in the investigation of Malegaon blast case, wherein a Brahminist terror group was involved, the suspected nexus between the IB and the Brahminist forces and the cordial relations between the IB and KP Raghuvanshi, his quick appointment at such a crucial moment could not have been possible without the insistence of the IB.

18) Intentionally blocking the extremely specific information about Mumbai terror attack with mala fide intention

The IB, which had been passing on even unspecific and vague intelligence warnings about the impending terror attack on Mumbai, to the Mumbai Police, the state government and the Western Naval Command, did not pass on the extremely specific and hot intelligence on the eve of 26/11 about the impending terror attack to the Mumbai Police and the Western Naval Command, with mala fide intention.

19) Intentionally not observing 35 mobile phone numbers furnished to them by RAW

The RAW had furnished to the IB, through the Home Ministry, 35 mobile phone numbers being used by LeT terrorists five days prior to the Mumbai attack. But it did not keep them under observation till the Rangabhavan Lane incident took place, or it kept the numbers under observation but used the information so obtained for some dubious purpose.

20) Suspicious role in CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack

The above-mentioned facts, taken with the mysterious CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan part of the attack in which Hemant Karkare who was responsible for exposing the Brahminist terror plot to destabilise the government and establish a "Brahminist Rashtra" in the name of "Hindu Rashtra," was killed, reaffirms the mala fides of the IB.

21) Not treating the blast cases involving Brahminist outfits as a nationwide terror plot

During the course of the investigation of the Malegaon bomb blast case 2008, many other blast cases, such as Malegaon blast case of

2006, Nanded case of 2006, Samjhauta Express blast case, Ajmer Dargah Sharif blast case, Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) blast case, and also cases of blasts in Karnataka and Orissa, etc., were found to have been caused by the Brahminist terror outfit Abhinav Bharat with the objective of destabilising the government. In spite of these revelations, the case was not investigated as a nationwide anti-national plot. A thorough enquiry was not made with the political and religious big-wigs whose names had cropped up in earlier investigations and even the section of law for "waging war against the State" was not invoked. It will be naivety, bordering on stupidity, to think that these decisions were not taken by the IB which had been the *de facto* investigation agency of all the blast cases.

22) Keeping under wraps many true facts to hide its dubious role

In order to hide its acts of omission and commission in the case of Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, and its suspected role in the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan Lane part of the attack in which Karkare was killed, many real facts were kept under the wraps and the investigation was pushed on to a totally different track by the IB either by taking the Crime Branch Mumbai into confidence or by pressuring it. It did not allow the real evidence such as the CDs of the wireless communication among senior police officers during the period of the attack, especially during the first four hours, the log books of the Police Control Room, the mobile phones of Karkare and some other officers, etc. to come on record under the pretext that they contained secret information. In fact, there was hardly anything which could be called secret. The IB did not bring this evidence on record as they had the apprehension that it would expose the Brahminist–IB connection threadbare. Moreover, they did not allow some of the witnesses, who had actually seen the terrorists at Badhwar Park, at the CST and in the Rangabhavan Lane, etc., to tell the truth and those who stuck to their guns were dropped from the list of witnesses, the most glaring example being that of Anita Uddaiya discussed in Chapter VI dealing with the Mumbai terror attack.

Till recently, the Official Secrets Act, 1923, was considered to be IB's preserve. Many officers and private persons, whom the IB considered as coming in their way, have been booked under the Act. The IB's Brahminist officers did not spare even their own former bosses who wrote books and exposed the authoritarianism, high-handedness, arbitrariness and unaccountability of the IB, as their conscience did not allow them to sit in peace. But now it is the turn of the IB to be booked. Many of the incidents mentioned above, if probed deep by an independent and impartial agency, would see several serving and retired IB officers liable to be prosecuted under this Act.

XI

Urgent measures needed to save country and society

It is surprising, rather unimaginable, that a handful of Brahminists have been taking hundreds of millions of people of this country for a ride for hundreds of years, thus belying Abraham Lincoln's famous dictum that "We may deceive some of the people all of the time or all of the people some of the time, but we cannot deceive all of the people all of the time." If we wish to rid the Indian society of the stranglehold of Brahminism, we must wake up and make urgent amends at governmental, administrative, judicial, social, and at many other levels.

A) Urgent corrective measures by the government

I) Investigation committees

If the government really wishes to expose the nationwide conspiracy of Brahminists, it should immediately set up two high-level committees:

i) to investigate all bomb blast and terror attack cases which took place in the country since 2001; and

ii) to investigate the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan part of the Mumbai terror attack.

The first committee may be headed by a sitting Supreme Court judge, assisted by two High Court judges and comprising of 10 renowned criminal advocates and of equal number of professionally competent senior police officers known for impeccable integrity and unimpeachable secular credentials. They, in turn, would constitute as many investigation teams as required. The other committee for the CST-CAMA-Rangabhavan part of the Mumbai terror attack may be headed by a sitting High Court judge and assisted by two renowned advocates and a

team of police officers whose integrity and secular credentials are above-board. None of the members of the committees, including the judges, should even remotely be connected with, or suspected to be connected with, or likely to be sympathetic to, any of the religious, communal, fundamentalist or fascist outfits or their front organisations. Moreover, the police officers to be included in the investigation teams should not have any connection, whatsoever, with the earlier investigation in the case. Both the committees may be given a fixed time limit for completing the investigations.

II) Need to have a perfect coordination and free communication among the PMO, MHA, MFA, MoD and state governments

The gullibility of senior political leaders holding high offices in the Central government and the lack of communication among the important government departments like PMO, Home, Foreign Affairs and Defence and the lack of transparency in their working has been exploited to the hilt by the Brahminists in the IB over the years. Moreover, by taking advantage of the fact that the Director of the IB gives a daily briefing to the Prime Minister and by liberally using terms like "cover operation," "counter-insurgency operation," "anti-terror operation," "international relations," "secret diplomatic mission" they execute their hidden agenda by keeping senior ministers and senior bureaucrats in the dark. Thus, they engineer "encounters" with "terrorists," or "extremists" or "spies" or arrange "counter terror attacks" or cause bomb blasts leaving senior ministers or bureaucrats – without cross-checking with each other – guessing that it must be a secret operation concerning some other department or that it must have the nod of the PMO.

How the IB officers may have their way and get away with it, is best illustrated by Lt. Col. Prasad Purohit's example. While he was plotting and engineering bomb blasts, some of his colleagues and seniors, who were later cited as witnesses, had suspected his motives and questioned him, but he silenced them by saying that it was a "counter military intelligence operation" (*The Indian Express*, Pune, 22 January 2009).

Apparently no further questions were asked. This is a typical ploy of the intelligence agencies to "cover" their operations. *Sometimes the "covers" become so thick that even the PM or HM can't see through it.*

The IB has, thus, become an omnipotent, omniscient and omnipresent organisation, with hardly anybody challenging its authority. Seniormost politicians, state governments, bureaucrats, state police and even the judiciary have been made to believe that whatever the IB does has the sanction of the Prime Minister and/or Home Minister and that whatever it does is in the interest of national security and prestige, and, hence, they accept its version as gospel truth. But this hypothesis may not always be correct. Many a time, the IB may be acting or making others act without the concurrence of the PMO or MHA and more importantly, many a time, the IB may not have the safety or security of the nation at heart, but only the interests of Brahminists, as has been amply proved in the case of Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, wherin they deliberately hid the hot and absolutely specific intelligence of the attack in order to save the Brahminists. At times, it forces state governments and investigation agencies to toe the wrong line dictated by it and, given its clout, authority and nuisance value, nobody dares challenge it. This fact has been borne out by several bomb blast investigations wherein, at the instance of the IB, hundreds of innocent persons were arrested and kept in jails on false charges and, on the other hand, many vital clues were left unpursued when it did not suit the narrow interests of some of its officers.

Thus, by taking advantage of lack of communication among important departments of the Central government and between the Central government and state governments, the IB carried out many "covert operations" over the years, let real perpetrators of bomb blasts go scot-free, and implicated many existent or non-existent terrorist organisations and their "operators" in bomb-blast cases with a view overtly to nail Pakistan, but covertly to denigrate and malign Indian Muslims with the sole objective of creating disharmony between Muslims and common Hindus, and thus paving the way for establishing the Brahminist Rashtra under the garb of "Hindu Rashtra."

III) Reining in the IB

If this situation is to be changed, and if this country is to be saved from the evil designs of the communal and fascist forces, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister of the country have a special role to play. Apart from ensuring that there is a perfect coordination and communication among the major departments of the Union and state governments, they should be wary of the material fed to them by the IB every day. They should not swallow whatever is dished out to them without a grain of salt. Before accepting any information and acting on it, they should get themselves satisfied about the credibility and impartiality of the sources of information and should also ensure that the information is coming from all possible sources and not from a particular source only and that no vital information is hidden from them. Therefore, they should keep all channels of communication open and should try to have parallel sources of information. To that end, they may consider getting a weekly, if not daily, briefing from a senior member of the Minority Commission, police department and the like. Moreover, they may consider following methods to rein in the IB:

i) It should be ensured that no "covert operation," or "counter-insurgency operation" is carried out without the express approval of the PMO, HMA, and the department(s) concerned.

ii) If a permission is sought for any such "operation," it should be got spelt out in no uncertain terms before according it sanction. A thorough enquiry needs to be done as to what exactly is the operation, what is its objective, whether there is any hidden communal or political agenda behind it, how is it going to be executed, who are the persons executing it and, lastly, and more importantly, whether the "operation" is really necessary.

iii) In the event of the "operation" being given a go-ahead, the minister and the secretary of the department, and the CM of the state in which the operation is going to be conducted, should be apprised by a sufficiently senior officer of the PMO or the MHA, specially designated for the purpose.

iv) The IB should not be permitted to issue circulars or directives to state governments or to police chiefs without getting them approved by the PMO or the MHA.

v) It should be ensured that no telephones are kept under observation without the formal approval of the authorities concerned. The department of telecommunication and mobile phone companies should also be told about this in no uncertain terms.

vi) The IB should be strictly instructed not to disclose to the media any secret information concerning terrorists' plans or activities, or concerning any sensitive issue, but to work it out discreetly and take suitable action to foil the diabolical plans of the terrorists, if any.

vii) If, in spite of such instructions, sensitive information continues to be published or telecast, the matter should be inquired into thoroughly and deterrent action taken against those responsible for leaking out such information, and they be immediately transferred out of the IB.

viii) A couple of sufficiently senior officers of the IB may be specially authorised for the purpose of briefing the media openly whenever it is absolutely necessary to do so, and they may disclose only that part of the information which the public ought to know. In the event of any information being published or telecast, quoting anonymous IB source, it should immediately be countered by the IB issuing a press note saying that it was not given by the IB.

ix) If some newspaper or news channel publishes or telecasts some sensitive information falsely quoting an IB source, the matter may be taken up with the Press Council of India or the controlling authority of the news channels and, depending on the seriousness of the matter, criminal action may also be contemplated.

x) The IB should be stopped from crossing its limits and

interfering in the investigation of bomb-blast cases. In chapters III, IV, V and VIII of this book, I have discussed how the IB stepped in whenever the needle of suspicion was found pointing towards Brahminist elements; how it took the investigation on wrong tracks; how it gave wide publicity to its new theory; how the local police and even courts fell prey to the media hype; how hundreds of Muslim boys were arrested without any evidence and were made to languish in jails; how, on the other hand, the role of Brahminists in blast cases was played down in spite of having positive evidence against them and so on. Hence, it should be ensured that the IB does not interfere with any investigation or enquiry unless it is absolutely necessary, and that too, only to the extent of providing some positive and true inputs.

xi) Some of the so-called "terrorist attacks," wherein all the terrorists had been killed, as in the case of attack on Parliament or on RSS headquarters in Nagpur, were suspected to be the handiwork of the IB. Such cases should be inquired into by fact-finding committees headed by sitting or retired judges of the Supreme Court. Reports of such committees need not be made public, but at least, the government would come to know what the facts were, and there would be some control on the unbridled activities of the IB, RAW, paramilitary forces and the police. There is bound to be strong opposition to such inquiries by these organisations, claiming that the morale of the forces would go down. But the government should put its foot down for the sake of human rights and fair play.

xii) The government should get the important reports and notes on communal matters submitted by the IB during the last 50 years scrutinised very carefully by an independent body in order to see whether they suffered from any communal or caste bias.

xiii) The government should check the antecedents of the IPS officers who had been on deputation to the IB, especially those who were there for 10 years and more, and see whether they had any connections with Brahminist organisations. Henceforth, the government should not accept the officers recommended by the IB without getting their antecedents carefully vetted. It should also be ensured that there is an even proportion of officers in the IB belonging to different religions, castes, communities and regions.

xiv) So far as the permanent staff of the IB is concerned, the government should gradually revamp the IB and purge this sensitive organisation of communal elements who had been ensconced in sensitive posts for a long time.

xv) And last, but not the least, the activities of some of the retired IB officials, especially those who had the reputation of being "very efficient," be kept under surveillance as some of them are suspected to be calling the shots and guiding the Brahminist elements.

IV) Giving up the policy of untruth thrust upon the government by the IB Brahminists

The forces which killed the Father of the Nation are now killing his main principle, "the Truth," through their *protégés* in the IB by misleading the government to follow the path of untruth, especially in matters of international relations, terrorism and the national security by raising the bogey of Pakistan. Admittedly, Pakistan is on inimical terms with India, mainly on the Kashmir issue, since its inception. Therefore, any move on the part of any government organisation, especially the intelligence agency, which would put Pakistan in a tight spot, is and must always be welcome. But, to that end, why should we depend on crutches of untruth when the truth has been with us?

In the first place, Pakistan is nowhere near India in any field – political stability, military capability, economic growth, social justice or any other field, for that matter. Secondly, and most importantly, India's track record of secularism has been so impressive that merely by belting out

hundreds and hundreds of Muslim names from politics to cricket, to hockey, to other sports, to music, to science to atomic energy to film industry and so on, India could shut the trap of Pakistan in any international forum and Pakistan would never dare raise the Kashmir issue again. But, unfortunately, whatsoever diplomatic mileage is gained by such impressive achievements is more than frittered away by the words and deeds of the Brahminist organisations which are bent upon destablising the secular polity by engineering communal riots and also discrediting the government in the eyes of the international community, with a view to achieving their selfish goal of establishing the Brahminist political system under the garb of "Hindu Rashtra," as has been proved in the investigation of some of the recent bomb-blast cases. With this view in mind, the Brahminists, with the help of the IB, have taken the government on the path of untruth *vis-à-vis* Pakistan, overtly to nail down Pakistan, but in reality to demoralise Indian Muslims and also to expose the government to a lot of ignominy and embarrassment in the international fora, as happened in the case of the attacks on Parliament and Akshardham, the Mumbai local train blast and Samjhauta Express balst cases, to mention only a few, in which India failed to substantiate its earlier charges of Pakistan's involvement to the satisfaction of the international community. The moral of the story is that no amount of diplomatic acumen can convince the international community if our policy is based on untruth. Therefore, in matters such as foreign policy, internal security and terrorism, the government should eschew the policy of untruth, intentionally sought to be thrust upon it with mala fide intention by the Brahminists through their *protégés* in the IB and to follow the path of truth which we have in abundance.

B) Total transparency in judiciary

A need to have an in-built self corrective mechanism

The judiciary is an extremely sacrosanct institution. In order that it retains its sanctity, it should have an in-built, self-corrective mechanism of its own having checks and balances. In the absence of such a

mechanism, there is a danger of the judiciary losing the tremendous faith the common public have in the system, as was noticed in the course of the investigation of some bomb-blast cases during the last few years. The attitude of some of the lower courts in these cases has definitely shaken the confidence of the general public, especially of the minority community, in the judiciary. In some of the cases, the investigation agencies had been changing the theories of investigation like shirts and every time arresting a different set of persons and, surprisingly, the lower courts had been liberally granting and extending police custody remand to every set of arrested persons apparently without verifying the evidence at hand. And worse still, the judiciary had been applying different sets of criteria to different communities as is evident from the ensuing paragraphs.

In the Mumbai train blast case, Malegaon blast case of 2006, Mecca Masjid (Hyderabad) blast case, Ajmer Sharif Dargah blast case, Ahmedabad blast case and in so many such cases, hundreds of Muslim youths were arrested merely on suspicion, their police custody remands were easily granted and they were made to languish in jails for years on end. But the Brahminist accused, who were either caught red-handed or against whom there had been positive evidence of their direct or indirect involvement in terror conspiracies, as in Nanded blast case of 2006 and Malegaon blast case of 2008, are walking free as they were quickly released on bail or some were even liberally granted anticipatory bails, while others were never arrested. When human rights activists, secularists and Muslim organisations had been shouting from the house tops in this regard and pointing out the blatantly discriminatory attitude of the lower courts, the higher judiciary ought to have taken cognizance of their complaints and ordered an enquiry or taken corrective measures *suo moto*. But, unfortunately, this did not happen.

Moreover, some of the judgements of the superior courts in matters concerning communal or religious issues, both civil and criminal, and the specific remarks of judges therein during the last 10-15 years have caused tremendous anxiety among the common people.

Admittedly, the judges too are human beings with some of them

having been influenced by the media propaganda and some others under the influence of their own communal or religious ideology. But certainly such factors should not weigh with the judges while dispensing justice. With this objective in mind, the idea of an in-built mechanism in the form of an in-house judicial committee referred to in the beginning, was mooted. Either the judiciary can have such an in-built and in-house committee of its own or there may be a separate committee comprising retired judges of the Supreme Court and some legal experts to act as a watchdog. This committee will subject to strict scrutiny such of the decisions or judgements which are suspected to have been influenced by corruption or by political, communal, casteist or religious considerations, or such decisions or judgements against which there has been a loud public outcry. The objective should be to somehow save the judiciary from extraneous forces, as it is now the last hope of the Constitution, Democracy and Secularism.

C) Social measures

Governmental and judicial measures are not enough to bring about the change in the social order. There are many factors which are beyond the ambit of administration and judiciary, which call for social measures such as social control, social reforms, changes in approach, perception and attitude and so on, some of which are suggested below:

I) Social control over media

Media is one of the most important tools in the hands of the Brahminists which has helped them not only in continuing but also consolidating the age-old discriminatory Brahminical social order. Unless the media is taken out of the Brahminists' control, there is no hope of bringing about social change. But, in this regard, there is hardly anything which the government or the judiciary can do. The remedy lies in the social reformists and the secular organisations exercising social control over the media.

Though the media, both print and electronic, is almost completely

dominated by Brahminist elements, most of their owners and/or directors are not such as to be called "communal," as some of them are known secularists or liberals, some belong to secular political parties or organisations and so on. But as they are interested only in projecting their own political or social image and in the commercial aspect of their newspaper or channel, most of the times they are not aware of the wily games being played by the Brahminists entrenched at various levels in their newspaper or TV channel and they do not realise how, by way of selection and positioning of news items and articles, or by twisting the facts or killing certain news, they knowingly promote the Brahminist ideology, glorify the Brahmins, promote religious fundamentalism and superstition, degrade other castes, demonise Muslims and other minorities, spread communal hatred, foment communal trouble, assist Brahminist political parties and so on, with the sole objective of continuing the Brahminist domination over the society. If these facts are brought to the notice of the owners periodically, on the basis of regular and objective analysis of the materials published in their newspapers or telecast on their channels, the owners or directors and/or chief editors may bring about necessary changes, and more importantly, the Brahminists, who have been ensconced in the media and surreptitiously carrying out the Brahminist agenda would realise that somebody is watching and observing their activities.

It is here that Hindu reformist organisations and secular organisations can play a very positive and effective role. With the help of manpower and resources at their disposal, they may form regional committees for carefully monitoring and analysing the contents of newspapers published in the region and in the state regularly and pointing out the news items, articles and other material having caste or communal overtones. These committees may also monitor important TV channels and mark serials intentionally promoting religious fundamentalism or superstition and also creating caste or communal animosities. Moreover, they may point out how important meetings, seminars, processions or other important programmes of secular or reformist organisations have been intentionally blacked out or how important news items showing the

Brahminists in bad light have been hushed up. The leaders of the organisations will prepare a note based on this analyses at the end of the month and either hand it over to the owner and/or the editor or send it by post.

If the owners and editors start taking these notes seriously and discussing the same in their meetings, it will have another positive impact: journalists belonging to other castes and communities whose voices, in spite of their being in sizeable number, have been hitherto muffled because of the Brahminist domination in the media, would be emboldened to write or speak freely on all the issues political, social or communal, and gradually the media will be liberated from the clutches of the Brahminist forces. But it calls for perseverance and dedication on the part of reformist and secular organisations.

Moreover, the reformist organisations may think of getting prepared by their units in every city and town a list of intellectuals, social workers and opinion-makers, who in any case do not account for more than one per cent of the population and try to reach out to them by way of postal correspondence, SMSs, emails, blogs or by any other method and try to convey to them the news and the views which they think the Brahminist-dominated media has intentionally not published or telecast. By this method, in course of time, the biased attitude of the purely Brahminist media would be exposed, their credibility would go down and eventually their readership and viewership would also dwindle.

II) The role of social-reformist organisations

Apart from trying to bring about social control over the media, the social reformist organisations and their leaders are expected to perform some important tasks, as suggested below, to bring about social change.

1) Common Hindus be convinced that Hindu-Muslim conflict is not a Muslim issue alone

The patent weapon devised by the Brahminists over the years to neutralise Hindu reformist movements aimed at changing the Brahamnical social order, is the Hindu-Muslim riots and the spectre of terrorism,

whereby common Hindus and Muslims are made to fight each other while Brahminists continue with their subjugation of the society. It has been noticed that whenever the reformist movement picked up momentum, a couple of communal incidents are deliberately engineered by the Brahminists which brings the movement back to square one, with 'Bahujan' (common Hindu) youths running after the Brahminists and in the long run ruining themselves as much as the Muslims. Therefore, common Hindus must understand that any Hindu-Muslim conflict is not a Muslim issue alone and hence it should not be left to the Muslims alone to handle. In this regard, reformist leaders can play a very positive role. They may convince common Hindu youths that the deliberately engineered communal riots or terror attacks are aimed more at common Hindus, whom the Brahminists intend to subjugate for perpetuity, than at the Muslims who could be subdued any time.

But this is easier said than done. Though the reformist leaders themselves have been thoroughly convinced on this count and they seriously broach this subject in their indoor meetings, seminars and symposiums, they are wary of emphatically stressing this point in public meetings and of openly appealing to the common Hindu youth not to indulge in anti-Muslim activities on the provocation of the Brahminists. This is probably because they have the apprehension that the youth who have been administered an overdose of anti-Muslim venom over the years, may not easily digest the theory that the Brahminists' main target in fomenting communal riots are common Hindus instead of Muslims. Their apprehension is not totally unfounded, but that should not be the reason for them to be mere passive spectators allowing the Brahminists to have their way and take common Hindus for a ride, as in the past. They may convince the youth gradually and step by step, starting with teaching them the correct history of the Medieval period, which the Brahminists have intentionally twisted to create Hindu-Muslim divide, followed by presentation of objective and logical analyses of some of the important communal riots which have taken place during the last about 50 years and by giving concrete examples, with facts and figures, of how in the process, both common Hindus and Muslims have

suffered and how the Brahminists have gained politically, socially, educationally, and in service matters. In short, unless common Hindus are convinced about the main agenda and designs of the Brahminists in fomenting communal riots, all attempts to change the Brahminical social order will fail.

2) Common Hindus to be liberated from superstitions

Another important task the reformist organisations are expected to do is to liberate common Hindus from the stranglehold of religious bigotry and superstition, which has been exploited by the Brahminist for centuries to control common Hindus. In this regard also, they should tread cautiously as, if they outrightly start criticising religious practices and rituals, there could be a serious backlash. They should educate the people step by step. They may explain to them the religious scriptures in the modern context and the significance of various religious rituals and rites on a scientific basis and convince them how the Brahminists have been exploiting them and misguiding them for their selfish motives.

3) Brahminists and Brahmins not to be put in the same bracket

Some reformist leaders do not differentiate between Brahminists and Brahmins and try to put them all in the same bracket. Some of them are so much prejudiced against Brahmins as a caste that they are not prepared to touch them even with a pair of tongs. But they should understand that a majority of Brahmins do no subscribe to the casteist and supremacist views of the Brahminists and, of late, have even started distancing themselves from them. While I was in service, I worked with many Brahmin officers, but barring a few of them, none had a Brahminist attitude. Today I work with many Brahmin activists; in the building I live in, almost 50 per cent are Brahmins; I have many Brahmin friends and even my son-in-law is a Brahmin, but I do not notice a trace of Brahminism in them. If they are not criticising Brahminists openly, it is because they apprehend danger of social ostracism and not because they support the casteist and racist views of the Brahminists. Under these circumstances, if we do not take them along, a reverse process may start and they may go back to the Brahminists' fold, and in a way it will negate the basic principle of the reformist movement that says that castes are not by birth. The reformist leaders should understand that the term "common Hindus" includes non-Brahminist Brahmins also, and hence they should try to involve them in their movement aimed at changing the Brahminist social order.

III) Secularists and intellectuals

In the current communal scenario, the secularists and intellectuals have a very crucial role to play without getting influenced by media hype actuated by the Brahminists in the IB.

1) Not to be swayed by media reports

There are umpteen number of organisations and individuals in the country who have totally devoted themselves to secularism, and whenever there are communal riots or cases of discrimination against the minorities or of injustice on the ground of religion or caste or creed, they rise to the occasion, fight with the authorities and even knock at the doors of higher courts. There is, thus, no room, whatsoever, to doubt their sincerity, honesty, dedication or credentials. But of late, even some of them seem to be getting influenced by the media hype about the so-called "Muslim terrorism" and by the stories of the fake and fabricated investigations of bomb-blast cases demonising Muslims, systematically spread by the Brahminists in the IB through the local police and the Brahminist-dominated section of the media, and have started thinking that there could be a section of Indian Muslims who may be helping the jihadi groups. Especially after the Mumbai terror attack of 26/11, some of them were so much stunned and their sensibilities so much numbed that they even stopped discussing the greyest aspects of the attack and its doubtful investigation, blacked out the subject all together and started speaking and writing on less important and less relevant issues. Some others were so much taken in by the Goebbelian anti-Muslim propaganda by the IB and the media that they joined the chorus of Brahminists and started demanding that Muslims condemn

terrorism, and exhorting them to eschew terrorism and join the mainstream. This sudden change of attitude on the part of the hitherto staunch secularists is a cause of deep concern as it is fraught with serious consequences, giving a boost to the IB and its Brahminist masters and encouraging them to further indulge in the theories of total untruth and take the public indefinitely for a ride.

2) Parallel investigation by secular groups

Instead of getting swept away by the Goebbelian propaganda of the IB through the media, secularists and intellectuals will do well to make an objective study of any such case and do the logical analysis of its investigation. They may visit the spot, make inquiries with the victims and the witnesses, go through the news items published in various newspapers during the first couple of days of the incident and also those published after the police claim of cracking the case, test the police claims on the touchstone of logic, subject them to the scrutiny on the basis of the evidence collected by them and make their report public in a press conference. There is no denying the fact that the media, especially its Brahminist-dominated section, may not give their report the prominence it deserves or may publish it with many "ifs" and "buts" in order to prove their earlier reports correct. But that should not deter the secularists from conducting such inquiries in important cases.

It's not that they have not done so before. Many NGOs, human rights and secular organisations have formed fact-finding committees in respect of some of the incidents and published their reports. But they did not seem to have the desired impact on the investigation agencies and the administration, the reason for which is not far to seek: either the enquiry reports were not followed with perseverance and were not taken to their logical end or such inquiries were very few and far between. In order to have a tangible impact on the investigation agencies, such exercise must be repeated in succession in all important cases and their objective reports supported by credible evidence made public and followed up meticulously. This will definitely have some check on the investigation agencies and they may refrain from indulging in

manipulating blatantly false evidence and arresting wrong people at the instance of the Brahminists in the IB. At the same time, the publication of such reports may egg the general public on to think on other lines and the main objective of the Brahminist forces and the IB to constantly misguide the public will be defeated to a great extent.

3) Aggressive secularism

Moreover, the secularists, Hindu reformists and intellectuals need to adopt an aggressive posture, if they expect the governments and the authorities to come round their viewpoint, which, in most of the cases are correct and just. In matters having communal overtones, the Sangh Parivar and other Brahminist organisations are always aggressive irrespective of the fact whether their actions, demands or viewpoints are correct, justified and legal or not, with the result that governments and the police meekly bow to their demands, some times even against court orders. The secularists and intellectuals, on the other hand, more often than not, are defensive and passive in their approach, and hence are normally snubbed or ignored by the authorities.

Magic could happen if secularists and reformists also turn aggressive. This has been manifested by Karantaka's reformist organisation Karnataka Komu Souharda Vedike (Karnataka Communal Harmony Forum) in the case of Baba Budangiri Dargah controversy of Chikmangalur which had been intentionally raked up by the Sangh Parivar. To counter the massive rallies being taken out by the Sangh Parivar since 1999 to pressurise the government on this issue and for allowing them to celebrate Datta Jayanti in the Dargah, the Vedike mobilised the public keeping Muslims aside and convincing common Hindus that the Baba Budangiri controversy was not a Muslim issue but a game plan of the Brahminists to engage common Hindus in such issues for continuing their dominance over the society and for gaining political mileage out of it. The Vedike started taking out counter rallies. Though the response was not very encouraging initially, it grew gradually as the people started getting convinced about the ill intent of the Sangh Parivar and the BJP and reached its peak in 2003 with more than

20,000 people joining the Vedike rally and the number of people in the RSS Shobha yatra, on the other hand, dwindled to a few hundred. Consequently, the BJP-led coalition government had to implement the court order, maintaining the *status quo* and thus putting an end to the illegal religious practices initiated by the Sangh Parivar by resorting to hooliganism. The lesson that we may learn from this incident is that unless we become aggressive, the government and the police do not act. This is an example worth emulating by the secular and reformist organisations throughout the country if the real agenda and ill intent of the Brahminist forces in fomenting communal troubles are to be exposed.

4) The word "Brahminist" and not "Hindu" be used *vis-à-vis* Muslims in communal matters

By now, it has become clear that almost all the communal incidents which have taken place since the last decade of the nineteenth century have been the brainchild of Brahminists with the gullible common Hindu being the victim and instrument of their hate campaign. More often than not, the Brahminists remain behind the curtain, pulling the strings and it is the common and poor Hindu who is visible in the forefront, with the result that after any communal incident, the secularists, the intellectuals and Muslim leaders use terms like "Hindu," "Hinduism," "Hindutvadi [Hinduist] organisation," "Hindu conspiracy," "Hindu bomb," etc., to refer to the forces fighting Muslims, thus unnecessarily dragging gullible common Hindus into the fray. The Brahminists are naturally amused at the use of these terms as this helps them in their plan of carrying out the Brahminist agenda in the name of Hindus and Hinduism. Therefore, the Brahminists and the section of the media controlled by them start using these terms more enthusiastically and more liberally as it helps them rope in more and more common Hindus. In a way, secularists, intellectuals and Muslim leaders unwillingly alienate common Hindus and push them in the trap laid by the Brahminist and make their tasks easy. Therefore, it will be more appropriate in this context that the word "Hindu" should be avoided and replaced with "Brahminist."

5) Not to blame the government and the police for partisan attitude, as they are also victims of the system

In the event of communal riots or alleged terrorist attacks or bomb blasts, secularists and Muslim leaders invariably end up blaming the government and the police for their partisan attitude, not knowing that the government and the police are as much victims of the systematic anti-Muslim propaganda being incessantly carried out by the Brahminist forces as the general public. Moreover, after every communal incident, the local media which is mostly dominated by Brahminist elements, pressurises the local police by asking them questions and cross-questions so as to indirectly suggest what action they should take and what they should not, if they wish to have favourable reporting in the media. Senior Brahmanist journalists use the same strategy at the state level to pressurise the government. In important matters, the IB also intervenes in the investigation and dictates terms to the investigating agency and the state government by creating the impression that they are doing it at the instance of the central government. As a result, both the state government and the local police, for the sake of favourable media reporting and to retain their positions, yield to the pressure of the media and IB and take actions which in most of the cases are discriminatory and unjust. The response of the government or the police would, in all probability, be the same even if a different party is in power or the individuals occupying the posts belong to different religions or even belong to the minority community. Therefore, there is no point in blaming or criticising the government and the police in communal matters. The real solution lies in first ridding the intelligence agencies and the media of the Brahminist elements followed by concerted and sincere efforts on the part of secular organisations, Hindu reformist organisations, Muslim leaders and the government to change the anti-Muslim atmosphere created by the Brahminists over the decades.

IV) Muslims to eschew fundamentalism and shrug off inferiority complex

Fundamentalism: The Muslim community in India is afflicted by two serious maladies: fundamentalism and inferiority complex. It is most unfortunate that Muslims, even some of the educated ones, are not ready to understand the religious scriptures in the modern context. They value the letters more than the spirit, and hence are averse to accepting new ideas and concepts. Some clerics are said to be against scientific research saying that it tends to "create" new matters which amounts to competing with the Creator. But this argument is not correct, as no research "creates" a thing; it merely discovers what already exists. The educated among the Muslims should try to convince them on such issues even at the cost of incurring their wrath. Some fundamentalist organisations preach the young boys that they should blindly follow the tenets of Islam as interpreted by *them* or by some medieval scholars in the context of their times, and that whatever they do or earn in this life in contravention of their interpretation of the tenets would not come to their rescue on the Day of Judgement. As a result, a very large gullible section of the community in its quest for heaven after death, lives the life of virtual hell in this world. The sooner Muslims in general and Muslims in India, in particular, give up empty religious rhetoric, understand the true meaning of the scriptures, practise them in spirit rather than in letter and accept the reality of modern life, the better it would be for them.

Inferiority complex: The greatest damage that has been caused to the Muslim community as a result of the sudden spurt of communal riots, engineered by the Brahminists as a part of their diabolical designs in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 20th century, is that prominent political and social Muslim leaders of that period like Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Mohammad Ali Jauhar, Shaukat Ali, Hasrat Mohaani, Hakim Ajmal Khan and others, not knowing the real cause of the riots and thinking that they could be the results of

some genuine misunderstanding between the two communities because of historical or some other reasons, developed a tremendous amount of inferiority complex, which later percolated to the whole community. With the increase in the intensity and frequency of the communal riots in the 20th century, especially after Partition and Independence, the amount of inferiority complex in the community especially among leaders increased manifold, with the result that nobody could boldly take up the just cause of the Muslim community for the fear of being stamped "communal," thus relegating it to the last rung in the social and economic hierarchy as pointed out by the Sachar Committee only recently.

The situation has not changed till today. However highly placed a Muslim in India may be, he/she definitely suffers from this complex somewhere inside him or her. The latest example is that of the then Union Minister for Minority Affairs, Barrister AR Antulay, who after having expressed his logical and genuine perceptions in regard to the death of the ATS chief, Hemant Karkare, during the Mumbai terror attack, had to eat humble pie.

If this is the case of one of the most prominent, intelligent and bold Muslim leaders in the country, the plight and psychology of common Muslims can only be imagined. When hundreds and hundreds of Muslim boys were being arrested in bomb-blast cases without an iota of evidence and were being kept in jails for years on end, no politician, no social worker, no secularist, no neighbour, and in some cases, even no advocate was coming forward to their rescue or plead their case before the police and authorities, or in courts. It were their parents and in some cases their relatives who were running hopelessly from pillar to post only to get frustrated in the end. All others distanced themselves from their families, in spite of knowing that the arrested boy was innocent, as they had the apprehension that if they tried to help the so-called "terrorists," they too would be harassed by the police and even may themselves be implicated in some case. This was because in the investigation of any bomb blast case, the terrorism of the police, supported by the IB and the Brahminist section of the media, knew no bounds.

The impact of the reports, published in the media, both print and

electronic, on the basis of the information fed by the IB and at its instance by the local police, as regards terrorist activities in the country and about the involvement of Muslim terror outfits and persons was so much that even the Muslim community started believing that there could be a section of misguided Muslims in India indulging in such insane acts. As a result of this impression and mainly out of the collective inferiority complex, there was a virtual race among various Muslim religious and social bodies to condemn the so-called "terrorism" and to declare that Islam was against terrorism.

- In December, 2007, Sufis from across the country gathered in New Delhi under the banner of "Khwaja Garib Nawaz Council" and took out a peace march to Parliament.
- In the same month a conference of thousands of *ulama* from all over the country was held at Darul Uloom Deoband and issued a "declaration" against terrorism.
- That was followed by a resolution by progressive Muslim groups in Kerala to fight extremism and terrorism.
- In February 2008, Darul Uloom Deoband issued a "fatwa" against terrorism.
- In May 2008, a huge anti-terror rally was held at Ram Leela Ground in Delhi.
- In the same month, about 500 to 600 clerics from Maharashtra gathered at Pune to condemn terrorism.
- In November 2008, a "peace train" of 2000 Muslim clerics was taken to Hyderabad, and a general body meeting of Jamiat Ulama-i Hind was held at the Nizam College Ground, Hyderabad, where terrorism was condemned.

In fact, there is nothing wrong in condemning terrorism. Rather, it is the duty of every citizen to do so. However, Muslim religious and social bodies were not merely condemning the terror acts, but they were passing resolutions and declarations saying that "terrorism has no place in Islam," "terrorism, does not have Islamic sanction," "Islam says killing of one innocent person is tantamount to killing the whole humanity,"

"terrorism to Islam is like fire to water" and so on, thus, unwittingly, endorsing the view that some sections of Muslims in the country have been indulging in terror acts. This was more out of a sense of insecurity as a minority community than out of ignorance. Though they were being influenced by newspaper and electronic media reports about the involvement of "Muslims" in blast cases, they were not quite sure about it. They were in a confused state of mind till the investigation of Nanded and Malegaon blast cases revealed who the real terrorists had been.

Now that the real terrorists and their masters are known to the country, Muslims should shrug off their inferiority complex and start living with dignity. In future, if Muslim boys are arbitrarily caught by the police without any evidence in any terror case, they should muster courage to question the police by confronting them with the facts of several blast cases in the past in which Muslim boys who had been arrested and tortured for months and years were found to be innocent and the involvement of Brahminist terrorists therein was exposed. Let the disclosures in Nanded, Malegaon and many other blast cases be a turning point in the secular history of this country.

V) Brahmins to distance themselves from the Brahminists and the Brahminists to give up illusions

Even though the percentage of the Brahminists among Brahmins is very small, definitely not exceeding even 10 percent of the total Brahmin population, the fact remains that only a microscopic percentage of the remaining Brahmins openly oppose the perverted ideology of the Brahminists and the unscrupulous methods and strategies employed by them to attain their desired objective. This is not to suggest that the remaining 90 percent totally subscribe to the Brahminist viewpoint and support them wholeheartedly. With the rapidly changing world, many of them have changed their outlook and have rid themselves of the illusion that their race is destined to rule India forever. But they do not have the courage or gumption to oppose the extremists in their ranks for the fear of reprisal as there have been umpteen number

of cases in the past where Brahmins opposing Brahminists were eliminated mercilessly, the latest example being that of Hemant Karkare. This section may account for about 50 percent of the total Brahmin population. But there still remains a sizable 40 percent of them who, though do not participate in Brahminist activities, yet sympathise with them passively, thinking that whatever they have been doing is for the welfare, uplift, empowerment and glorification of their caste and in the event of Brahminists' succeeding in their mission, they would be immensely benefitted. There is nothing wrong in wishing the welfare and wellbeing of one's own community, and in striving for the same, but it should not be at the cost of other communities and people and the means used to achieve the same should be fair, transparent and honest. But the Brahminist approach has been exactly the opposite. Their true face has been bared only in the recent investigation of the Nanded and Malegaon blast cases which have revealed that they had a mala fide intention of creating chaos in the country by causing bomb blasts and engineering communal riots as a prelude to establishing the Brahminist Rashtra in the name of "Hindu Rashtra," by overthrowing the lawful and constitutionally-established government. Now, at least the remaining Brahmins should wake up and not only distance themselves from the evil designs of the Brahminists but also show courage to oppose them openly.

Brahminists should also now sit up and do serious introspection. Is their ideology feasible in the present age? And is it possible for them to achieve the objective they wish for? With the advancement in science, technology and means of communication during the last couple of decades, the world has virtually become a global village. With TVs in about 70 percent of houses, computers in about 10 percent of families, and Internet connection reaching the remotest of villages, it will be foolish on their part to think that the whole society will be misguided and misled, and run over by spreading misinformation as in the past. Even Brahmin youths in their 20s and 30s would not accept this theory, notwithstanding their indoctrination since childhood by the Brahminists in RSS *shakhas*. It is high time the Brahminists realised that

the general public has discovered their real agenda and has understood the various gimmicks adopted by them in different ages to hoodwink common people, and gave up the idea of controlling the Indian society for perpetuity and got into the Indian social mainstream. This is in their interest and the interest of the country.

Conclusion

I am an extremely optimistic person. One may say, I am over-optimistic to the extent of being an idealist. I have a dream of a truly secular, socialistic and democratic India. I believe that one day saner counsel will prevail upon the Brahminists and they will give up their perverted casteist ideology and their Machiavellian methods. If this happened, common Hindus will be liberated from the slavery of religious bigotry and superstition, Hindu reformists, secularists and Dalit leaders will adopt a policy of forget and forgive towards the Brahminists, Muslims will give up fundamentalism, all sections of our society will get over their complexes and get assimilated in the national mainstream and jointly strive to make a strong and progressive India wherein economic development will be aimed more at reducing inequality than increasing total material wealth. I have a dream of an obsolutely secular society wherein religion will be confined to homes, places of worship and, at the most, to community halls; elsewhere everybody will be a professional, a fellow Indian and a human being working for the best interests of the country.

Hemant Karkare's yeoman service

I know my hopes are very high. But it is also a fact that one cannot dream without reason. I do not dream out of nothing. I suddenly noticed a chink in the darkness and could see a flood of hope trying to gush in through the chink. In the pitch darkness, who has made this chink? It is Hemant Karkare who has made this chink by exposing the Brahminist terror plot and opening a Pandora's box, thus giving a hope of the end of the age-old Brahminist hegemony. Had he not dared to do what he did, the end of this socialistic democratic republic was a

foregone conclusion. The terror out-fit Abhinav Bharat would not have to wait till 2024, as contemplated by the conspirators, the "Hindu [read Brahminist] Rashtra" with its separate constitution and separate flag would have been in place by 2015. Therefore, the people of India should be indebted to Hemant Karkare for saving the nation and its Constitution, and confer upon him the Bharat Ratna, no less.

Belling the Cat

One of my main objectives in penning this book is to let the posterity know what yeoman service Hemant Karkare has rendered to the society and how he has saved the nation from the diabolical designs of so-called patriots and nationalists. I have also described the chain of developments that led to the situation which, but for the timely and bold action on the part of Karkare, would have blown into a catastrophe. I have made no bones in pointing out who the main conspirators and perpetrators of the whole conspiracy have been. In order to save the nation and its Constitution somebody had to bell the cat. I have done that. I know the cat is very furious, extremely vindictive, ruthless, heartless, unscrupulous and all-powerful. I know the consequences. But for the sake of the country and for the sake of 99 percent of its population, I am prepared to face any consequences.

Annexure A

Important points in respect of the specific intelligence about the Mumbai terror attack published in some important newspapers (discussed in chapter VI)

(I) *The Times of India*, Pune, 1 December 2008:

1) The details emerging suggest that the much appreciated Indian Navy and Coast Guard may have failed to carry out their brief by ignoring an intercept from RAW, warning of an attempt by LeT to infiltrate a jihadi gang into Mumbai.
2) The intercept, sent as recently as 19 November, said that a Lashkar-controlled ship had, with dangerous cargo, sailed from Karachi and could try to sneak into Indian waters.
3) Navy sources angrily contested the claim of the country's external intelligence agency, saying "No intercept was passed on to us."
4) RAW sources, however, stuck to their guns.

(II) *The Indian Express*, Pune, 3 December 2008:

Admitting that the terror attack on Mumbai using the sea route was a "systemic failure," Indian Navy chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said that the Navy had no "actionable input."... He said, "India is going to be attacked by terrorists" couldn't be called "actionable."

(III) *The Times of India*, Pune, 3 December 2008:

1) Senior officials of Mumbai Police admit that Intelligence Bureau (IB) had as early as March, 2007 alerted the Maharashtra government on the possibility of a strike off Gateway of India using the sea route. The IB message read, "Kashmir-origin *fidayeen* are likely to reach Mumbai via the sea route to commit an act of spectacular proportions."
2) Subsequently, between March 2007 and 22 November 2008, at least five warnings landed at Maharashtra's Home Department and Mumbai Police Commissioner's doorsteps, each indicative of the fact that the threat to high-profile hotels such as Taj was real and imminent and

growing by the day.

3) The warnings were not specific enough to indicate the date and time, but described the manner in which the strike was likely to be carried out.
4) Even U.S. intelligence officials alerted the state about a "potential attack from the sea against hotels and business centres in Mumbai."
5) In view of the warning, the police stepped up security arrangements, held a series of meetings with the managements of leading hotels situated on the coast and also with fishermen's associations, officials of the Port Trust, Coast Guard and the Navy. A boat was also said to have been hired to mount a watch on the sea between Taj and Oberoi.
6) By mid-November came the last of the alerts indicating that a vessel had set sail from Karachi carrying dangerous cargo. However, it appears that the vigil had been relaxed by them.

(IV) *Sakal*, Pune, 3 December 2008:

1) American intelligence agencies had warned India *twice* in September about the potential attack on Taj and other vital centres.
2) After the attack, the American intelligence agency had been tapping the satellite phones of the terrorists. It has found that some of the conversations directly point to America and that though some of the SIM cards with the terrorists had been purchased in Kolkata and one had been purchased in America and that the American intelligence agency had been expressly recording all the conversation emanating from that particular SIM card.
3) In respect of the inputs given by the IB and RAW on 12 and 18 November, respectively, the Navy chief, Admiral Suresh Mehta, said the inputs were not actionable.
4) Responding to the allegation that the suspected boat Kuber was inspected and released by the Coast Guard, he clarified that the boat was stopped, but allowed to go as the documents were in order.

(V) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 11 December 2008:

1) Internal inquiries into the Mumbai terror attack have revealed that despite clear intelligence inputs, the Coast Guard and the Navy failed to either spot or interdict Al-Hussaini, the Pakistani ship that carried

the LeT terrorists, and this took place at a time when warships and some IAF aircraft were participating in an annual exercise for the defence of Gujarat.
2) Within 25 minutes of the alert reaching the Indian Coast Guard station at Jakhau, off the Bhuj coast, Neelkanth M. Yengde, Station Deputy Commandant, faxed a message to the BSF Bhuj Commandant and Commander, Coast Guard, Gujarat, Daman, Diu and Porbundar districts. He said that one Coast Guard hovercraft H-185 and one offshore patrol vessel C-142 were being withdrawn from the Tatraksh XXIV exercise "due to real-time scenario developments." This fax was apparently sent around 11.30 pm on 20 November, just six days before the Mumbai attack.
3) The inputs by the RAW requested the Coast Guard Jakhau station to direct a ship to the area for surveillance, launch Dornier aircraft at first light for a coordinated sea/air search and deploy boats and personnel to patrol off the creek area. This input was shared by all agencies concerned, including the IB.
4) The Coast Guard, it is learnt, did launch a hovercraft and an off-shore vessel to interdict the suspected LeT ship but the search apparently ended by 6 pm at Kandla on 21 November. Sources said Coast Guard ships docked at Kandla for a function that night.
5) The terrorists on board the suspected LeT vessel managed to reach Mumbai, despite the fact that the Gujarat exercise involved the Navy, Coast Guard, IAF, and elements of the Army's 11 Infantry Division and the BSF.

(VI) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 15 December 2008:

1) An internal probe into the possible intelligence lapse around the Mumbai terror attacks has given a virtual clean chit to the Coast Guard citing its attempts to locate the infiltrating Lashkar vessel but has pointed fingers at the Intelligence Bureau for not "refining" its inputs and at the Naval Headquarters for keeping its Western Command out of the loop.
2) Sources confirmed that inquires so far have revealed:
   a. The intelligence input about the infiltrating Lashkar vessel's

coordinates was passed on to the Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, Naval Headquarters, which did not forward it to its operational Western Naval Command. The Principal Director, Naval Intelligence, directly reports to Navy Chief through the Deputy Chief.

b. The Western Command in-charge of the Konkan coast came into the picture only when its marine commandos (Marcos) engaged the terrorists after a request from the Maharashtra Chief Secretary in the midnight of 26-27 November.

c. The Coast Guard launched a ship, a hovercraft and a Dornier to search for the Lashkar vessel between 20-24 November, but could not find it as the vessel never entered Indian waters.

d. After receiving the initial intelligence input on 20 November, the Coast Guard got back to the Intelligence Bureau asking for further actionable leads as the suspected ship could not be traced within the Indian maritime boundaries but the IB failed to refine its input despite reminders from the Coast Guard.

e. As per the intelligence input, the coordinates of the Lashkar vessel were 30-34 which puts the ship 20 to 30 nautical miles south of Karachi but well within the Air Defence Interrogation Zone. In other words, this area was out of bounds for Indian agencies to enter without permission from Karachi.

(VII) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 24 December 2008:

1) The coastal wing of the Mumbai Police, which was patrolling the area near Badhwar Park in Cuffe Parade, where the 10 terrorists landed on 26 November, was ordered to move out 40 days before the attack.
2) Additional Commissioner of Police (South Region) Dr. K. Venkatesham, who issued the orders, termed it as "just an administrative move." However, he refused to explain the reason for the move.
3) "When the coastal police was specifically formed to watch the coast, I don't know why we were stopped from patrolling highly sensitive areas despite intelligence inputs about a possible terrorist strike on the city via the sea," said a coastal police officer, requesting anonymity.

(VIII) *The Indian Express*, Mumbai, 26 November 2008:

1) In a meeting of top bureaucrats, including the NSA, held in the chamber of Union Home Secretary Madhukar Gupta, DGP Maharashtra, AN Roy, asked IB Chief PC Haldar, why the 20 November intelligence alert on a Lashkar-e-Toiba ship, given to the Coast Guard and the Naval Headquarters, was not passed on to the Mumbai Police? Haldar bluntly replied that the Mumbai Police could do nothing on the high seas.
2) On 20 September 2008, *i.e.*, four days after the Marriot Hotel bombing in Islamabad, Joint Director IB alerted the Maharashtra DG that the LeT was planning an attack in Mumbai and identified Taj Mahal Palace Hotel, Vallabbhai Patel Stadium, Sea Rock, or Taj Land's End Hotel, Mumbai Juhu airfield and JW Marriot Hotel as likely targets.
3) In an 18 November 2008 meeting, the U.S. alerted RAW Joint Secretary, AK Dashmana, that an LeT ship was trying to infiltrate into Indian waters. It also gave latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of the vessel. This input was passed on to the IB for dissemination to the respective agencies. Joint Director, Prabhakar Alok, forwarded the input to the Naval Headquarters and the Coast Guard for action.
4) While the Naval headquarters never passed on the intelligence to its sword-arm, the Western Naval Command, the Coast Guard launched a search for a suspected LeT vessel at dawn on 21 November. As the coordinates provided by the U.S. intelligence put the vessel 20-30 miles south of Karachi, the coast guard never found the ship. Its officers not only wrote a letter to IB Jt. Director, Alok, but also called him up in a bid to get more intelligence. Alok promised to revert, but never did.

(IX) *Hindustan Times*, Mumbai, 10 January 2009:

1) Sources in the highest quarters in Delhi have told *Tehelka* that the mobile phone numbers that were used by the Mumbai terrorists were available with the Intelligence Bureau for at least five days prior to 26/11. Highly placed sources shared the contents of a "secret" note that contained 35 mobile phone numbers, 32 out of which were purchased from Kolkata and three from Delhi, by workers of the LeT.
2) The contents of the note were very precise. It read, "These numbers

need to be monitored and the information taken from these numbers regarding the contents of the conversation, current locations and the call detail records are required for further developing the information."

3) These highly placed sources revealed that this crucial piece of information was received by the IB on 21 November, at least five days before Mohammad Ajmal Kasab, the lone surviving terrorist, and his nine accomplices got off the inflatable dinghy at Badhwar Park in the evening of 26/11.

4) For all the four days, the numbers were active, but they were not being monitored. The lapse is all the more critical because at least three of the 35 numbers contained in the secret note were the very same cell numbers that the terrorists, while in Mumbai, used to keep in touch with their handlers in Pakistan.

5) Sources in the PMO reveal that it is only after Kasab and his accomplice Ismail Khan (the 10 had broken up into five pairs) had killed 58 passengers at Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus, after Anti Terrorist Squad Chief, Hemant Karkare, had been shot dead with two other officers, and after the remaining four pairs had lodged themselves at their respective targets – Nariman House, the Taj and Oberoi hotels – that someone in the IB woke up to the fact that it had received a list of mobile phone numbers. Quick calls were then made to Kolkata, the service providers alerted and the blood curdling truth soon hit home – that three of the 35 numbers that ought to have been monitored were being used by the terrorists.

6) It was only after this that the Mumbai Police were alerted and the process of recording the conversations of the said mobile phones began.

7) In this case, in a superb covert operation, Indian forces managed to penetrate the ranks of the Lashkar and *plant* 35 SIM cards on them. But in a terrible communication and execution bungle, the scrupulous follow-up monitoring of the SIMs that should have taken place was not done.

Annexure B

The transcript (only pertaining to the activities at Cama Hospital, Rangabhavan Lane and Girgaum Chowpatty) of the wireless conversation among the Control Room, the CP, the Jt. CP (Crime), DCP Zone-I ACP Girgaum Division and others taken place on 26 November 2008 probably sometime between 10.45 p.m. to 11.30 p.m. as telecast by NDTV India, IBN7 and Aaj Tak TV channels on 7 December 2008.

(I)

(Conversation relating to other parts of the terror attack)

(II)

Control to BDDS (Bomb Detection and Disposal Squad) of Zone II: (in Marathi) Location?

Control to BDDS mobile phone: (in Marathi) Taj Hotel. Some work is going on.

(III)

(Conversation relating to other parts of the terror attack)

(IV)

Control to BDDS: (in Marathi) Are you Going to Chowpatty?

BDDS to Control: (in Marathi) Going to Chowpatty. Peter D.B. Marg [Sr. Police Inspector of D.B. Marg Police Station] has called.

(V)

(Conversation in connection with other parts of the attack)

(VI)

King[CP] to Crime [Jt. CP (Crime)]: The fellows caught at Chowpatty,

need to be immediately interrogated.

Crime to King: Noted Sir, There are two fellows; apparently who are caught there. This is what we are told. I have directed a team. If you permit, sir, I will bring them to the Crime Branch and I will interrogate them here, sir.

King: Roger, What is the location of Victor [The Chief of the ATS (Hemant Karkare)] and East Region [Addl. CP East region (Ashok Kamate)] and what is the situation about central region [Addl. CP, Central Region (Sadanand Datey)]

Crime: Central region [Datey] is in Cama Hospital. East region [Ashok Kamate] is coming to SB1 office.

King: What about Victor [Hemant Karkare]?

Crime: He …….. Hemant was at CST railway station. I will find out his location and ask him to get in touch with you right away.

King: Whether East region [Kamate] and Victor [Karkare] are injured or are they safe? And similarly whether Central region [Datey] has got any medical aid? Similarly whether all other injured people have been provided with medical aid?

Crime: I am trying to do that. There was a report that there was firing on East region's [Kamate's] vehicle, but nobody was injured. But Central region [Datey] I am not able to get through. As soon as I get through, I will get back to you.

King: Send rescue party immediately to rescue him.

Crime: Already done, Sir. Addl. CP Crime and three units of Crime Branch are doing the entire job.

(VII)

(Conversation concerning other parts of the attack)

(VIII)

Able Girgaum [ACP Girgaum Division]to South control and all concerned: (in Marathi) Both, the person now injured and the dead person have been sent to Nair hospital.

South Control: (in Marathi) Are they terrorists?

Able Girgaum: They did not obey our orders. They went ahead. One of them fired at our policemen. They are terrorists only.

(IX)

(Conversation regarding other matters)

(X)

Crime calling King: DB Marg, that is Chowpatty, both of them are dead. DCP Detector I just reported. Both of them have been shot dead. They came out from a Skoda car, firing. Our people retaliated; both of them have been shot dead.

Reading References

① The Riddles of Hinduism — Babasaheb Ambedkar

② (Article) 9 is not 11 and September is not November — Arundhuty Roy